















Financial and Currency Crises:  
Contagion and Welfare Costs  
in Emerging Markets 
 


























PhD in Economics  
















I declare that: 
 
This thesis has been composed by me under the supervision of Dr. Richard Holt and Dr. 
Andrew Snell from the University of Edinburgh; the work is my own and it has not been 
submitted for any other degree or professional qualification. 
 













Crises in emerging markets during the 1990’s pose a challenge to understand why economies with apparently 
strong fundamentals did face severe devaluations and severe disruption in their functioning. We study three 
different aspects of crises:  
 
i) Contagion is defined as the possibility of a domestic financial or currency crisis to 
spread to other countries. We study the 1990’s crises and introduce a new measure for 
defining financial crises and isolating their impact on currency crises and vice versa;  
 
ii) During the 1990’emerging countries in crises suffered severe adjustments in the 
level of consumption. We build on Lucas’s measure of welfare loss and derive a more 
comprehensive measure that includes: total loss; loss related to changes in consumption 
growth rate; to volatility of consumption; and, to changes in the level of consumption;  
 
iii) Trying to explain the behaviour of consumption after crises in emerging markets 
during the 1990’s we found contradicting theoretical approaches and empirical results. 
We solve the model of intertemporal maximisation of consumption assuming that 
agents maximise over several periods at a time. We extend the intertemporal framework 
to include the decision of participating not only in the loanable funds market but in 
other financial assets and derive the solution for a stock market. The results imply an 
alternative to the specification of the Euler equation for consumption with more 
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Prologue: Why should we care about crises? 
 
 
A horse! A horse! 
My kingdom for a horse! 
Richard III, 5.4. 
William Shakespeare 
 
“Oh, hush thee, my babe, granny’s bought some 
shares 
Daddy’s gone out to play with the bulls and the 
bears 
Mother’s buying on tips, and she simply can’t lose, 
And Baby shall have some expensive shoes” 




The purpose of this prologue is to give a historical perspective on currency and financial 
crises. From apparently isolated events, crises have evolved to become events of possible global 
impact not only in their occurrence but as well in their effects. Understanding the mechanisms 
by which a crisis can spread from one country to another and the welfare costs that it imposes to 
the economy can provide with the policy instruments to prevent and to react accordingly to 
minimise the negative impact it may have. The main body of the work focuses on three main 
aspects of crises: the first one is the identification of possible causes of currency and financial 
instability. This part discusses the issues of contagion, interdependence, performance of leading 
indicators and the possible feedback between financial and currency markets. Secondly, the 
measure of welfare costs have been often set aside by the literature, although there are several 
attempts to measure the costs of crises, these efforts address fiscal impact, losses of 
international reserves and micro-level studies in income and expenditure rather than welfare 
proper. We derive a comprehensive measure of welfare costs which include the different effects 
on the behaviour of consumption; we build up on Lucas (1987) and take into account not only 
effects on the growth rate and volatility of consumption but on the level as well. Finally, we 
attempt to explain the behaviour of consumption by re-examining the intertemporal 
consumption framework and expanding it to explain not only decisions in the loanable funds 
market but in other asset markets. An important result is that under this approach the Euler 
equation for consumption needs to be modified to include the effects of wage and portfolio 
holdings and monetary policy through the real interest rate has a more complex impact than 
previously thought. The objectives of the research, the structure of the work and an outline of 
the principal contributions are to be found at the introduction.  
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Financial and currency crises have been part of the History of monetary and financial 
markets. Whenever there have been assets to trade, whatever their form (Quetzal feathers, salt, 
carved stone, tulips, real estate, coins, printed currency, debt or stocks) there have been 
unexpected events, excessive needs for funding, mismanagement, honest mistakes or plain fraud 
which may trigger a crisis and alter the functioning of these markets. For example, Williams 
(1997) explains the process by which after four centuries of monetary stability, by the third 
century AD the Roman Empire had to degrade the silver standard of the coinage because of 
uncontrolled monetary expansion needed to finance the running and expansion of the Empire 
and because of the exhaustion of silver mines in Spain. The consequence was a debasement of 
the coinage and inflation. A rough illustration of this process can be seen in the increase of the 





This process can be hardly considered a crisis by today’s standards, when information flows 
instantly from one corner of the world to another and the time for reaction to these events has to 
be almost instant. However, the depletion of reserves (in the form of silver supply); a 
government deficit (to keep running an overstretched bureaucracy and huge military expenses) 
and the use of monetary expansion to finance it; and finally, inflation, are still ingredients in the 
modern world for a currency or a financial crisis.  
 
There is a long way from the outbreak of inflation in the Roman Empire and the 
Argentinean crisis in 2001 but these episodes have always appealed to the imagination not only 
of academic circles but of the general public. The sudden realisation of the value of a kingdom 
in terms of a more useful horse in battle (the real estate asset vs. the liquid asset is what 
Kindleberger (2000) characterises as the manic and panic phases of a financial crisis) is an 
amusing way to think about the presence of these episodes in Literature; but more seriously, 
Alexander Dumas’s The Count of Monte Cristo provides with an ample recount of common 
financial speculation projects available during the 19th century. When Edmund Dantes, in his 
role of the revengeful Count, talks Mr. Danglars into investing in several projects that range 
from silver mines in Peru and Mexico to farms in Siberia is just portraying the investment 
opportunities and the artificial bubbles that were taking place during the 1800’s. If this is 
thought to be just a curiosity of the period, Dumas describes a typical bank run caused by the 
sudden realisation of the public that the capitalisation of the Danglars Bank is not enough to 
Reign Amount per annum 
Julius Caesar (c. 46 BC) 225 denarii 
Domitian (AD 81-96) 300 denarii 
Septimus Severus (AD 193-211) 600 denarii 
Caracalla (AD 211-217) 900 denarii 
Maximinus (AD 235-238) 1,800 denarii 
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cover the totality of deposits, phenomenon that still can happen in today’s banking systems. 
And to complete the picture of financial misfortunes, Monte Cristo circulates false information 
into the French stock market about the capacity of the Spanish government to fulfil the payment 
of outstanding bonds, forcing the prices to fall because investors are exhibiting herding 
behaviour; when truthful news were known, the prices of the bonds returned to their 
fundamental level.  
 
 Along history and with the development of financial markets and integration of economies 
through commerce, these episodes have become more sophisticated in terms of technology 
advance in designing new type of assets and communications; they happen faster, from the 
beginning to the end it can be just matter of hours to have a global impact; but the most 
worrying feature of financial and currency crises is that, when they happen, they can disrupt the 
normal functioning of a country’s economy, unbalance the international financial system and 
impose large welfare costs to the general public even if they do not participate directly (or even 
indirectly) in financial markets. We have to make a brief review of some of the historical crises 
in financial markets in order to understand how we arrived to the complexities of the 1990’s and 
the crises that affected emerging countries with apparently successful economic and financial 
reforms.  
P.1.Bubbles and manias: modern panics in the beginning 
 
Here we briefly discuss some of the most famous financial crises that constitute typical 
examples of these phenomena. We start with the Tulip-mania and the South Sea Bubble 
bursting; both can be thought as modern panics in financial assets, one happening in the 
commodities market (as strange it may sound today, trading of futures of tulips is not different 
to trade in futures of oil, live stock or orange juice in modern times) and the other in the real 
estate market (which several authors point to be at the hub of the Thai crisis in 1998).   
 P.1.1.Tulip-mania (1636-1637) 
 
Kindleberger (2000) explains that the tulip arrived to Holland from Turkey in 1593 and it 
became a symbol of status and wealth. Some of the tulips exhibited flame patterns that make 
them unique and as a consequence these specimens (at the beginning it was thought to be a 
species) were highly valued.  These patterns, seen in the spring of 1636, increased the price of 
tulips in the market and were the trigger of the “mania” in September of the same year. 
However, between September and January of 1637 there were no specimens in display (because 
the season for lifting the flower was in June) therefore, the asset in this case is the promise of 
flamed flowers in a future date. The mosaics were thought to be a ‘fundamental’ value to the 
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asset and it traded as that; however, being a disease1 and not a mutation they were not 
genetically bicoloured varieties (which exist but with predictable patterns). During this period, 
the bulbs traded effectively as any financial contract future, trying to buy low and to sell high 
without the bulb being planted.  
 
The end of this tulip-mania came to an end when the tulips were planted and two things 
happened: i) tulips were not scarce anymore, in fact they became excessively common; because, 
ii) the disease was not genetically transmitted from one generation to another. With perfect 
information, the market realised that tulips were greatly overpriced above their fundamental 
value and the market crashed in a selling frenzy of worthless bulbs.   
P.1.2.The Mississippi and South Seas Bubbles (1720) 
 
The South Sea and the Mississippi bubbles share the similar feature of company’s share 
prices soaring and then crashing. Each episode had a different underlying asset though. For the 
South Sea Company it was trade with South America while for the Compagnie d’Occident it 
was the proposal of switching from gold and silver into paper.  The South Sea Company and the 
Compagnie d’Occident sought rapid expansion of its balance sheet through corporate takeovers 
and/or acquisition of government debt financed with successive issues of stock.  
 
Garber (1990) explains the process by which John Law created the Compagnie d’Occident; 
Law argued that any investment project could be financed by the issuance of high powered 
money which would be absorbed by the increase of money demand that would come from the 
income and wealth effects of the project once completed; the liabilities represented by the 
emission of convertible instruments would be backed by the profits of the company. Law’s 
monetary theory was that printing money would boost investment and commerce, therefore he 
authorised the Banque Royale the issuance of notes linked with the emission of stock. However, 
Kindleberger (2000) argues that the equivalence between bonds and shares as money is a fallacy 
and soon investors started to redeem shares in the form of gold putting pressure on Law’s 
scheme.  Law reacted by pegging the price of shares and paying with money at a fixed rate, 
doubling in one month the quantity of legal tender in circulation. After several devaluations in 
order to combat the resulting inflation, the share price fell to 2,000 livres by September 1720 
and to 1,000 livres by December, by September 1721 it was back to 500 livres per share.  
 
                                                 
1 The College of Agricultural, Consumer and Environmental Sciences of the University of Illinois 
explains the symptoms that a tulip presents when it is affected by a virus; “tulip breaking” as it is called, 
consists in the appearance of dark patterns on lighter coloured background (mosaics). 
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The South Sea Company failed because it was based on the assumption that Great Britain 
would be granted permission by Spain to commerce with its colonies and obtain a monopoly. 
However, the Spanish policy throughout its colonies in America was to control tightly all trade 
in and out the continent and this permission was never granted. The Company’s strategy was to 
convert government debt into shares. According to Garber (1990) prices of company’s shares in 
January 1720 were 120 pounds per share, 950 pounds in July and finally 290 pounds in October. 
The insiders and management of the company knew that the company and the government 
could not afford the liquidation of shares and started selling after realising capital gains before 
the second payment to shareholders was due. Kindleberger (2000) explains this bubble as a 
variant of a Ponzi game that was attainable as long as share prices rose indefinitely in order to 
finance the payments to shareholders since the trade aspects of the company were inexistent.   
 
P.2. The 20th Century: Citius, Altius, Fortius 
 
The 20th century witnessed the most rapid advances in technology than in the rest of Human 
History. International relations, trade and financial markets have benefited from the advances in 
telecommunications (from the first underwater telegraph cables passing through the wireless up 
to satellite communications); it has never been easier to transfer information from one place to 
another. This as convenient as it is, poses risks to the functioning of international markets, the 
crash in 1987 was blamed to the automated stop-loss orders that spiralled out of control and 
herding behaviour is more likely to appear when there is little time to react to news. On the 
other hand, the amount of international assets held by countries has never been higher, USD 
37,888 billions in 2003 according to figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
database. This integration of capital markets allowed emerging countries to have access to more 
resources of funding for investment. However, because of the amount of resources and the high 
mobility of capital, when things go wrong, a sudden stop and/or a reverse in capital flows can 
produce deep recessions with important loss of output, welfare costs and decrease the 
opportunities and conditions to achieve a stable growth.  
 
P.2.1.The Great Crash (1929)  
 
Starting in October 24th, the “Black Thursday” and passing through the “Black Monday” 
and finally the “Black Tuesday”, October 28th and 29th, the Great Crash constitutes perhaps the 
stereotype of a financial crisis. With a fall of 12.8% of the Dow Jones index on Monday 28th this 
crisis marked the sharpest fall in the index up till then and for another 30 years. Rivers of ink 
have been devoted to recount the events leading to the crash of the New York Stock Exchange 
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(NYSE). Three great accounts of the crash have been written by Galbraith (1954), Morgan-
Witts (1979) and Steele-Gordon (1999) not only about the events in the stock market but about 
the American society and the general mood surrounding the events so we will only provide a 
brief glimpse of the events around the Crash.  
 
In 1928, President Coolidge was optimistic about the perspectives of the American 
economy and the boom of the NYSE was being fuelled by low interest rates and the good 
investment prospects. Speculation played an important role as well, this was a largely 
unregulated market where short sales (bear strategy in which someone sells borrowed stock for 
which the seller will pay later for it in the hope that the price will fall), bear raids (a group of 
sellers start selling short in order to push the price down and benefit from the price fall), 
syndicates (groups of investors that manipulate the prices selling and buying among themselves) 
and corners (syndicates would buy all the floating stock secretly and then impose prices once 
the market is ‘cornered’) were day to day operations and that, as Steele-Gordon (1999) 
documents, were already in use during the Tulip-mania. Hence, despite the belief that the 
episode was an anomalous misfortune that hit the USA, the resulting boom of Wall Street was 
nothing else but a speculative bubble. One thing is certain and it is that this crisis constitutes the 
first one in which technology accelerated the rate of events and once the process started, it took 
only 3 days to erase the value of 5 billion USD out of the stock market. Because of the volume 
traded, during the three days of crash, the teletypes carrying the information with stock prices 
started running with one and a half and two hours lag adding to the confusion and the 
uncertainty.  
P.2.2.Farewell to Bretton Woods: The end of stability 
 
According to Cohen (1977), in July 1944 at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, 45 countries 
met to discuss the post-war conditions for the recovery of Europe and several monetary issues. 
Between them was the stability of exchange rates to avoid unexpected fluctuations; the Bretton 
Woods Agreement established an international monetary system of convertible currencies, fixed 
exchange rates and free trade based on the convertibility of currencies into gold. The objective 
was to avoid violent fluctuations like the ones experienced after World War I and to impose 
monetary and fiscal discipline to the participating countries (similar to the Euro scheme). As 
fundamental parts of this new system the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) were established. The 
IMF was the monetary moderator that held deposits in gold, US Dollars and national currencies. 
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These subscriptions were set according to the share in international commerce and the paying 
capacity of the country2.  
 
However, within the Bretton Woods system the pre-eminence of the US Dollar turned out to 
be its downfall. Cohen (1977) describes in detail the events leading to the abandonment of the 
Agreement. After a brief period of surplus in the trade balance in 1957 because of the closure of 
the Suez Canal, the US plunged into continued deficits that pressured the dollar to be devalued. 
Additional pressure came from the fact that the US had liabilities that exceeded its gold 
reserves. The problem that the rest of the world faced was that speculation against the dollar 
depended on the elimination of deficits; however, the availability of USD depended on the US 
continued trade deficits and because of these there was a problem of trust in the ability of the 
US to convert USD into gold. After several negotiations and attempts to disincentive the 
speculation against the dollar, President Nixon asked for a realignment of international 
currencies to eliminate the overvaluation of the currency. On August 15th 1971, the US 
suspended the gold convertibility of the dollar and let the currency to adjust according to its 
market value. The abandonment of convertibility implied the adoption of floating exchange 
rates and of domestic monetary and fiscal policies not necessarily compatible with the stability 
of the currencies. Several countries adopted fixed exchange rates but without the backing of an 
international system, only on their own reserves opening the possibility of speculative attacks 
against their currencies. Other adopted, mainly developed countries, flexible exchange rates. It 
was not until the European monetary union was adopted that a similar international coordination 
effort was seriously adopted.  
P.2.3. Debt crises in less developed countries (LDC) 
 
On August 12th, 1982 the Mexican minister of finance informed the US Treasury and the 
IMF that Mexico was unable to meet its obligation to service its debt for USD 80 billion. By 
October 1983, 27 countries with a total of USD 239 billion of debt had already rescheduled their 
debts. This chain of debt defaults threatened 8 of the largest US banks with failure. The lending 
boom to less developed countries started with the rise in oil prices during the 1970’s and the 
average growth of LDC averaged 6% during this period, even the Mexican President José López 
Portillo stated in 1977 during the annual presidential address to Congress “These are times to 
learn to manage the abundance”.  
 
By 1979 the servicing of debt represented already 30% of the value of exports, while Brazil 
presented a debt-service ratio of 60% (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation FDIC, 1997). One 
                                                 
2 Sources: World Bank and IMF 
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explanation of the Latin American debt crisis that started in 1982 refers to the fiscal deficits 
incurred by most of the major countries in the region. According to Wiesner (1985) between 
1979 and 1982, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico more than doubled the size of their non-financial 
public sector deficits from 6% to over 15%. But together with fiscal expansion, the financing of 
this expansion has to be pointed as a major cause, instead of financing with direct investment 
and access to capital markets, the governments of these countries used international debt to 
finance their expenditure. According to figures of the IMF (in Wiesner, 1985), domestic savings 
and investment as percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) were declining. 
 
Savings and Investment  
(As percentage of GDP) 
Source: IMF 
 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Argentina     
Gross domestic 
investment 
25.7 20.0 18.1 17.1 
National savings 21.1 16.2 13.0 13.3 
External savings 3.1 3.8 5.0 3.8 
Brazil     
Gross domestic 
investment 
21.1 19.2 18.4 15.0 
National savings 16.0 15.1 12.9 12.0 
External savings 5.1 4.1 5.5 3.0 
Mexico     
Gross domestic 
investment 
28.1 29.0 21.2 16.5 
National savings 24.0 23.2 17.8 20.2 
External savings 4.1 5.8 3.4 -3.7 
 
However, the world recession and high international interest rates contributed to the 
aggravation of the situation. The external financing allowed the appreciation of the currencies 
creating fears of devaluations that triggered an outflow of capital and the dollarisation of 
economies. The attempt by the US to curb the inflation caused by high oil prices by increasing 
interest rates, and the subsequent increase in the LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) rates 
made the debt services hard to meet. This crisis was fuelled by the belief that growth was finally 
stable and permanent. However, Wiesner (1985) argues that the availability of resources was 
flawed in two ways: i) it was used to finance consumption instead of investment; and, ii) instead 
of attracting more resources from capital markets, the financing continued to be via debt 
contracting. Risk sharing is not the same in debt markets where the country is committed to pay 
a certain amount to service the debt than in capital markets, where the investor assumes the risk 
of the loss. However, countries like Mexico were following a policy of protection of trade and 
domestic investors while maintaining a repressed financial system which in the facts meant that 
the only agent in the economy with access to international funds was the government. All these 
factors determined most of the reforms to be implemented during the next decade, liberalisation 
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of markets, free trade agreements and structural reforms. However, as is the topic of this 
dissertation, these efforts ended up not in a debt market & currency crisis but in a financial 
system & currency crisis.  
P.2.4. The Great Crash II (1987) 
 
Monday October 19th 1987 set a new loss record in the NYSE. The Dow Jones lost 22.6% in 
a single day the biggest loss since the Black Monday in 1929. Prior to the crisis, the stock 
market experienced a bull market episode fuelled by hostile takeovers, mergers and leveraged 
buyouts which were financed with junk bonds. Initial public offers (IPO’s) were being used to 
finance all kinds of investment, especially those related to the relatively new market of 
computers. The swift rise of stock prices raised concerns about a crash as it happened in 1929. 
There were other indicators that increased these concerns, interest rates were rising and a sell 
out of US Treasury bonds by the Nippon Telephone and Telegraph contributed to the rise of 
interest rates above 10%. The high interest rates, threats of currency devaluation by the Treasury 
Secretary, a large trade deficit and other events shattered the confidence in the stock market and 
on Friday October 16th it fell 17.5% the biggest drop recorded till that day.  
 
The next chain of events revealed a feature of globalisation and technology: contagion. On 
Monday as markets started to open from east to west heavy falls in local stock markets: Japan, 
Hong Kong, Singapore and London fell as they opened. However, when the turn of Wall Street 
to open arrived, the sharpest fall of all occurred. Only 25 shares of the Standard & Poor’s 500 
continued trading while the rest didn’t have any buy orders. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
where derivatives are traded followed suit (Steele-Gordon, 1999). At the hub of the crash were 
the adoption of out-of-time portfolio insurance strategies (by selling futures an investor can 
insure the portfolio against changes in prices, when it is done at the moment of a plunge the 
only effect is the collapse of derivatives’ markets) and program trading. At the time, computers 
had been recently put in charge of balancing and rebalancing portfolios in real time, information 
about prices and traded volumes is received and the computer decides the optimal composition 
of the portfolio; while in 1929 the teletypes lagged with the transmission of information adding 
to the uncertainty, in 1987 the constant flow of information translated into massive sells when 
automatic stop-loss orders were executed and prices spiralled down triggering more and more 
sell orders. Hillebrand (2004) tests Black’s hypothesis about the causes of the crash; this 
hypothesis states that a correction in the mean reversion process of the stocks is in place when 
the true size of portfolio insurance becomes known, that is asymmetric information that is 
revealed. However, the result of this test is that on the day of the crash there was only a 7% of 
probability of a crash greater than 20%. Schiller’s (1987) findings in a survey realised after the 
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crash revealed that portfolio insurance played only a small role in the execution of stop-loss 
orders and did not play the central role predicted by the Black hypothesis.  
 
The UK Treasury analysis of the crash recognises that the response of US companies after 
the plunge helped to support the market, these companies bought back their own shares. In 
Tokyo, the long term investing institutions provided buying support prompted by the Ministry 
of Finance (HM Treasury, 2005). Additional measures included the lowering of interest rates 
and the injection of liquidity to the economy by increasing the money supply. In a sharp contrast 
to 1929 when the financial market took 22 years to recover the level before the crash the panic 
ended swiftly and the market recovered its previous level in two years.  
P.3. Conclusions of the prologue 
 
Summing up, if there is an asset that, due to an external shock, its fundamental value is 
thought to be increased permanently, its price is going to adjust upwards to reflect this change. 
Once complete information is revealed and turns out that the shock was temporarily, a price 
adjustment downwards is necessary. A crash may appear when the asset holders react at the 
same time without the market being able to absorb the sell orders. This process will be detailed 
in the body of the work, but for now this description can be applied to any market that faces a 
mania (or bubble) doesn’t matter if its tulips in 1636, real estate in 1929 or financial derivatives 
in 1987.  
 
In this prologue we wanted to make the reader aware that financial crises, in either of their 
forms, and currency crises are part of the functioning of economies; even if in developed 
countries it is hard to imagine the devastating consequences that these phenomena can have and 
the impact in wealth distribution, impoverishment and welfare that emerging countries had to 
face. This account is by not means exhaustive, Steele-Gordon (1999), Mackay (1841), Galbraith 
(1954 and 1975) give much more detailed examples of financial distress along history. 
Technology advances have only made crises faster, deeper and with potential global effects.  
Introduction 




The main objective of this work is to analyse three main aspects of currency and financial 
crises during the 1990’s:  
 
1. Measuring contagion and the interaction between financial and currency crises; 
2. Measuring welfare costs; and,  
3. To provide with a theoretical explanation of consumption behaviour.  
 
In order to do so, we have first to understand and define what constitutes a crisis. During the 
process of doing this research the first question that came up was, when do we face a crisis? It 
turned out that answering this question was like defining bad weather, an elusive concept that 
everybody talks about but it is difficult to describe. Therefore Chapter 1 tries to give a 
comprehensive overview of the theoretical and empirical research on this field; we discuss 
different theoretical approaches and models that try to explain currency and financial crises. 
Most of the literature treats these phenomena as separate events; in other words, we find 
currency crises models and financial crises models with several distinctions within each type of 
crisis. We provide some of the pros and cons of each kind of model in order to obtain a working 
definition for our empirical work.  
 
According to Kurgan (1979) first generation models of currency crises find that they can 
occur because of inconsistent and unsustainable government policies. These models explain 
fairly accurately crises experienced by Latin American countries in the late 1970’s and early 
1980’s. However crises in the 1990’s in emerging countries in South East Asia and Latin 
America happened in countries that were undergoing reforms that provided with sound 
macroeconomic fundamentals, liberalisation of financial markets and integration to the world 
economy. On the other hand, banking crises á-la Diamond-Dybvig (1983) were not the main 
characteristic of problems in the banking sector. Allen and Gale (2000) describe the usual 
sequence of events in this new type of crisis: problems in the banking sector that are followed 
by a currency crises that feedbacks and deepens the banking crisis. However, the banking 
system has not been the first cause of the twin crisis; instead, the common cause is usually a fall 
in asset values due to a slowdown in the economy. We also provide a review of the empirical 
work that has be done in this field; this literature, which constitutes the bulk of studies of 
financial and currency crises, has focused on the process and early warning indicators that may 
help to forecast a crisis. Chapter 2 presents an overview of the events that took place during the 
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Mexican, Brazilian, South East Asian, Russian and Argentinean crises and we study the 
common factors that may help to understand what happened in these countries.  
 
Chapter 3 analyses the phenomenon of contagion by applying the recent developments by 
Pesaran and Pick (2005) to the IMF data that we used in this research; this methodology not 
only allows establishing the presence of contagion but as well identifies the main 
macroeconomic that may help to explain these crises. We developed and included a measure of 
the Financial Market Pressure (FMP) in order to capture the possible effect of a financial crisis 
on a currency crisis. We found that there is no consistent role of fundamentals previous to these 
crises but that financial crises feedback on currency crises and vice-versa, consistently. 
 
A less developed field is the measurement of the costs imposed by economic disruption and 
the welfare loss after a twin crisis. In chapter 4 we review Lucas’s (1987) methodology which 
measures the welfare loss of separate changes in the growth rate and volatility of consumption. 
We modify this measure in order to include changes in the level of consumption as the ones 
observed in several countries during the 1990’s and we obtain a single measure that captures:  
 
1. Total welfare loss;  
2. Welfare loss due to changes in level of consumption;  
3. Welfare loss due to changes in the growth rate of consumption; and, 
4. Welfare loss due to changes in the volatility of consumption.  
 
We found that the most important welfare effects are linked to the growth rate in the long 
run and the level of consumption in the short run whereas volatility has a small or no impact on 
welfare losses.   
 
Finally, Chapter 5 studies the impact of policy options available to counter the effects of the 
crises on consumption; we need a framework that can explain the behaviour of consumption. 
We found that the Obstfeld and Rogoff (1999) approach based on the original work done by 
Lucas (1987) does not explain the idiosyncrasies of crises during the 1990’s and that the Euler 
equation approach is not enough to explain consumption behaviour, therefore we go back to 
basics to describe consumption within the intertemporal maximisation framework and to derive 
a consumption path equilibrium.  We drop one assumption of the Euler approach solution, 
which is that individuals maximise an infinite number of two-period sequential problems and 
instead we analyse the case for which individuals maximise over lengthier periods of time (the 
extreme being a single maximisation problem with infinite periods); this implies that the 
intertemporal budget constraint always binds.  This approach explains some puzzles in the 
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behaviour of consumption regarding the impact of monetary policy, mainly that a change in the 
interest rate has a negative impact on the level of consumption in the short run and a positive 
one in the growth rate on the long run and improves on the estimation by including income as 
an explanatory variable in an expanded version of the Euler equation.  
 
We also recognise that this problem only deals with the loanable funds market and while 
useful to analyse potential crises and credit crunches in the banking system, it does not address 
the behaviour of other financial assets’ markets. Therefore we apply a simple optimisation 
problem to allocate wealth between consumption and a financial asset that follows a binomial 
stochastic behaviour. Applying the results for the individual to a market structure such as the 
one proposed by Emmons and Schmid (2002) we can model the behaviour of a financial market 
where:  
 
1. Asset mispricing is the result of the errors in the appreciation of the unknown 
probabilities of each state of nature.  
2. The market price of the asset includes the information from full-information 
investors and noise traders. 
3. The ask-bid gap depends on the proportion of noise traders in the market.  
4. Changes in the risk free interest rate have a negative effect on consumption.  
5. A rational bubble appears when the asset is overvalued and it is optimal for both 
types of traders to sell at the higher price. In a sequential framework, this market 
frenzy can lead to a bursting bubble and a crisis. Additionally, there is an impact on 
goods prices; therefore an overvalued asset market spills over an increase of goods 
prices. If we link this effect to an open economy we may end up with pressure over 
the currency market and facing the probability of devaluation.   
 
Each chapter contains an introduction that explains in more detail as well as the relevant 
conclusions obtained. Finally, there is a set of global conclusions that complement and 
summarise the ones within each part. Recurring, sudden and deep financial and currency crises 
are phenomena that countries like Mexico want to avoid because of their negative impact on 
welfare, growth and wealth distribution.  
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Chapter 1: Currency and financial crises; defining bad 
weather 
 
Bud Fox: …there are no many takers; the stock is 
plummeting… 
Gordon Gekko: …I am losing millions... 
Bud Fox: …the bid is … going down.  Gordon. 
What do you want to do? 
Gekko: Dump it 
Dialogue in Oliver Stone’s Wall Street (1987) 
 
How could I have been so mistaken as to have 
trusted the experts? 




During the 1990’s several countries carried out structural reforms in order to eliminate fiscal 
imbalances, reduce inflation and achieve higher growth rates. In some countries these reforms 
were part of a long-term effort towards industrialising and developing the economy (South East 
Asia and Russia) and in others (mainly all countries in Latin America) they were aimed to 
wards preventing the occurrence of the hitherto recurrent speculative attacks and currency 
crises. According to Tirole (2002) these initially successful reforms were followed by dramatic 
financial and currency crises with economic contractions often compared with the Great 
Depression.   
 
The literature produced after these episodes is vast and has tried to provide some answers to 
the problems posed by the sudden crises affecting countries with undergoing economic reforms. 
Tirole (2002) argues that these crises in emerging markets have shattered the consensus among 
economists not only with regard to the benefits of capital liberalisation or structural reforms in 
emerging countries but also regarding the nature and causes of these crises. As a first step, it is 
important to define clearly what is meant by the term “crisis” and be aware that a financial crisis 
does not imply per se a currency crisis since it can happen in a closed economy, however it may 
be the case that opening the economy may increase the probability of a financial crisis occurring 
by providing investors with a wider range of assets (i.e. foreign currencies) to hedge risk. In 
other words when a country opens its economy, not only foreign capital can be pulled out but 
also domestic investors can find relatively safer returns in foreign markets and may have the 
incentives to disinvest in the domestic financial markets. Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) highlight 
that depending on the object of the analysis, the literature has identified a currency crisis with 
devaluation from a “hard peg” (i.e. fixed or crawling peg) or with an extreme value of an 
exchange rate pressure indicator; a stock market crisis with a sharp fall in the stock market 
index or with an upsurge in the volatility of asset prices; and, a banking crisis with a collapse in 
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the ratio of non-performing assets to total assets, the closure of failure of important banking 
institutions, the occurrence of major bail-outs, large scale nationalisations of banks or 
widespread bank runs.   
 
Section 1 of this chapter surveys the macroeconomic feedback and asymmetric information 
models of financial and currency crises. The first approach studies different interactions 
between macroeconomic fundamentals, the external sector and the financial system. The other 
approach focuses on asymmetric information and market imperfections that can trigger a 
financial crisis at any given time. As we will see, policy implications are quite different and 
involve a mixture of policy actions that should be effective to prevent a crisis. However, some 
of them were in place or being implemented at the time of these crises. This indicates that these 
recent crises need to be studied more in-depth as Tirole (2002) clearly points out. Studying the 
debt market allows to understand the analysis of the borrower-lender relationship in a broader 
way than the usual bank-depositor approach; the latter ignores the developments in financial 
theory such as the possibility of diversification, self-insurance and immunisation of liabilities.  
 
Deposit contracts and bank runs are far from being at the hub of recent crises. It is more 
likely that firms with high leverage faced early liquidation of debt (either in secondary markets 
or by direct claims for repayment of loans) due to increased risk in the economy and that the 
efforts made by governments to provide the investors with short-term attractive yields 
denominated in foreign currency increased those risks rather than correct them. This do not 
imply that bank based lending is not relevant in a financial crisis; on the contrary in most of the 
cases the weaknesses of the banking system has been a consequence of the previous currency 
crisis. But these weaknesses are to be found in the asset side of the balance sheet, non-
performing loans and low recovery have placed the banking systems in financial distress. In 
other words, liquidity shortages in the banking system come from deterioration of asset quality 
and not from an initial run on deposits as this literature implies. As Tirole (2002) mentions, 
there is a necessity for going back to basics in order to think over again the consequences of 
economic reform and understand where did these countries fail.  
1.1. Crisis!!!.... But, what is a crisis?  
 
There is a consensus that crises during the 1990’s were not caused by bad economic policies 
or by an unsustainable growth of the money supply and/or uncontrolled inflation. On the 
contrary, these economies were implementing stabilisation programmes that were considered as 
promising and these countries offered good investing opportunities as the large capital inflows 
suggest. Figures from the World Bank database show that net capital inflows as part of GDP 
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represented 9.4% in Brazil (1992-95); 25.8% in Chile (1989-95); 9.3% in Korea (1991-95); 
45.8% in Malaysia; 27.1% in Mexico (1989-94); and, 51.5% in Thailand (1988-95). For these 
countries, access to international financial markets meant access to creditors with short 
investment horizons requiring relatively secure investments (such as pension and mutual funds). 
The use of short-term maturities and dollar denominated debt were two important factors that 
put pressure on the ability of both private and public sectors to face their liabilities in case of 
withdrawal of these funds. 
 
Eichengreen and Rose (1999) point out that the output costs of currency and banking 
crises can be a year or more of economic growth, and only the resolution costs of banking crises 
have often been the equivalent of two or more years of Gross National Product (GNP) growth. 
As capital becomes increasingly mobile, the severity and persistence of the consequences of a 
crisis of either type have grown as the recent experiences in Asia and Latin America show. 
Tornell (2001) describes the boom-bust cycle experienced by Mexico and Thailand as typical of 
countries undergoing twin currency and banking crises. Typically, prior to such a crisis, an 
economy experiences: i) a lending boom, along which bank credit to the private sector grows 
unusually quickly; and, ii) an appreciation of the real exchange rate. When a twin crisis occurs, 
the real exchange depreciates and the banking system fails. Tornell (2001) highlights the fact 
that that such a failure is not caused by a run on banks by depositors, but rather by a sharp 
deterioration in the bank’s loan portfolio. In the aftermath of a crisis, the consequences are 
usually: i) a recession, which is typically short-lived (GDP usually recovers its growth in the 
second year after the crisis); and, ii) a long-lived credit crunch that develops parallel to an 
expansion in GDP. This credit crunch mainly affects households and small and medium-sized 
firms in the non-tradable sector.  
 
In this section we try to give a definition of what it is considered to be a crisis and the 
different types of crises that can occur in the economy. A more in depth discussion of the 
models that have been developed to explain crises will be presented in section 2 of this chapter.  
1.1.1. Financial crises. 
 
To define financial crises we need to identify the sector that is initially affected by them. A 
‘financial system’ includes domestic banks and other financial entities that perform bank-like 
operations (intermediation of resources between lenders and borrowers) such as insurance 
companies, stock exchange institutions, savings and loans, etc., as well as a central bank that is 
committed to act as lender of last resort. According to Mishkin (1991), monetarists beginning 
with Friedman and Schwartz (1963) have linked financial crises with banking panics. A banking 
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crisis refers to a situation in which actual or potential bank runs or failures induce banks to 
suspend the internal convertibility of their liabilities or which compels the government to 
intervene to prevent this by extending assistance on a large scale. A banking crisis may be so 
extensive as to acquire systemic proportions. Systemic financial crises are potentially severe 
disruptions of financial markets that, by impairing markets’ ability to function effectively can 
have large adverse effects on the real economy.  These authors stress the importance of banking 
panics because they perceive them as a major source of contractions in the money supply, which 
in turn, have lead to severe contractions in aggregate economic activity in the United States; 
hence, under this view a financial crisis only takes place if there is the possibility of a banking 
panic and as consequence a sharp decline in the money supply.  
 
Kindlberger (1978) and Minsky (1972) outline a broader view; financial crises either 
involve sharp declines in asset prices, failures of large financial and non-financial firms, 
deflations or disinflations, disruptions in foreign exchange markets or some combination of all 
of these. With a similar view, according to the G-103 Working Party on Financial Consolidation 
a ‘financial crisis’ is defined as “an event that will trigger a loss in economic value or 
confidence in a substantial portion of the financial system that is serious enough to… have 
significant adverse effects on the real economy” and “systemic risk” as the probability of a 
crisis occurring. One of the problems associated with these views is that they do not supply with 
a rigorous definition of what characterises a financial crisis, and it thus lends itself to being used 
too broadly as a justification for government interventions that might not be beneficial for the 
economy. It is important to note that as the IMF recognises (1998) systemic financial crisis may 
involve a currency crisis, but a currency crisis does not necessarily involve serious disruption of 
the domestic payments system and thus may not amount to a systemic financial crisis. 
 
It is interesting to note that according to Sachs and Tornell (1996) recent crises were far 
from being bank-run driven, even in the cases where a banking crisis was present, such as 
Mexico and Argentina, the bankruptcies within the banking system were result of a currency run 
and of important weaknesses that undermined the banking system capacity to deal with shocks 
(as in the case of Argentina and the “corralito” as described by de la Torre, Levy and 
Schmukler, 2002) or due to an explosion of bank loan defaults and risk exposure (as it occurred 
in Mexico) rather than a “classic” depositors’ bank run. Other candidates to be taken into 
account when studying a financial crisis are the stock market and the debt market. The crash of 
the stock market in 1929 is one of the most well-known and studied episodes in the history of 
                                                 
3 The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) defines the group of ten as to be conformed by Belgium, 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and 
the United States. G-10 consults and co-operate on economic, monetary and financial matters. 
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financial crashes and is still under debate its contribution to the Great Depression. The 1929 
crash has some resemblances to the recent crises mainly because of: i) the existence of a market 
environment with hidden and non-disclosed information; ii) a financial system not efficiently 
regulated or supervised; and, iii) all kind of financial manoeuvres and excesses (as documented 
by Steele-Gordon, 1999). However, one of the common features of recent crises that Tirole 
(2002) documents is not the use of the stock market as source of financing, but the use of short-
term debt denominated in foreign currency that is easier in terms of information disclosure due 
to the stock market regulations.  
 
According to the IMF (1998) the factors that underlie the emergence of imbalances and that 
render an economy vulnerable to financial disturbances may be grouped under the following not 
mutually exclusive headings: unsustainable macroeconomic policies, weaknesses in financial 
structure, global financial conditions, exchange rate misalignments and political instability. In 
addition, there is a natural tendency for economic activity to fluctuate giving rise to shifts in 
market sentiment that can contribute to stress the financial system. These factors contribute to 
the conditions under which crises occur and should be distinguished from the immediate causes 
(or triggers) of crises, which are usually events or news that lead economic agents to reassess 
their positions. Macroeconomic factors, especially lending booms, have been found to play an 
important role in creating financial sector vulnerability in many Latin American countries and in 
other emerging market economies as well. Because of the characteristics of recent structural 
reforms, it is expected that such debt would be contracted predominantly by large firms: in 
almost every country analysed, reforms included a shrinking public sector where government 
owned enterprises (usually large monopolies) were privatised and their size and expected 
profitability allowed them to obtain financial credits in international markets. Unlike crises that 
happened before the 90’s, these countries were trying to control fiscal expansion and to avoid 
“undisciplined” economic policies. As Tirole (2002) points out, this characteristic is one of the 
main sources of risk for a crisis occurring; he finds a collective action problem that refers to the 
monitoring of the financial arrangement, to intervention in case of violation, and to 
renegotiation in case of distress. Investors individually have a very suboptimal incentive to 
commit the resources to accomplish these tasks and free riding is likely to ensue.    
 
1.1.2. Financial instability and currency crises. 
 
A currency crisis may be said to occur when a speculative attack on the exchange value of a 
currency results in a devaluation on the exchange value of a currency results in a devaluation (or 
sharp depreciation) of the currency, or forces the authorities to defend the currency by 
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expending large volumes of international reserves or by sharply raising interest rates. The IMF 
(1998) argues that the composition of capital inflows has been considered an important factor in 
a number of currency crises in emerging market countries. In both the South East Asian and 
Mexican crises, the reliance on short-term borrowing to finance large current account deficits 
was a crucial ingredient precipitating the crisis. Foreign direct investment, in contrast to debt 
contracting inflows, is often regarded as providing a safer and more stable way to finance 
development because it refers to ownership and control of plant, equipment and infrastructure 
and therefore funds the growth-creating capacity of an economy, whereas short-term foreign 
borrowing is more likely to be used to finance consumption. Another lesson of recent crises is 
that currency mismatches in private sector balance sheets (of either financial institutions or 
corporations) may be more of a problem in countries with inflexible rates, since an exchange 
rate peg may encourage borrowers to ignore exchange rate risk. In sum, the argument of the 
IMF is that experience suggests that countries with high levels of short-term debt or foreign debt 
intermediated through domestic financial institutions are likely to be particularly vulnerable to 
internal or external shocks and thus susceptible to financial and currency crises.    
 
Distortions in the financial sector, in conjunction with macroeconomic volatility, constitute 
another group of factors are behind the recent currency crises. Often these distortions arise in 
times of rapid financial liberalisation and innovation in countries with weak supervisory and 
regulatory policies or where the government intervenes directly in the allocation or pricing of 
credit. Insufficient regulatory regimes in more liberalised financial environment have created 
moral hazard by encouraging financial institutions with low capital ratios to assume imprudent 
risks. They have also tended to increase possible mistakes evaluating and monitoring risks in 
more competitive environments arising from deregulation or privatisation of state-owned banks. 
In some cases, politically motivated lending and fraud further worsen the quality of asset 
portfolios and deficiencies in accounting, lack of disclosure and biased legal frameworks add to 
the problem by allowing financial institutions to disguise the extent of their difficulties. To these 
factors, the IMF adds the frequent failure of governments to take prompt corrective action when 
problems emerge with the consequence that losses become larger and more difficult to manage. 
Investors who perceive that the investment portfolios will not reach the expected return and 
furthermore, that the central bank will not be able to meet the liabilities denominated in foreign 
currency will opt to withdraw their funds from the country in trouble. It is when the 
phenomenon of sudden stop and reversal of capital flows takes place; as we will see, the causes 
of currency crises differ radically from the debt crises in the 1980’s that were driven by fiscal 
imbalances and insufficient reserves to meet public sector external debt.  
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1.2. Models of currency and financial crises 
 
 
"Has your husband any Spanish bonds?" he asked 
of the baroness. "I think so, indeed! He has six 
millions' worth." "He must sell them at whatever 
price."…When it was seen that Danglars sold, the 
Spanish funds fell directly... Next morning Le 
Moniteur …"It was without any foundation that Le 
Messager yesterday announced…the revolt of 
Barcelona...A telegraphic signal, improperly 
interpreted, ..." The funds rose one per cent higher 
than before they had fallen. This…made the … 
(loss) of a million to Danglars. 




Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2002) point out that in past years there has been a significant 
re-evaluation of the models used to analyse crises in emerging markets. Some of the recent 
models typically stress the existence of financial constraints or distorted financial incentives. 
These authors develop a model that tries to address particular problems of emerging markets 
rather than to adapt the existing ones that deal better with well-developed economies. Their 
model is based on a dual liquidity approach that tries to differentiate domestic liquidity shocks 
from international liquidity shocks. This approach still depends on liquidity shocks hitting the 
economy but in our view external liquidity shocks with “sunspot” triggering do not explain why 
emerging economies with large capital inflows suffer sudden stops and reversals of the direction 
of the flows. Therefore, it is necessary to turn to other models that try to explain the causes of 
crises in a more detailed way; in order to do that, we need to identify the stylised facts that are 
common to crises in emerging countries. 
 
Mishkin (1991) describes the usual timeline that a financial crisis follows; rather than 
starting with bank panics, most of financial crises begin with a rise in interest rates, a stock 
market crash and the widening of the domestic-foreign interest rate spread; this is also true for 
pre-1990’s crises where the main source of instability was the government indebtedness and 
fiscal imbalances that forced Latin American countries to declare incapacity to pay their 
external debt. Furthermore, a financial panic frequently is immediately preceded by a major 
failure of a financial firm and the beginning of the recession that increases uncertainty in the 
market place. Only after these problems have manifested themselves in financial markets do we 
find that a bank panic occurs.  
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Diagram 1: Sequence of events in a financial crisis (Mishkin, 1991) 
 
 
Glick, Moreno and Spiegel (2001) describe common elements of financial crises in 
emerging markets during the past decade:  
 
1. Financial crises took place after extensive liberalisation, particularly in financial 
markets. In recent years countries that have gone through processes of economic stabilisation 
have tried to tackle down inflation and to correct fiscal imbalances by diminishing the size of 
the public sector through privatisation of government owned enterprises, in order to achieve 
these goals, economic reform, liberalisation and global integration have been key elements of 
their strategies. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, most Latin American countries – 
particularly Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Argentina- undertook ambitious reforms aimed at 
modernising their economies. All of these, except Chile4, have faced a financial crisis, a 
currency attack and an economic meltdown that has lead, in particular, to a worsening of 
income distribution and, in general, to a slowdown in economic activity after the crisis. 
Domestic financial markets were liberalised, with credit controls and lending restrictions 
removed, access to international financial markets broadened and the permissible activities of 
domestic financial institutions expanded.  
 
The outstanding Asian growth over the past thirty years was largely the result of 
liberalisation and opening of real sectors across the region. In contrast, Asian financial sectors 
were relatively less developed with domestic credit often channelled through the banking sector 
                                                 
4 Chilean stability may be explained by several reasons. Economic reform was made under the military 
regime of General Pinochet and has been explicitly one of the models to follow by other countries. 
Financial liberalization included the privatization of the pension system in an early stage of the reforms 
deepening the financial intermediation. Foreign investment was encouraged to be done directly rather 
than in short-term assets. Furthermore, a Tobin tax for withdrawals of the country done before a year had 











Adverse selection and moral hazard problems worsen 
Decline in economic activity 
Bank  
Panic 
Adverse selection and moral hazard problems worsen 
Decline in economic activity 
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to particular privileged domestic sectors and firms, though usually in accordance with export-
promoting industrial policy. Beginning in the 1980s, financial markets were liberalised 
gradually across the region, first by allowing more market-oriented adjustment of interest rates 
and allocation of credit, and later by permitting domestic financial institutions greater freedom 
in asset and liability management. As Corsetti et al. (1998) argue, some efforts were made to 
contain short-term inflows, but these policies did not reduce the vulnerability of domestic 
financial sectors to shocks.  
 
2. They were preceded by significant capital inflow surges that ceased abruptly. The 
Mexican and Asian crises were preceded by substantial capital inflows that reflected a number 
of factors, including the search for higher yields on the part of international investors in an 
environment of low interest rates in industrial countries, strong macroeconomic and structural 
reform policies on many emerging markets and capital account opening. When the crises broke 
out, sharp cutbacks in short-term financing occurred as access to international capital markets 
was sharply curtailed. 
 
3. At the time of the crises, relatively rigid nominal exchange rate regimes tended to be in 
place and un-hedged foreign currency and interest rate exposure was high. Nominal exchange 
rate pegs were in place in almost every country that experienced financial difficulties. In the late 
1980s, a number of Latin American countries adopted exchange-rate-bias inflation stabilisation 
programs, relying on the exchange rate as a nominal anchor. Investor confidence in the stability 
of these exchange rate pegs encouraged borrowers in emerging markets to take advantage of 
lower foreign interest rates through foreign borrowing without hedging foreign currency or 
interest rate risk.  Exposure to exchange rate risk was particularly troubling for commercial 
banks. As a legacy of financial liberalisation, banks were particularly able to capitalise on 
interest rate differentials through foreign borrowing and domestic lending. In addition, the 
degree of exchange rate risk stemming from foreign borrowing by banks was commonly 
exacerbated by maturity mismatching between long-term illiquid assets and short-term 
liabilities.  
 
4. The crises tended to involve a number of countries simultaneously. After the Mexican 
Peso crisis in December 1994, the larger Latin American countries experienced varying degrees 
of volatility in their foreign exchange markets and declines in their equity markets. Argentina, 
though it successfully maintained its currency peg, suffered substantial costs while defending its 
currency by keeping interest rates high. After the floating of the Thai Baht, financial 
disturbances spread elsewhere in East Asia. The Russian default in August 1998 was 
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accompanied by an even more widespread turbulence. Bond spreads rose globally, and the 
access to foreign capital of emerging markets in all regions was severely curtailed.  
 
One of the most important features is that economic fundamentals were sound. Mexico’s 
fiscal policy was conservative; inflation had been under control for several years, and market 
interest rates preceding the crisis of 1994 did not appear to indicate an expected devaluation of 
the Peso5.  When analysing macroeconomic conditions prevailing in some of the Asian 
countries, growth rates were far superior to those in other emerging markets, inflation rates were 
moderate, and government budgets were in balance or showed surpluses. However, some 
authors attribute the crises to policy mistakes. Dornbusch and Werner (1994) found that in 
Mexico there was a sharp increase in private spending and overvaluation of the real exchange 
rate and an increase in domestic credit that was aimed to sterilise the foreign exchange losses 
caused by an asset demand decline occasioned by higher interest rates in the USA. Both in 
Mexico and Asia, there were some indications of increasing vulnerability in the period prior to 
the 1997-1998 crises provided by the large and growing current account deficits, slowing 
exports and real appreciation of currencies. However, the main factor that triggered the attack 
was the realisation that short-term liabilities imposed an excessive burden on international 
reserves. 
 
An additional element that some authors use to explain the extension of the crises is related 
to the weaknesses and distortions of financial sectors. Asian financial crisis was a consequence 
of bad lending and investment practices fostered by an environment of relationship lending, 
disincentives to fully monitor risk and inadequate supervision and regulation of domestic 
financial institutions during the lending boom of the 1990s. As in Mexico, credit tended to flow 
to borrowers with relationships to government or private bank owners and to favoured sectors 
rather on the basis of projected cash flows and risk assessment. At the time this was unknown in 
almost every country as one of the deliberate policies was to hide information regarding 
international reserves and amount and conditions of the contracted debt. In all of them the 
supervision and enforcement of rules was in the best of cases unreliable. Galbraith (1954) 
explains “According to the accepted view of events, by the autumn of 1929 the economy was 
well into a depression… Thus viewed, the stock market is but a mirror which… provides an 
image of the underlying or fundamental economic situation. Cause and effect run from the 
economy to the stock market, never the reverse. In 1929 the economy was headed for trouble. 
Eventually that trouble was violently reflected in Wall Street”. However, some of the models 
                                                 
5 They base this argument in the fact that interest rate differential between dollar denominated Tesobonos 
and US T-Bills was relatively constant before the crisis, indicating no increase in market risk premium for 
holding Mexican assets.  
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that have been developed do not make this linkage or focus on other mechanisms that address 
market failures. In these models, triggers can be sunspots, rumours and shifts in expectations 
justified or not. This is especially true in those models that model bank runs only as the only 
source of financial instability. Masson (2001) discusses three different types of models which 
produce multiple equilibria for financial assets prices: i) macroeconomic feedback models; ii) 
bank run models; and iii) fad and herding models. Each one adopts a different approach and of 
course the implications for policies aimed to prevent a crisis are different. Shifting from an 
initial equilibrium to another can be the result of a crash or a temporary adjustment depending 
on the setting. In the next section, we are going to discuss these three types within the two main 
bodies of literature that address the possibility of financial crisis in an economy: a) 
macroeconomic feedback models; and, b) asymmetric information models. The latter comprise 
bank run models, fad and herding behaviour in the classification of Masson (2001).    In table 1 
we summarise the sources of instability and the mechanisms that trigger a financial market crash 
in both types of models. In macroeconomic feedback models, the sources of instability are 
mainly coordination failures of agents that observe macroeconomic fundamentals and the 
financial markets play an accelerator role that feedback into the macroeconomic performance. 
On the other hand, asymmetric information models focus on market failures derived from 
incomplete information and in the study of the revelation mechanisms that can lead to panics 
even if macroeconomic fundamentals are sound.  
 
General sources of instability 




• Coordination failure among depositors • Market inefficiencies due to 
asymmetric information or market 




• Macroeconomic adjustment through the 
financial accelerator 
• Information spillovers 
• Credit exposure 
• Debt financing in asymmetric 
information and limited commitment 
environments 
Triggers of crises 
 Macroeconomic feedback models Asymmetric information models 
Sunspots • Arbitrary shifts in expectations that can 
trigger bank runs or speculative attacks 
• Arbitrary shifts in expectations that 




• Runs can be caused by coordination failure 
in a full information environment 
• In multi-bank models, credit exposure can 
lead to contagion 
• In multi-bank models, herding 
behaviour can lead to contagion 
Financial 
shocks 
• Asset price declines can turn liquidity 
problems into solvency problems 
• Bank runs can turn liquidity 
problems into solvency problems 
New 
information 
• Shifts in expectations • Shifts in expectations  
Table 1: Sources of instability and triggers of financial crises  
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Policy implications are also different depending on which model we rely on. We summarise 
them in table 2.  
 
Policy implications 
Elimination/ reduction of coordination 
failure 
Asymmetric information models 
Ensuring liquidity provision of markets Deposit insurance, suspension 
of convertibility, transparency, 
taxing early withdrawals from 
the country, minimum capital 
requirements, subsidised 
lending and recapitalisation of 
banks 
Reducing contagion risks 
Macroeconomic feedback 
models 
Injection of liquidity through 
repurchase agreements, 
monitoring and enforcing capital 
requirements 
Reducing the impact of the financial 
accelerator 
Counter cyclical monetary 
and fiscal policies 
Bailout guarantees, lender of 
last resort operations, collateral 
requirements for payment 
system participation, restricting 
credit exposures 
Table 2: Policy implications 
 
We now turn to discuss in more detail different types of models that have been developed to 
try to explain crises. It is important to keep in mind that depending on the approach, models 
may or may not make a distinction between a financial and a currency crisis.  
 
1.2.1. Macroeconomic feedback models 
 
 In these models there is no distinction between a financial and a currency crisis, 
furthermore, differentials between domestic and international financial markets are not 
explained and are assumed to receive exogenous shocks. A higher domestic interest rate, 
triggered by fears of devaluation or default, feeds back in an adverse way on the economy’s 
prospects. The linkages are various, in the first-generation models, the decision to devalue is 
triggered when foreign exchange reserves, falls below a certain threshold; higher interest rates 
can make reaching this threshold more likely because they increase the economy’s foreign debt 
servicing, as in Masson (1999) or because higher interest rates trigger a run in the banking 
system and expansion of domestic liquidity and an outflow of reserves as in Chang and Velasco 
(1998b).  
 
These models address the notion of the link between the financial system and the real 
economy. The financial system is viewed as an important source and driver of real business 
cycle fluctuations. Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990) show that the optimal financial contract 
in the presence of information asymmetries involves an agency cost arising from the need to 
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monitor or audit the borrower, both of which are costly actions to the lender. This monitoring 
cost is passed on to the borrower in that the lender demands a bigger share of the returns from 
successful projects. Borrowers can reduce the agency cost of debt by investing their own wealth. 
Hence there is a negative relationship between capital and agency costs. Similarly, there is an 
inverse relationship between borrower’s wealth and cost of investment since the resources are 
owned.  They show that in a dynamic model of investment, this feedback between agency costs 
of investment and borrower net worth creates a mechanism whereby shocks to the economy are 
amplified and propagated through their effects on the borrowers’ cash flows. The net worth of 
borrowers is also affected by changes in the value of real and financial assets, creating an asset-
price channel. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) argue that the inability of lenders to prevent 
borrowers from defaulting strategically leads them to require that borrowers post collateral. 
Hence, firms’ net worth is important to determine their debt capacity or credit limit.  
 
The effect of the financial accelerator on the real economy is twofold. First, the borrower is 
pro-cyclical and this introduces an additional source of fluctuation and persistence into a 
standard real business cycle. Second, exogenous shocks to borrower net worth can initiate real 
macroeconomic fluctuations. A necessary condition for the financial accelerator to exist is 
borrowing by firms. In a downturn, an increasing number of firms become cash constrained, 
increasing the effects of the accelerator. In an upturn, the external funds premium falls and debt 
capacity increases as firm’s balance sheet positions improve and this may lead them to use their 
own resources for investing in the firm. In these theories, financial crises are represented by a 
deepening of an economic downturn at the end of an upturn. The triggers are unanticipated and 
therefore, financial crises tend to be unpredictable. The importance of this group of models is 
that they formalise the idea that financial crises can amount to substantial costs in terms of real 
output.  
 
Arellano and Mendoza (2002) surveyed models on emerging market crises, which have 
financial frictions as a central element for explaining the sudden stop phenomenon. 
Nonetheless, few of them have had as an objective the study of quantitative implications of 
these models and to integrate them with an equilibrium business cycle framework. Emerging 
markets are characterised by a set of empirical regularities that Calvo (1998) labelled the 
“sudden stop” phenomenon: i) a sudden loss of access to international capital markets; ii) large 
reversal of the current account deficit; iii) collapse of domestic production and aggregate 
demand; and, iv) sharp corrections in asset prices and in the prices of non-traded goods relative 
to traded goods. The sudden stop phenomenon is not compatible with the predictions of the 
majority of existing models of current account determination and business cycles in small open 
economies, both frictionless real business cycle models and models with nominal rigidities.  
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Arellano and Mendoza (2002) argue that the common starting point of much of the 
literature on emerging market crises has been to model international capital markets as subject 
to a variety of financial market imperfections and to attribute these imperfections to various 
forms of informational frictions that are more pervasive in emerging markets than in industrial 
country capital markets. There are two proposed financial transmission mechanisms. The first 
mechanism is related to the debtor’s ability to pay: debtors may be willing to repay their debts, 
but their ability is threatened by the realisation of bad states of nature. Creditors aim to cover 
their exposure to default risk by imposing lending conditions on borrowers (collateral or 
liquidity requirements). Quantitative applications in an RBC setting are rare and there are two 
major shortcomings, first borrowing constraints are always binding along an equilibrium path 
and this rules out equilibrium dynamic in which one can observe large reversals of the current 
account triggered by a switch from a state of nature in which the constraint did not bind to one 
in which it does. Most models deal with perfect foresight experiments in which the credit 
constraint arrives as an unexpected shock. Hence, economic agents are not given the 
opportunity to adapt their optimal plans to the possibility of being suddenly unable to access 
international capital markets. The second mechanism is the debtor’s willingness to pay: debtors 
decide optimally to default. The implications of this incentive-compatibility or participation 
constraint vary depending on the structure of the economic environment on which it is imposed.  
 
Although financial crises usually come hand in hand with currency crises, it is important to 
be aware of the distinctions between them. In order to do this, we will review the different 
approaches for speculative attacks that lead to a currency crises. First, we need to define a 
currency crisis, in all models a speculative attack is waged against a pegged exchange rate that 
depletes the foreign exchange reserves leading to the abandonment of the exchange rate peg. 
This is because there are expected gains to all the agents that attack the currency before 
international reserves are depleted. When there is a floating exchange rate regime then there are 
no gains since the exchange rate adjusts immediately. Eichengreen and Rose (1999) argue that 
currency crises cannot be identified with changes in the exchange rate regime, which is contrary 
to the assumption made in other studies. Their argument is that not all decisions to devalue or 
float the exchange rate are preceded by speculative attacks. More importantly, a central bank 
may successfully defend its currency against attack by using its international reserves to 
intervene in the foreign exchange market or by raising interest rates. This phenomenon is 
completely different from a financial crisis. A financial crisis can happen in a closed economy 
with prices of domestic assets crashing because of the actions of domestic agents6. Why does a 
                                                 
6 The well known episodes along History in where the price of real estate in Florida prior to the 1929 
crash, tulips in the Netherlands, municipal bonds of the Orange county and local runs such as the US 
savings and loans collapse are example of a financial crisis without a currency crisis .   
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financial crisis usually come along with a currency crisis in emerging markets? This is a 
question that could be answered straight forward by arguing that the currencies were pegged and 
losses in financial markets were expected to recover with gains derived by attacking the 
currency. However, this does not respond basic questions like: Which are the risks of opening 
the economy to foreign capital? And, which is the role that the exchange rate regime plays on 
agents’ decisions when a financial crisis is about to happen? In order to answer these questions 
we discuss the models that have been developed to analyse speculative attacks.  
 
1.2.1.1. First generation models  
 
A review of first-generation speculative attack models, developed by Krugman (1979), 
Flood and Garber (1984) and Blanco and Garber (1986) presented in Hallwood and MacDonald 
(2000), describes them as combinations of elements of the monetary approach to the balance of 
payments and the flexible price monetary approach to the exchange rate. The former theory is 
used to make the point that a rate of domestic credit expansion faster than the rate of growth of 
demand for domestic money causes a fall in foreign exchange reserves- which ultimately forces 
the abandonment of the peg. The monetary approach to the exchange rate is used to a) calculate 
the shadow floating exchange rate, which is the rate that would prevail if there was a flexible 
regime; and, b) to support the observation that a speculative attack on a currency will occur 
before foreign exchange reserves are exhausted. This is because in the monetary approach to the 
exchange rate, the current exchange rate is determined not only by current fundamentals but 
also by the discounted value of expected excess money supplies. Another point is that the 
exchange rate will not jump to a new market rate as such a transition would imply that some 
profitable opportunities for currency speculation had been ignored; rather the transition will be 
smooth to a floating rate that approximates the old pegged rate, thereafter depreciation sets in.  
 
A simple way to understand this type of models is shown in diagram 2 by Agenor, Bhandari 
and Flood (1992). The line MM depicts the money supply that is the sum of the domestic credit 
(line DD) and international reserves (line RR). Before the abandonment of the peg, domestic 
credit increases and reserves decrease in the same proportion. When the reserves are not enough 
to sustain the peg this is abandoned and the money supply adjusts because the only component 
now is domestic credit. Thus, the money supply follows the path MMD. As the credit expands 
and the reserves decline, the shadow exchange rate tends to depreciate until it intersects with the 
fixed valued. This is when the exchange rate is abandoned and the observed exchange rate 
coincides with the shadow one.   
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Diagram 2: First generation model of currency attacks 
 
These models reveal some important aspects of a speculative attack. However, their main 
deficiency lies in the fact that they assume perfect foresight. In reality agents are unsure about 
when the attack will actually take place and they are also uncertain about how much the 
exchange rate will change if there is an attack. As we have already said, in most of the cases 
when there is a speculative attack, the exchange rate overshoots before stabilising around a new 
equilibrium rather than following a stable path. Flood and Marion (1997) say that in the first 
generation models inconsistent policies prior to the attack can push the economy into a crisis. 
 
1.2.1.2. Second generation models  
 
In second-generation speculative attack models, the government’s decision to devalue is 
endogenous, which increase the set of relevant macro fundamentals that are affected by 
investors’ devaluation expectations and that can positively affect the devaluation probability. 
Obstfeld (1994) gives two examples: one in which exchange rate expectations increase the 
unemployment-inflation trade-off, another where inflation expectations increase the burden of 
servicing government debt. In the former, the expectation of devaluation raises inflation 
expectations and wage demands, making it more likely that the authorities will give in to those 
demands and devalues in order to avoid unemployment. In the latter case, higher interest rates 
reflect increased fears that the authorities will inflate away outstanding debt, raising the burden 
of that debt and hence the likelihood that the inflation option will be chosen.  
 
Cole and Kehoe (1996) develop a general equilibrium model with optimising private sector 
agents. In this model, the key variable influencing vulnerability to self-fulfilling attacks is the 
amount of short-term government debt. It is assumed, as in first generation models, that 
domestic credit grows at a rate µ0, same, but if there is an attack, then it will grow at a faster rate 
µ 1. Hallwood and MacDonald (2000) summarise the speculative attack in the second generation 
models in diagram 3. 
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Diagram 3: Second generation model of currency attacks, Hallwood and MacDonald (2000) 
 
 
Imagine that domestic credit lies to the left of DB in such a case, if there is an attack then the 
shadow exchange rate jumps from the one compatible with µ0 to the other that is compatible 
with a faster rate of growth µ1. Since this shadow exchange rate is still below the fixed level of 
the exchange rate, there is a loss of capital for speculators. Exactly at DB there is no clear 
incentive to the economy to move from C to B and even if that happens there would be no profit 
for speculators derived from a speculative attack. Between DB and DA there are incentives to 
mount an attack, however this depends on coordination of the agents to be successful. Morris 
and Shin (1998) argue that the apparent multiplicity of equilibria associated with self-fulfilling 
beliefs that lead to a currency attack is to oversimplify the role played by information in a 
speculative episode.  Information plays a subtle role in speculative crises. What is important is 
not the amount of information per se, but rather how public and transparent is this information. 
If market participants are well informed about the fundamentals, but they are unsure of the 
information received by other participants, and hence unsure of the beliefs held by others, 
speculative attacks may be triggered even though everyone knows that the fundamentals are 
sound7, in their words “a ‘grain of doubt,’ allowing that others may believe that the economy is, 
in fact, unstable will lead to a currency crises even if everyone knows that the economy is not 
unstable.”  
 
Hallwood and MacDonald (2000) explain that the purchasing power parity (PPP) underlies 
much of the literature of the modern literature on the balance of payments and exchange 
determination in second-generation models. The PPP doctrine suggests that we should be able 
to buy the same bundle of goods in any country for the same amount of currency. The 
                                                 
7 These authors cite the Mexican case to support their findings. They say that one of the most important 
causes was the uprising of the EZLN in Chiapas. In this specific case during all the year of 1994 there 
were political incidents that weren’t the “subtle information” that they assume but clear evidence of 
political and social unrest that included riots, local uprisings, high profile political assassinations (not 
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fundamental notion is that the exchange rate depends upon price levels. Given two countries 
with homogeneous tradable goods, no barriers to trade, no capital flows and full employment in 





t PSP =         (1.1)
 8 
 
This condition simply states that at date t, the price of good i in the home country (Pi) must 
equal its price in the foreign country (Pi*) multiplied by the foreign exchange rate S. If this 
equation does not hold, then it is profitable for arbitrageurs to trade. From this simple condition, 
there are two main views of PPP; the first one is the absolute PPP, which states that the ratio of 
the price index (weighed sum of prices) in both countries is equal to the exchange rate in this 








=  takes the value of 1. Another version is 
the relative PPP which relates the inflation rates of both countries to the depreciation of the 
exchange rate *ttt pps ∆−∆=∆ . 
 
Another view alternative to the PPP is the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP). To the 
economy described above, it is assumed that each country issues a bond which is assumed to be 
a perfect substitute for the foreign currency denominated bond. The UIP is therefore assumed to 
hold *1 tt
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Usually it is assumed that real interest rates are equal in both countries and therefore the 
expected nominal depreciation of the exchange rate is equal to the inflation differentials. 
 
                                                 
8 Corresponds to equation 1 of chapter 1 
9 The nominal interest rates i  and *i  may be decomposed into real and expected inflation 
components
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                 Diagram 4: UIP model of currency attacks, Hallwood and MacDonald (2000) 
 
 
The use of a portfolio approach to the determination of the exchange rate explicitly links the 
performance of the financial market in the domestic country with the performance of the rest of 
the world. Hence, differences in this performance can lead to a currency crisis. However, the 
factors behind expectations of a poor performance and the information mechanisms that can 
trigger such a crisis are not explained. In summary, these models explain currency crises, but the 
financial crisis component is not addressed. These first and second-generation models do not 
explain weaknesses in the financial system. Chang and Velasco (1998a) argue “…recent events 
in Mexico, East Asia, Russia and Brazil have confirmed that a satisfactory explanation of 
emerging market financial and currency crises remains elusive”. Furthermore, they argue that 
first generation models have fallen out of fashion because many actual crises seem to lack the 
crucial fiscal disequilibria. On the other hand, they argue that second generation models implied 
that crises may be driven by self-fulfilling expectations, since the costs of defending and 
exchange peg may depend on anticipation that the peg will be maintained. However, the 
emphasis on economic slowdown of economic activity was at odds with the crises of Mexico in 
1994 and of East Asia in 1997. They conclude that instead of fiscal imbalances or weakness in 
real activity, recent crises in emerging markets have revealed financial sources of vulnerability.  
 
One of the main objections that can be made to the interpretation of crises as jumps between 
multiple equilibria in macroeconomic feedback models is that the linkages involved take time to 
operate. Expectations need to be coordinated on the bad equilibrium; this has not been 
modelled. When introducing large speculators rather than atomistic agents this removes the 
discontinuity needed for multiple equilibria. This coordination issue needs some sort of 
information transmission mechanism that is not studied in the literature and needs to be 
explained in order to really understand a financial crisis. This kind of models fail to explain why 
seemingly successful economic reforming countries have experienced sudden crises, in other 
words, the question if there are there any risks associated with the reforming processes that 
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of course impossible to predict crises reliably, and any successful attempts to construct models 
to do so would presumably affect the behaviour of policymakers and financial market 
participants alike, which would quickly render the models obsolete. Furthermore, for crises 
arising from pure contagion effects early warning signals may be unavailable because the crises 
stem from inherently unpredictable market reactions. What is more feasible is to identify the 
kinds of weaknesses that typically render economies vulnerable to financial crises, including to 
spill-over effect, whether or not a crisis does materialise”. The IMF (1998) proposes as indicator 
for a lead up to a currency or banking crisis to look for evidence of the economy being 
“overheated”: inflation relatively high (though recent crises clearly fail to comply with this); 
appreciation of the real exchange rate; increased current account deficit; excessive domestic 
credit expansion and a rapidly rising ration of broad money to international reserves. 
Additionally, because of the experience of the Mexican and South East Asian crises the IMF 
includes the indicators of non-performing loans in the banking system and of short-term 
currency exposure in both the financial system and the corporate sector.  
 
In the next sections we will discuss the asymmetric information approaches to financial 
crises. Most of the literature is focused on bank runs and this literature has build up from the 
seminal paper by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), we will outline its main characteristics and other 
models that incorporate herding behaviour. However, since these models only deal with bank 
runs by depositors they do not offer an explanation of what has happened in the cases of 
financial crashes and economic meltdowns that involve defaults on public and corporate debt 
and on bank loans rather than a sudden run by depositors. Herding models have been used as 
well to try to explain information avalanches in financial markets and have been successful in 
explaining localised frenzies and crashes in financial markets but not a collapse that involves the 
financial, the real and the external sectors all together.  
1.2.2. Asymmetric information in financial markets 
 
Marvin: …I need the information now, before the 
close…No, in ten minutes is history, at four o’clock 
I’m a dinosaur 
 
Gordon Gekko: The most valuable commodity I 
know is information. Wouldn’t you agree? 
Bud Fox: Yeah… 
Dialogues in Oliver Stone’s film Wall Street (1987) 
 
 
Mishkin (1991) argues that transactions that take place in financial markets are subject to 
asymmetric information in where one party often does not know all that he or she needs to know 
about the other party to make correct decisions. Asymmetric information creates problems in the 
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financial system in two basic ways: before the transaction is entered into (adverse selection) and 
after the transaction is entered into (moral hazard). As an example, adverse selection in debt 
markets occurs when the potential borrowers who are the most likely to produce an undesirable 
(adverse) outcome (i.e. bad credit risks) are the ones most likely to be selected. Since adverse 
selection makes it more likely that loans might be allocated to bad credit risks, lenders may 
decide not to make any loans even though there are good credit risks in the market. Credit 
rationing may appear; some borrowers are denied loans even when they are willing to pay a 
higher interest rate. This occurs because individuals and firms with the riskiest investment 
projects are exactly those who are willing to pay the highest interest rates since if the high-risk 
investment succeeds, they will be the main beneficiaries. Thus a higher interest rate leads to 
even greater adverse selection. Moral hazard occurs after a loan is extended when the lender is 
subjected to the hazard that the borrower might engage in activities that are undesirable from the 
lender’s point of view because they increase the probability of default. Bernanke and Gertler 
(1989) argue that moral hazard can also occur because high enforcement costs might make it too 
costly for the lender to prevent it even when there is complete information about the borrower’s 
activities. One way that financial markets can solve the problems created by asymmetric 
information is the use of collateral, since it reduces the consequences of adverse selection or 
moral hazard because it reduces the lender’s losses in the case of default. Net worth performs a 
similar role to collateral. If a firm has high net worth, then even if it defaults on its debt 
payments as a result of poor investments the lender can take title to the firm’s net worth, sell it 
off and use the proceeds to recoup some of the losses from the loan.  
 
Another way that asymmetric information problems can be solved is through the private 
production and sale of information that allows all the participants to have full information about 
the individuals of firms who need to finance their investment activities. Monitoring and 
enforcement of restrictive covenants is another method for reducing moral hazard. By 
monitoring a borrower’s activities to see whether he is complying with the restrictive covenants 
and enforcing them if he is not, lenders can prevent borrowers from taking on risk at their 
expense. Banks help reduce the adverse selection problems in financial markets by becoming 
experts in the production of information about firms so that they can sort out good credit risks 
from bad ones. Then they can acquire funds from depositors and lend them to good firms.  
 
Mishkin (1991) provides a definition of financial crisis using the asymmetric information 
framework: “A financial crisis is a disruption to financial markets in which adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems become much worse, so that financial markets are unable to 
efficiently channel funds to those who have the most productive investment opportunities”. A 
financial crisis thus results in the inability of financial markets to allocate resources efficiently 
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and this in turn leads to a sharp contraction in economic activity. Under this definition there are 
five factors that can lead to substantial worsening of adverse selection and moral hazard in 
financial markets.  
 
1. Increases in real interest rates: individuals and firms with the riskiest investment 
projects are exactly those who are willing to pay the highest interest rates. If market interest 
rates are driven up sufficiently, because of increased demand for credit or because of a decline 
in the money supply, good credit risks are less likely to want to borrow while bad credit risks 
are still willing to borrow. Because of the resulting increase in adverse selection, lenders will no 
longer want to make loans, possibly leading to a steep decline in lending which will lead to a 
substantial decline in new investment and thus in economic growth. 
  
2. Stock market declines: a sharp decline in the stock market can increase adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems in financial markets because it leads to a large decline in the market 
value of firm’s net worth. Mishkin (1991) notes that the decline in asset values could occur 
because of a rise in market interest rates that lowers the present discounted value of future 
income streams. The decline in net worth as a result of a stock market decline makes lender less 
willing to lend because the net worth of firms has a similar role to collateral, and when the value 
of collateral declines it provides less protection to lenders so that losses from loans are likely to 
be more severe. 
 
The decline in corporate net worth as a result of a stock market decline increases moral 
hazard incentives for borrowing firms to make risky investments because these firms now have 
less to lose if their investments have already lost value. The resulting increase in moral hazard 
makes lending less attractive, providing another reason why a stock market decline and hence a 
decline in net worth leads to decreased lending and economic activity. 
 
3. Heightened uncertainty: this makes it harder for lenders to screen out good from bad 
credit risks. The resulting inability of lenders to solve the adverse selection problem makes them 
less willing to lend, leading to a decline in investment and aggregate activity.   
 
4. Bank panics: this is the classic scenario for a financial crisis. Banks perform an 
important financial intermediation role by engaging in information producing activities that 
facilitate productive investment for the economy. Thus, as described by Bernanke (1983), a 
financial crisis which results in a bank panic, reduces the amount of financial intermediation 
undertaken by banks, and will hence, lead to a decline in investment and aggregate economic 
activity.  
Chapter 1: Currency and financial crises; Defining bad weather 
Financial and Currency Crises 
27 
 
The source of a bank panic is asymmetric information. In a panic, depositors, fearing for the 
safety of their deposits, withdraw them from the banking system, causing a contraction in loans 
and a multiple contraction in deposits, which then causes banks to fail. Asymmetric information 
is critical to this process because depositors rush to make withdrawals from solvent as well as 
insolvent banks since they cannot distinguish between them. Furthermore, if the banks opt for 
protecting themselves by increasing their reserves, then it is likely that the loans and deposits 
contract and promote other bank failures. The net result is that a bank panic reduces the funds 
supply for loans and the cost of financial intermediation rises causing a reduction in investment 
and a decline in aggregate economic activity. A bank panic can also have as a consequence an 
increase in interest rates because the panic results in decreasing liquidity since the supply of 
funds available to borrowers has been curtailed and through this channel, the bank panic leads to 
economic contraction.  
 
5. Unanticipated declines in the price level: the decrease the net worth of the firms. 
Because debt payments are contractually fixed in nominal terms, an unanticipated decline in the 
price level raises the value of firms’ liabilities in real terms, but does not raise the real value of 
firms’ assets. The result is that the net worth in real terms declines. A sharp drop in the price 
level therefore causes a substantial decline in real net worth and an increase in adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems facing lenders. The resulting increase in adverse selection and 
agency problems causes a decline in investment and economic activity.  
 
In the remainder of this section we discuss bank run models and herding behaviour models. 
Within the bank run discussion, we will discuss the Diamond and Dybvig model (1983), which 
is considered to be the seminal work in the bank run literature. Then we turn to the extension to 
this model made by Chen (1999) who introduces the possibility of herding behaviour (that is 
when an agent ignores its own information and act based on the observed actions of other 
agents). These two models provide analytic tools used in the literature on asymmetric 
information and herding behaviour. Additionally we discuss the general equilibrium model by 
Allen and Gale (1998) who address the problem of optimal monetary policy. These phenomena 
are extremely important in financial markets since prices are mainly driven by the incorporation 
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1.2.2.1. Liquidity or bank runs models 
 
“…I received this morning five millions, which I 
paid away; almost directly afterwards another 
demand for the same sum was presented to me; I 
put this creditor off till tomorrow, and I intend 
leaving today, to escape that tomorrow, which 
would be rather too unpleasant for me to endure.”  
Letter from banker Baron Danglars to his wife in 




Depositors need to form expectations of what other depositors are doing: if other depositors 
run, then it is optimal for the rest to run too, if the amount of liquid assets available to the bank 
is less than demand deposits outstanding. In the formalisation of Diamond and Dyvbig (1983), 
the trigger that determines whether each individual wants to consume now rather than later is a 
coordination mechanism when faced with the realisation of a shock. Even those wanting to 
consume later may want to withdraw if a bank run is likely to occur. Several variants and 
applications of this model have been developed. Sachs (1984) shows that if international debt to 
a large number of domestic bank creditors is within a certain range relative to a country’s 
income, then panic can occur. Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) model the Mexican crisis as a 
self-fulfilling panic in a macroeconomic feedback model while Radelet and Sachs (1998a) argue 
that a run by international creditors played a role in the Asian crisis.  
 
As Masson (2001) argues, such liquidity models rely on the existence of many 
uncoordinated agents, in direct contrast to macroeconomic feedback models. Rogoff, (1999) 
argues that a frequent criticism is that it depends on sequential servicing of withdrawals, and 
this implies that it would be easy to eliminate runs by suspending convertibility, this argument 
however may be true for speculative attacks on a fixed rate (if we ignore the possibility of a 
black market appearing) but not for a financial crisis where the main debtors are firms. Another 
objection is that these models lack a triggering mechanism and rely on a sunspot pattern.  
 
We have to be aware that these models have been only used in bank runs and the crises we 
are interested in have not been bank run driven. Contracting of direct debt by firms has been one 
of the problems that the Mexican and the Asian crises share. Gavito, Silva and Zamarripa 
(1997) argue  that the Mexican banking crisis only happened after the currency crisis and the 
bond market collapse and was the result of the high rates of non performing loans that 
endangered the financial position the banks and lead them to bankruptcy while forcing the 
intervention of the government to bail out the failing banks. In the case of the Asian crisis, 
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Corsetti et al. (1998) point out that the chaebols10 were bankrupt before the currency attack and 
this was one of the main reasons of it, the inability of the government to bail out the firms.  
 
The role of banks is to transform illiquid technologies into liquid payoffs, and also to 
provide liquidity insurance as the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model shows. In this model, 
banks offer demand deposits to match the agents’ liquidity needs with projects’ maturities. 
However, these demand deposits open up the possibility of bank runs. Bank runs and bank 
panics are special forms of herding behaviour. A bank run occurs when the deposit holders of a 
bank suddenly withdraw their money. If a run on a single bank spreads over to other banks, it 
can cause a panic in the whole banking system. Although withdrawals by deposit holders occur 
sequentially in reality, the literature typically models bank runs as a simultaneous move game. 
During a bank run, depositors rush to withdraw their deposits because they expect the bank to 
fail. These sudden withdrawals may force the bank to liquidate its assets if capital reserves are 
not enough to face the withdrawals. If the panic is widespread and other banks face the same 
loss of confidence then the banking system and the monetary system may be severely disrupted 
inducing a fall in production.  
 
We now turn to two asymmetric information models that study the relationship between 
banks and depositors. Asymmetric information creates conditions that can lead depositors to 
panic and this may trigger a bank run. The first model we discuss is the Diamond-Dybvig 
(1983) that is considered to be the seminal paper that addressed this issue. The other is Chen’s 
(1999) who introduce sequential information disclosure about the financial situation of banks. 
This may cause a herding behaviour in agents and a crisis due to bad expectations of banks’ 
performance. Additionally, we discuss the Allen and Gale (1998) model which addresses the 
optimal monetary policy after a crisis.  
Diamond-Dybvig (1983)  
 
The motivation of this model is that bank runs are thought to be a common feature of 
extreme crises along monetary history. It tries to explain why during a bank run depositors 
expect the bank to fail and how these expectations give them incentives to withdraw their 
deposits. There are three main findings in the model. First, banks issuing demand deposits can 
improve on a competitive market by providing best risk sharing among people who need to 
consume at different random times. Second, the demand deposit contract providing this 
improvement has an undesirable equilibrium (i.e. a bank run) in which all depositors panic and 
withdraw immediately, including even those who would prefer to leave their deposits in if they 
                                                 
10 Economic conglomerates in Thailand.  
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were not concerned about the bank failing. Third, bank runs cause real economic problems 
because even sound banks can fail, causing the recall of loans and the termination of productive 
investment. The model also offers a framework in which mechanisms as suspension of 
convertibility of deposits and the existence of a lender of last resort are fully justified.  
 
Banks are able to transform illiquid assets by offering liabilities with a different, smoother 
pattern of returns than the illiquid assets offer. These contracts have multiple equilibria. If 
confidence is maintained, there can be efficient risk sharing, because in that equilibrium, a 
withdrawal will indicate that a depositor should withdraw under optimal risk sharing. If agents 
panic there is a bank run and incentives are distorted. In that equilibrium, everybody rushes in to 
withdraw their deposits before the bank gives out all of its assets. The bank must liquidate all its 
assets, even if not all depositors withdraw, because liquidated assets are sold at a loss. 
 
The model has three periods and a single homogenous good. All investors receive an initial 
endowment of 1 unit. The productive technology yields a positive return R if the investment is 
held to maturity, if it is interrupted before then the investor only gets back the initial investment. 
All consumers are identical at the initial period and each one faces a risk of requiring liquidity 
the next period when they will learn if they can keep their investment or if they will need to 
withdraw. Agents do not store goods at the initial period because the productive technology has 
a positive expected return while storage has zero return. If an investor faces a liquidity shock, 
then he will withdraw and consume his initial endowment and hence, productive investment is 
destroyed. If he can keep the investment to maturity he will consume R at the third period and 
nothing at the other period 1. Therefore, the pattern of consumption {c1, c2} for each consumer 




Date 0 Depositors decide to deposit. Banks invest the proceeds in long-term projects.  
Date 1 1. Liquidity shocks are revealed. Depositors in need of liquidity withdraw.  
2. Negative expectations about the bank’s soundness. Late consumers may decide to withdraw  
Date 2 Investment projects mature. If the bank is still open, late consumers who have not yet 
withdrawn withdraw. 
 Table 3: Diamond and Dybvig model (1983) timeline 
 
The demand deposit contract gives each agent that withdraws at date 1 a fixed claim of r1 
per unit deposited at date 0. There is no priority in the order of withdrawal; it is done on a first-
come, first-served basis. Agents not withdrawing in period 1 get a pro rata share of the bank’s 
assets in period 2. Let V1 be the period 1 payoff per unit deposit withdrawn at T=1 and V2 the 
period 2 payoffs per unit deposit not withdraw at date 1. Therefore, we can characterise each 
payoff as: 
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Where fj is the number or withdrawers’ deposits serviced before agent j as a fraction of total 
demand deposits; f is the total number of demand deposits withdrawn. Hence, at date 1 the 
payoff will be the agreed payment of r1 if the number of withdrawers is less than the available 
assets that can be paid.  
 
The demand deposit contract can achieve the full-information optimal risk sharing as and 
equilibrium. This happens at the equilibrium when the fixed payment per dollar of deposits 
withdrawn at T=1 is equal to the optimal consumption of a type 1 agent given full information 
that is r1=c1.  If this contract is in place, type 1 agents will withdraw at date 1 and type 2 agents 
will wait till date 2. However, there can be equilibrium with a bank run, where all agents will 
find it optimal to withdraw early. This is because the face value of deposits is larger than the 
liquidation value of the bank’s assets.  
 
The capability of transformation of illiquid assets into liquid assets is both at the core of the 
problem of bank runs at the same time that it is for the liquidity service that banks provide. For 
all r1>1, runs are an equilibrium; if r1=1 a bank would not be susceptible to runs because 
( ) ( )1 2,1 ,1jV f V f< for all values of 0 jf f≤ ≤ ; but if r1=1, the bank is mimicking direct 
holding of the assets and is not an improvement on simple competitive claims markets11. 
Therefore, to improve this allocation the bank has to assume the risk of a run. The trigger of a 
run can depend of some commonly observed random variable in the economy, bad earnings 
report, a commonly observed run on another bank. According to Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 
once deposits are made, anything that can be perceived as a danger of a run, will lead to a run; 
hence, maintaining confidence is a main worry of banks with pure demand deposits.  
Chen (1999)  
 
This model is an extension of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) discussed above. Chen 
(1999) proposes that both the first-come, first-served rule and information externalities are 
important in causing contagious bank runs. The underlying intuition of the model is as follows. 
                                                 
11 This point is discussed in depth in chapter 4. 
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At a bank some depositors may be better informed than others about the value of bank assets. 
The informed depositors enjoy an advantage over the uninformed ones by being able to 
withdraw earlier when they realise that the bank cannot fully repay all depositors. Facing this 
informational disadvantage, the uninformed depositors may have an incentive to respond to 
other sources of information before the value of bank assets is revealed to all investors. Previous 
failures of other banks can be such information source. If banks’ returns are positively 
correlated, a high bank failure rate implies that returns of the remaining banks are likely to be 
low. Although this information is likely to be very noisy, the uninformed depositors may still 
respond to it and withdraw. The incentives to disregard own information and respond to the 
actions of other participants give way to herding behaviour and bank runs become contagious. 
In Chari and Jagannathan (1988) a panic run is the phenomenon that uninformed depositors 
misinterpret liquidity withdrawal shocks as withdrawals caused by pessimistic information 
about bank assets. But while they define panic as the ex-post mistake depositors make during 
their information updating process, Chen (1999) defines panic as the depositors response to 
early noisy information because of the payoff externality imposed in the deposit contract. He 
calls contagious runs “panic” for two reasons: i) during contagious runs, depositors are 
compelled to respond to early information; and, ii) because a contagious run is based on noisier 
information, it incurs higher social costs than a run triggered by more precise information about 
banks. This model shares a common feature with Diamond and Dybvig (1983) in that the payoff 
externality is important in causing inefficient bank runs. In contrast, the results do not display 
multiple equilibria. What is emphasized is how the negative payoff externality affects the way 
depositors respond to information, not how it creates multiple equilibria.  
 
As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), this is a three date model (T=0, 1, 2). There are N banks 
(in the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model the analysis does not depend on the number of 
banks) and numerous depositors. The initial endowment is again one unit and investors can 
deposit at the bank or store it. Liquidity shocks are again present in this model but the number 
of withdrawals is known from date 0. Under this assumption, investors facing liquidity shocks 
will always withdraw at date 1and the others will wait till date 2. Banks do not have capital; 
they collect deposits from depositors to make investments in long term projects with returns that 
depend on the realised state of nature at date 2. Each state of nature has a probability and they 
are mutually exclusive. After a bank invests in a long term project at date 0, at date 1 the 
bankers receive perfect information about the outcome of the investment. At each bank a 
fraction of depositors receive the same information, these are the informed depositors and they 
learn at date 0 whether or not they are going to have access to bank information. Informed and 
uninformed depositors have the same probability of facing the liquidity shock at date 1.  
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In order to introduce the possibility of herding behaviour, early at date 1 a fraction N1 of the 
N banks will be the first to receive the information and the remaining N-N1 will get their 
information later but during the same period. Information revelation may result in a number K1 
of bank failures among the first N1 banks. An individual bank faces failure when informed 
investors learn that the bad state of nature is the one that is going to happen, therefore they 
withdraw alongside with the investors with liquidity shocks. Hence, informational withdrawals 
cannot be distinguished from liquidity reasons. When uninformed agents observe a larger than 
expected number of withdrawals then they receive the signal that the outcome is likely to be bad 
and they may decide to withdraw triggering a bank run on the individual institution.   
 
The number of bankrupting banks among the first N1 is public information and is available 
to all participants at the same time. A large number of failures imply that the prospects of the 
banking industry are likely to be pessimistic. Investors in the remaining N- N1 update the 
probability that the prospects of the banking industry are unfavourable given K1. If this 
probability exceeds a threshold value, then investors in the remaining N- N1 banks will not have 
incentives to wait for the disclosure of the information of their own banks. Hence, they will 




Date 0 Depositors decide to deposit. Banks invest the proceeds in long-term projects.  
Date 1 1. Information and liquidity shocks of the first N1 banks are revealed. Depositors at these 
banks then decide whether to withdraw.  
2. Depositors at the remaining N- N1 banks observe K1 which is the number of failures 
among the first N1 banks. They update the prospects of the banking industry and decide 
whether to withdraw or not.  
3. Information and liquidity shocks in the remaining N- N1 banks are revealed. If a panic run 
has not yet occurred, depositors at these banks then decide whether to withdraw or not.  
Date 2 Investment projects mature. If a bank is still open, its depositors who have not yet withdrawn 
withdraw 
 Table 4: Chen model (1999) timeline 
 
 
This model introduces herding behaviour as a rationale for contagious bank runs. It explains 
better the possible causes of a bank run which can be identified with underlying weak 
fundamentals of the economy. However, it still focuses on the bank-depositor relationship of the 
economy and not in other aspects of the borrower-lender relationship in a broader debt market. 
In general bank run literature does not take into account diversification mechanisms and sets 
aside a portfolio approach which is necessary to fully understand the decisions of institutional 
investors that in a crisis are far more important than common depositors with limited access to 
financial markets.   
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Allen and Gale (1998) 
 
In Allen and Gale (1998), financial crises can improve risk sharing but they also involve 
deadweight costs when investment projects are prematurely liquidated. A central bank can avoid 
these costs by implementing an appropriate monetary policy. We review the open economy 
version of Allen and Gale (2000) which derives the optimal response of the monetary authority 
that faces the possibility of a crisis.   
 
There are three dates in this model, t= {0, 1, 2}. At each date, there is a single good for 
consumption or investment. There are two kinds of assets, a risk-free asset and a risky one. If 
one unit of the risk-free asset is invested at date t, it yields one unit at date t+1 for t=0, 1. The 
risky asset takes two periods to mature; if x units are invested then the return is Rh(x), where 
h(x) is a neoclassical production function with decreasing returns to scale. The random variable 




 t=0 t=1 t=2 
Investment period 1  Risk-free asset 
 Investment period 1 
   r1 
 R   
   r0 
   r1h(x) 
Risky asset Investment period   
   r0h(x) 
 
At date 1, agents observe a signal (such as a leading indicator) that predicts perfectly the 
value of r at date 2. Also, each consumer receives a time-preference shock at date 1, some 
become early consumers and the remainders become late consumers. There are equal numbers 
of early and late consumers and each consumer has an equal chance of belonging to each group. 
The size of each group is normalised to one. The initial endowment for each agent is 2. Thus the 
agent’s utility function can be written as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2,U c c u c u c= +      (1.3) 
Optimal solution for a closed economy 
 
Ex-ante, a central planner will maximise the ex-ante expected utility to obtain the optimal 
portfolio of the risky (x) and risk-free asset (y). Let ct(r) denote the consumption at date t=1, 2 
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. .    2                            Budget constraint at date 0, portfolio equal or less to the initial endowment
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( ) ( ) ( )2 1
ate 1, consumption less or equal to risk free asset holdings
           Budget constraint at date 2. cosumption less or equal to risky asset return 
                                        
c r rh x y c r≤ + −
( ) ( )1 2
           minus consumption of the risk-free asset at date 1
                              Incentive constraint so that late consumers wait to date 2c r c r≤
 
Solving this simple problem yields the optimal solution for the closed economy: 
 
( ) ( )
( )
( )1 2c c    if    2
rh x y
r r y rh x
+
= = ≥                                                   (1.4)  
In other words, consumption in both periods will be the same if the return of the risky asset is 
less than holding the risk free asset.  Another possibility is that if the return of the risky asset is 

















                 Diagram 5: Allen and Gale model (1998) for a closed economy 
 
 
In this simple stock market there is no insurance against the intertemporal preference shock. 
If an agent invests in the risk-free asset to provide consumption at date 1, then he will miss the 
higher returns from the risky asset. If he invests in the risky asset, there is the risk of having to 
sell the asset at a low price to provide consumption at date 1.  
 
Risk sharing can be achieved through a competitive banking system in which individual 
banks can purchase assets to provide for the future consumption of depositors. As in the 
Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model banks can take deposits from agents at date 0 and offer them a 
deposit contract specified in real terms promising 1 0d ≥ units of consumption at date 1 and 
2 0d ≥  units at date 2. Deposit contracts are not explicitly contingent on the returns to the risky 
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asset in order to allow for the possibility of a bank run. Allen and Gale (1998) demonstrate that 
these contracts are de facto contingent of r if there is no way to liquidate the risky asset with low 
returns. Given the limited amount of liquidity available, the amount each agent receives is 
smaller the greater the number of early withdrawals. If the risky asset can be liquidated then it 
can be modelled with liquidation costs ( )0 1γ< <  proportional to the return at maturity 
therefore the return at date 1 when liquidated can be expressed as ( )rh xγ . Bankruptcy rules of 
the bank are as follows: 
 
Bank Date 1 Date 2 
Can pay d1 
Must pay d1 even if it has to liquidate 
holdings of the risky asset as a 
loss 
Assets remaining at date 2 are paid to 
the remaining depositors  
Cannot pay d1  Must liquidate all its assets and pay 
out the liquidated value. 
Cannot pay to any depositors the 
result is a bank run at date 1 
 
This implies that there is a critical value of r (r*) to avoid a run. In order to avoid a run it 
should be possible to pay 1 2d d d= = units of consumption. Because of the constraint 
( )( ) ( )( )
( )
1 2 2 2
y rh x
u c r u c r u
γ+ 
+ >  
 
 it is not optimal for the bank to pay d>y. It would 
be better for the bank to increase y and avoid liquidating the risk asset. Thus, in 
equilibrium d y≤ and liquidation occurs only when there is a run. Consumption in both periods 
will be the same if the return of the risky asset is less than holding the risk free asset. Other 
possibility is that if the return of the risky asset is higher than holding the risk free asset then 
consumption in date 2 will be higher.  
2




















                 Diagram 6: Allen and Gale (1998) closed economy with a central bank 
 
Compared with the case without a banking system, the existence of banks that face costly 
liquidation is inefficient. The inefficiency of the equilibrium with a banking system arises 
because of the costly liquidation of the risky asset at date 1. This can be avoided if the deposit 
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contract is specified in nominal terms and the central bank adopts a monetary policy that makes 
the price level contingent on the state of nature. Now we have to assume that deposit contracts 
promise a constant amount of the domestic currency in every state of nature. In other words, the 
deposit contract is non-contingent in nominal terms and contingent in real terms. The central 
bank can introduce the appropriate variation in the price level so banks can avoid costly bank 
runs and achieve efficient risk sharing.  
 
A deposit contract promises the depositor D1 units of money if he withdraws at period 1 and 
D2 if withdrawal is at period 2. The price level at date is contingent on the risky asset return, 
hence ( )tp r , an arbitrage condition is ( ) ( ) ( )1 2p r p r p r= = . If we take the solution to the 






=        (1.5) 
 
This ensures that the optimal allocation is achieved and aligns the planner’s problem with 
the bank’s solution. This implies that the illiquidity of low returns can be offset by increasing 










                 Diagram 7: Allen and Gale (1998) price level in a closed economy  
 
Optimal solution for an open economy 
 
Allen and Gale (2000) introduce an international bond market to open the economy. The 
assumptions are  
 
- Small economy relative to the rest of the world.  
- The value of foreign currency is fixed in terms of consumption.  
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- One unit of the foreign currency is normalised so that it purchases one unit 
of the consumption good.  
- Short-term bonds in the international market which are now the risk-free 
asset.  
- The risk-free return on short-term bonds is fixed on 1ρ ≥ . 
- The risk of default is reflected on the face value of the bond, therefore all 
changes are on the price not on the expected return.  
- The exchange rate is controlled.  
 
The nominal interest rate interest rate is set to 0. Arbitrage between foreign-currency bonds 







≡  and we can set ( ) ( )1p r p r= . 
 
Access to international markets is valuable for three reasons: i) because the return on bonds 
is lower than the expected return on the risky asset, banks can make a profit by borrowing short 
in the international market and investing the proceeds in the risky asset at date 0; ii) second, 
when r is high liquidity can be obtained for early consumers by borrowing in the international 
market at date 1; and, iii) third, it may be possible to transfer the small country’s asset risk to 
lenders in the international bond market.  
 
We turn directly to the case where bank deposits are denominated in terms of the domestic 
currency. Domestic depositors are holding domestic currency debt, since a bank deposit 
promises a fixed amount of the domestic currency at each date. International bondholders are 
holding foreign currency denominated debt. In this case, the same as in the closed economy, the 
central bank can alter the real value of the domestic-currency debt, but additionally can alter 










Reduction in the 
real value of 
deposits
However, there is still risk of 
bankruptcy for very low 
realisations of asset returns
Banks can repay 
foreign bondholders
Increase in the 
domestic prices
Reduction of the 
exchange rate
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Banks now face two types of creditors in the event of bankruptcy, foreigners who have 
claims over international reserves and domestic depositors who hold claims in the domestic 
currency. Let q denote the price of one domestic currency bond and b the amount to be repaid at 






≤ .  
Let’s assume that in case of bankruptcy, foreign debt holders are seignior to domestic ones. 
The bank will go bankrupt when the output available is insufficient to pay the foreign debt. The 
foreign bondholder obtains his opportunity cost, which is the sum of the repayment with early 
liquidation at a loss plus the complete repayment. For *r r< foreign bond holders receive 
everything at date 1 and domestic depositors receive nothing. For *r r≥ the price level is given 
by the ratio of nominal claims to output when the incentive constraint binds and the central bank 
allows risk sharing between the early and late consumers for all values of r as in the closed 
economy case. However, there is no risk sharing with the international bond market, unless the 
economy is dollarised and the central bank looses independence.  
 
1.2.2.2. Other approaches. 
Herding behaviour 
 
The process of inferring information that feeds into expectations may lead to a mismatch in 
the relationship between observed fundamentals and the prevailing equilibrium. Banerjee, 
(1992), Bikchandani et al. (1992), Caplin and Leahy (1994), Lee (1997) and Chari and Kehoe 
(1998) explain how fads and herding behaviour among investors can be rational. The main idea 
behind these models is that if each individual investor has some private information. Then by 
observing the actions of others they will infer the information held by them, as there is no way 
to share information, and this can make rational the imitational behaviour. Depending on the 
sequence of the signals received, the equilibrium asset price can take one of several values. 
These signals can provoke a cascade or avalanche of sell orders and a large change of price. All 
these models try to explain crashes in the stock market rather than in the debt market so they are 
not used to explain economic meltdowns such as the ones that happened in emerging 
economies.  
 
A stock market crash is a significant drop in stock prices and it may occur when there are no 
major news events.  According to Brunnermeier (2001), theoretical models that explain crashes 
can be grouped into four categories of causes. Each of these models can explain crashes even 
when all agents act rationally. However they may differ on their prediction of the price path 
after the stock market crash. Depending on the model, the crash can be a correction and the 
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stock market can remain low for a substantial amount of time or it can immediately bounce 
back.  
 
• Liquidity shortage models: the market dries up when nobody is willing to buy stocks at 
a certain point in time. This can be due to unexpected selling pressure by program traders. 
These sales can be mistakenly interpreted as sales driven by bad news. This leads to a large 
price decline. This type of crashes is of a temporary nature. In other words, one would 
expect a fast recovery of the stock markets.  
 
• Sunspot models: a sunspot is an extrinsic event, in other words, is a public 
announcement that contains no information about the underlying economy. However, they 
affect economic decisions since agents use them as a coordination device and, thus, they 
affect agent’s beliefs. The economy may have multiple equilibria and the appearance of a 
sunspot might indicate a shift from the high asset price equilibrium to equilibrium with a 
lower one.  
 
• Bursting bubbles: a crash that may occur even when the fundamental value of the asset 
does not change. In this setting there is an excessive asset price increase prior to the crash. 
The asset price exceeds its fundamental value and all market participants know this, yet 
each trader thinks that the other participants do not know that the asset is overpriced. 
Therefore, each trader believes that it is possible to sell the risky asset at a higher price to 
somebody else. At some point the bubble has to burst and the prices plummet. This type of 
crash is a correction and prices would not be expected to rebound after the crash. Bubbles 
are hard to explain without introducing asymmetric information or bounded rational 
behaviour.  
 
• Lumpy information aggregation: a sharp price drop can also occur even when no bubble 
exists. In other words, it is not mutual knowledge that the asset price is too high. Traders do 
not know that the asset is overpriced but an additional price observation combined with the 
knowledge of the past price path makes them suddenly aware of the mispricing. These 
models are closely related to herding models. The difference with pure herding models is 
that herding is not only due to informational externalities. In most settings, the predecessor’s 
action causes both information and payoff externalities. A stock market crash caused by 
lumpy informational aggregation is often preceded by a steady increase in prices. The crash 
itself corrects this mispricing and hence, one does not expect a fast recovery of the stock 
market.  
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Crashes in competitive rational expectations equilibrium (REE) models 
 
In a competitive REE model, many traders simultaneously submit orders. They take prices 
as given and can trade any quantity of shares in each trading round. In this setting, crashes can 
occur because of temporary liquidity shortages, multiple equilibria due to portfolio insurance 
trading and sudden information revelation by prices.  
 
Grossman (1988) highlights the informational difference between traded options and 
synthesized options. Its main conclusion is that derivative securities are not redundant, even 
when their payoffs can be replicated with dynamic trading strategies. Large price movements 
are due to a lack of liquidity provision by market timers12, which underestimate the extent of 
sales due to portfolio insurance trading. Contrary to the experience of recent shocks, 
Grossman’s model also predicts that the price would rebound immediately after the temporary 
liquidity shortage is overcome.  
 
In Genotte and Leland (1990) the market crashes because some market participants 
incorrectly interpret the price drop as a bad signal about the fundamental value of the stock. In 
this model, traders hold asymmetric information about the value of the stock and, thus, the price 
of the underlying stock is also a signal about a fundamental liquidation value. Consequently, 
even these other market participants start selling their shares. Combining asymmetric 
information about the fundamental value of the stock with uncertainty about the extent of 
dynamic hedging strategies can lead to a larger decline in price at the end of the period. The 
reason is that the traders wrongly attribute the price drop to a low fundamental value rather than 
to liquidity shortage. These authors employ a static model even though stock market crashes or 
price changes occur over time. As the parameters change over time the price equilibrium 
changes, this is the dynamic component of this model. A stock market crash occurs if a small 
change in the underlying information parameter causes a discontinuous drop in the equilibrium 
price. This explanation of a stock market crash provides a different answer to the question 
whether the market will bounce back after the crash or not. The price can remain at this lower 
level even when the supply returns to its old level. The results may change in a fully dynamic 
model since agents could anticipate the effects of parameter changes and incorporate them into 
their strategies and in consequence smooth the large variations in the price.  
 
                                                 
12 These are less-than-average risk adverse investors who are willing to bear part of the risk and provide 
liquidity at a much lower expected rate of return. These market timers can only provide liquidity to the 
extent that they have not committed their funds in other investment projects in t=1 (Grossman, 1988).  
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Crashes in sequential trade models 
 
Sequential trade models are more tractable than REE models and allow focusing on the 
dynamic aspects of crashes. The economic insights of the herding literature provide a basis for 
understanding stock market crashes. An informational cascade or a partial informational cascade 
can arise in trading models.  
 
Avery and Zemsky (1998) illustrate a sequential trade model with µ of informed traders and 
(1-µ) uninformed liquidity traders. Liquidity traders buy, sell, or stay inactive with equal 
probability. Each informed trader receives a noisy individual signal about the value of the stock 
v ∈ {0, 1}. In a sequential trade model, predecessors’ action not only causes a positive 
informational externality but also a negative payoff externality. The price changes since the 
market maker also learns from the predecessor’s trade. Hence, he adjusts the bid and ask 
schedule accordingly. This action changes the payoff structure for all successors. They show 
that the price adjusts in such a way that it offsets the incentive to herd. This is because the 
market maker and the insiders learn at the same rate from past trading rounds. Therefore herding 
will not occur given pure value uncertainty. Indeed, informational cascades can be ruled out 
even for information structures which lead to herding behaviour since the authors assume that 
there is always a minimal amount of useful information. Hence, the price converges to the true 
asset value and the price process exhibits no excess volatility regardless of the assumed signal 
structure, due to price process’ martingale13 property.  This implies that large mispricing 
followed by a stock market crash can occur only with a very low probability. A more complex 
information structure is needed to stimulate crashes.  
 
The setting that Avery and Zemsky (1998) consider has two types of informed traders in 
order to explain large mispricing. One group of traders receives their signals with low precision 
qL, whereas the other receives them with high precision qH=1, that is, they receive a perfect 
signal. The proportion of insiders with perfect signals is either high or low and is not known to 
the market. This composition structure makes it difficult for the market maker to differentiate 
between a market composed of well informed traders following their perfect signal from one 
with poorly informed who herd. In both situations a whole chain of informed traders follows the 
same trade. If the prior probability is very low that poorly informed traders are operating in the 
market, a chain of buy orders make the market maker think that a large fraction of traders is 
perfectly informed. Thus he increases the price. If the unlikely event occurs in which only 
poorly informed traders herd, the asset price may exceed its liquidation value v. The market 
                                                 
13 Consider a filtered probability space together with an adapted stochastic process Z= {Zt; t=0, 1, 2,…, 
T}. The process Z is said to be a martingale if E[Zt+s | t=0,1,…,T ] = Zt all s, t ≥ 0 
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maker can infer only after many trading rounds that the uninformed traders have herded in 
which case the asset price crashes.  
1.3. Currency and financial crises: Forecasting the weather 
 
What does all this mean? Why did it happen? 
...What were the causes of these events? ... These 
are the instinctive, plain, and most legitimate 
questions humanity asks itself.  
Second Epilogue in War and Peace by Leo Tolstoy, 
1869 
 
I keep the subject of my inquiry constantly before 
me, and wait till the dawning opens gradually, little 
by little, into a full and clear light.  
Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) 
 
Prediction is very difficult, especially about the 
future 
Niehls Bohr (1885-1962) 
 
 
The understanding of financial crises is important not only from an “academic” point of 
view. It is a phenomenon that has real consequences and important policy implications. During 
the 1980’s several countries found themselves involved in currency crises which were 
commonly explained by fiscal and monetary imbalances. However, during the 1990’s countries 
with economic reforms and financial liberalisation processes faced sudden and unexpected 
collapses in their financial systems, currency crises and severe episodes of economic 
contraction. Thus, the understanding of the causes and risk factors that increased the 
vulnerability of these economies will allow not only to have a wider knowledge but to 
implement effective economic policies that may allow avoiding or preventing the occurrence of 
this kind of crises.  
 
When explaining ‘financial’ crises the majority of previous studies refers to currency crises 
and banking crises as occurring together and disregards their sequence and the possible channels 
of transmission. Few have addressed the occurrence of a ‘financial’ crisis as a phenomenon that 
shocks the financial markets (either in stock or debt markets, the banking system or speculation 
in other asset markets such as real estate). We will discuss some of the most recent studies that 
deal specifically with shocks to the financial markets and that can be applicable to recent crises 
in emerging economies. These studies analyse more in depth the behaviour of investors and the 
consequences that shocks to financial markets may have over macroeconomic conditions and 
vice versa. However, these studies focus on the role and impact that macroeconomic variables 
have in investors’ decisions rather than analyse the microeconomic foundations of these 
decisions; in other words there is still a gap to be filled between financial markets’ 
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microstructure and the aggregate performance of the economy. In this section we discuss some 
of the most representative empirical studies regarding financial and currency crises; these 
studies range from those proposing and testing new hypothesis to explain the causes of financial 
and currency crises to those that try to identify indicators that could allow the prediction of 
these crises. Eichengreen and Rose (1999) argue that while the number of theoretical models of 
the causes and consequences of banking and financial crises is considerable, systematic 
empirical work has been scarce. Most of the empirical work has focused in the search to identify 
which variables may be relevant for explaining the onset of a crisis and to identify which of 
those may be relevant and reliable predictors; on the other hand, work has been seldom done on 
testing the performance and predictive abilities of the structural models available. Among the 
issues discussed are: i) the definition of “crisis” that each approach adopts; ii) the variables 
included in order to explain a crisis (regardless the definition) and the methodology used to 
analyse the interaction between variables; iii) the results obtained; and, iv) the problems faced 
by each approach.   
 
1.3.1. Financial market structure approach 
 
Within this approach, there is a clear distinction between types of crises; the economy may 
face a currency crisis, a financial crisis or both at the same time. This distinction has acquired a 
great relevance since the 1990’s currency crises have been paired with severe disruptions of the 
normal functioning of the financial system. These disruptions may appear in several fashions, as 
a collapse in the price of assets (such as real estate and equity holdings), a collapse of the 
payment system (banking crises due to debtors’ defaults) or a collapse in bond markets due to 
the perception that liabilities (private or public) may not be covered. When doing this 
distinction, a currency crisis is defined as it has been done to define currency crises in the past, 
an attack on the domestic currency exchange rate and loss of reserves. However, the cause of 
this loss of confidence in the domestic currency is no longer an imbalance on public finances, 
but the likelihood or actual occurrence of a financial crisis. In this section we first present the 
theoretical background that these empirical studies propose. Secondly, we present some of the 
results obtained; and, finally we discuss some of the advantages and disadvantages of this 
studies.  
 
Kletzer and Chinn (2000) and Gourinchas, Valdés and Landerretche (2001) focus on the 
role played by the banking system in recent financial crises. Both papers highlight the impact 
that capital inflows have had in the allocation of credit; they both note that these pre-crisis 
inflows have implied a growth in loans to the private sector and because there are implicit 
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guarantees given by the government in case of default, sovereign debt growth liabilities rise 
accordingly. With a similar approach, Aizenman and Marion (2001) examine how increased 
uncertainty about an emerging market’s debt overhang might affect the willingness of foreign 
investors to supply new international credit. It can contribute to the liquidity shortage often 
experienced by emerging markets during a crisis. Chinn, Dooley and Shreshta (1999) argue that 
there must be three “insurance fundamentals” present in order to generate a private capital 
inflow followed by a speculative attack: i) a credit constrained government must have positive 
net assets; ii) the government’s commitment to exhaust these net reserves to pay off an implicit 
or explicit insurance contract must be credible; and, iii) private investors must have access to 
transactions that produce insured losses. These three factors must be present to trigger a capital 
inflow and the subsequent attack on the currency.  
 
Regarding the definition of crises, Eichengreen and Rose (1999) make a clear distinction 
between a currency crisis and a financial crisis. However, they only focus in banking crises and 
do not analyse the possible problems and shocks that happen in other financial markets. 
Accordingly, Gourinchas, et al. (2001) argue that lending booms are the cornerstone of 
numerous recent theories of financial and banking crises. These booms may arise following a 
poorly regulated financial liberalisation, a surge in capital inflow driven by external factors or a 
terms-of-trade shock that boosts domestic investment or consumption or both. They may also be 
the consequence of a macroeconomic stabilisation programme. During a lending boom, credit to 
the private sector rises quickly. Leverage increases and financing is extended to projects with 
low or negative net present value, either because monitoring becomes more difficult or because 
domestic borrowers’ net worth increases. Another risk factor is introduced by the existence of 
bailout-guaranties, either explicit or implicit, that induce private borrowers and lenders to 
develop and carry over riskier projects. The authors examine the case of Latin America for two 
reasons: first, the region experienced a relatively large number of lending booms especially in 
the 1990’s; second, a number of Latin American countries experienced exchange-rate 
stabilisation programs throughout the sample period.  
 
As Gourinchas, et al. (2001) found, the link between lending booms and currency crises is 
very clear in the case of Latin America but it does not address possible crises in over-the-
counter debt markets. This is especially true in the East Asian crisis where the firms were the 
ones that suffered liquidity constraints to meet their liabilities and the first attempts to bail them 
out by the government failed leading to the sudden reversal of capital flows and devaluation of 
the currencies.  In the same sense, Kletzer and Chinn (2000) propose a theoretical model of the 
dynamics of bank lending, domestic production and the accumulation of foreign currency 
liabilities by domestic financial intermediaries that ultimately leads to a financial crisis. The 
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equilibrium for the model economy predicts twin banking and currency crises that end a period 
of high gross domestic output growth and inflows of foreign capital. In this model, the loan 
portfolio choices of banks are subject to adverse selection in the presence of government deposit 
insurance for domestic savers and government guarantees of foreign currency loans for foreign 
creditors with insufficient monitoring. These features allow the banking crisis to be located in 
the asset side of the balance sheet rather than on the liability side (i.e. traditional models of bank 
runs by depositors). The empirical analysis on South East Asian countries that these authors 
carry out provides support for the implications of the models although formal hypothesis testing 
was not possible. In particular, countries that underwent a crisis appear to experience higher 
rates of international capital inflows and domestic bank intermediation. External debt has played 
a key role in crises in countries that have been experiencing historically high rates of economic 
growth before the crisis  
 
Regarding the surges of inflows followed by financial crises Chinn, Dooley and Shreshta 
(1999) claim that the most obvious explanation is to be found in the behaviour due to changes in 
expectations of investors. This is compatible with Aizenman and Marion’s (2001) study of the 
events in South East Asia during the 1997 crisis where they compare reported external debt 
levels before the crisis with higher figures uncovered once the crisis began, this suggests that 
there was debt unaccounted for prior to the crisis and that was disclosed during the crisis. This 
increased the uncertainty and perceived risk for investors and was a factor that influenced their 
decision to withdraw their funds from the affected countries. Chinn et al. (1999) claim that the 
traditional explanation of this kind of phenomenon that relies on conflicts between exchange 
rate policies and fiscal policies of emerging market governments is no longer adequate as it was 
ten years ago. The policy conflict in the model to be tested is between the desire of a credit-
constrained government to hold reserve assets as a form of self-insurance and the government’s 
desire to insure financial liabilities of residents. The first objective is met by the accumulation 
of foreign exchange reserves and line of credit. The second objective generates incentives for 
investors to acquire the government’s liquid assets when yield differentials make this optimal. 
The authors summarise a capital inflow/crisis sequence as follows: the availability of free 
insurance raises the expected yield on a set of liabilities issued by residents for a predictable 
time period. The yield differential relative to international returns generates a private growth of 
capital inflow that continues until the day of the attack. When the government’s marketable 
assets are matched by its contingent insurance liabilities, the expected yield on domestic 
liabilities falls below international rates and investors sell the insured assets to the government 
exhausting its assets 
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Other efforts to try to explain the determinants of crises have included the impact of 
institutional variables, such as corruption, rather than the macroeconomic environment. We 
briefly discuss one of these alternate studies. Wei and Wu (2001) argue that crony capitalism 
and self fulfilling expectations by international creditors have been often suggested as two 
opposing explanations for currency crises (these authors make no distinction between financial 
and currency crises). They propose corruption as a linkage between these two alternative 
explanations. Their main argument is that corruption may affect a country’s composition of 
capital inflows in a way that makes it more likely to experience a currency crisis that is 
triggered/ aided by a sudden reversal of international capital flows. The importance of this 
composition has been highlighted by the financial and currency crises in East Asia, Russia and 
Latin America during the 1990’s. Previous research has addressed three composition measures 
of capital flows relevant for the occurrence of a currency crisis: i) the lower the share of foreign 
direct investment in total capital inflows; ii) the higher the short-term debt-to-reserves ratio; or, 
c) the higher the share of foreign currency denominated borrowing in a country’s total 
borrowing, the more likely a currency crisis becomes. In their study, the authors make a greater 
emphasis on the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) share in total capital inflows because of the 
larger set of observations available and the higher reliability of them. The authors define 
corruption not only in the ‘narrow’ sense that refers to the extent to which firms (or private 
citizens) need to pay bribes to government officials but they use a broader definition that 
encompasses ‘poor public governance’ which also includes deviations from rule of law or 
excessive and arbitrary government regulations. 
 
1.3.1.1. Results obtained 
 
As we have seen, these empirical studies indicate that the term structure of debt is 
important, as well as the currency in which it is denominated, but also that there are institutional 
and regulatory arrangements that have an impact on the performance of financial markets and in 
their vulnerability to liquidity shocks. It is important to note as well that bank lending is not the 
only vulnerable mechanism, but also the wider debt market in which the domestic banking 
system may not be involved directly. In other words, as in the South East Asian case, indebted 
firms looking for direct foreign financing may face liquidity problems that in the short run put 
them in a default situation, with the consequence that foreign investors decide to withdraw from 
the country because of worsening expectations of the performance of the economy. This process 
can be worsened if there are institutional factors such as corruption that may hinder long-term 
investment and increase the uncertainty about the ability of the country to fulfil its short-term 
and foreign currency denominated debt. We will now discuss the specific findings of this type 
Chapter 1: Currency and financial crises; Defining bad weather 
Financial and Currency Crises 
48 
of studies regarding three main issues: i) credit booms; ii) investors expectations; and, iii) 
capital mobility. 
 
Credit booms  
 
Credit growth is considered one of the key determinants of banking crises, but this does not 
necessarily mean that credit booms are always harmful for the economy. In other words, “while 
the conditional probability of a lending boom occurring before a banking crisis may be quite 
high, it does not tell us much about the converse, namely the conditional probability that a 
banking crisis will follow a lending boom”. In order to analyse whether boom episodes are 
related to financial crises, and particularly whether they signal future banking troubles, 
Gourinchas, et al. (2001) compared the probability of having a banking crisis before and after a 
boom episode with the probability of experiencing such a crisis during tranquil periods.  They 
found that: first, the probability of a banking crisis after a lending boom is relatively low; and, 
second, that the likelihood of having a banking crisis up to two years after a lending boom is 
somewhat higher than during tranquil periods, although the increase is often not statistically 
significant. The conclusion to be drawn from these results is that lending booms generically lead 
to banking crisis is largely erroneous, that is while most banking crises may be preceded by a 
lending boom, and most lending booms are not followed by a banking crisis. Lending booms are 
associated with: an investment and – to a lesser extent- a consumption boom; trend output 
growth declines over 1 percent; a large increase in domestic real interest rates; a large increase 
in the current account deficit and a counterpart in the form of capital inflows; a real appreciation 
of the domestic currency; some worsening of the fiscal situation; a decline in foreign reserves 
and a shortening of the maturity of the external debt. In Latin America, lending booms are often 
followed or accompanied by banking and/or currency crises. Given the characteristics on the 
behaviour of some key variables across the sample allow to associate booms in Latin America 
primarily to financial liberalisation and development of the economies. Kletzer and Chinn 
(2000) found that he gap between capital inflows destined to non-crisis and crisis countries 
widened in the run-up to July 1997. Lending rations ratios exhibited a similar behaviour. In both 
sets of countries bank lending accelerates from the 1982:1-1993:4 period to the 1994:1-1997:1 
period. If total lending is considered, then the acceleration is even more marked. While the 
growth rate in lending to GDP ratio rises from 2.8 percentage points per year to 4.7 percentage 
points per year in the non-crisis countries, it rises from 4.4 percentage points per year to 7.8 
percentage points per year in the crisis countries.  
 
In order to determine the role of the exchange rate regime in banking crises, Eichengreen 
and Rose (1998) first analyse the simple correlation, i.e. the unconditional probability of a 
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banking crisis under fixed exchange rates. There is only very weak evidence against the 
hypothesis that banking crises are randomly distributed across regimes. The next step is to 
examine whether there is a partial correlation between pegged exchange rates and banking 
crises after controlling for macroeconomic variables. The dummy variables for countries with 
pegged and intermediate exchange rate regimes enter with coefficients indistinguishable from 
zero whether they are entered separately or together. To test the hypothesis that pegged rates are 
preferable when disturbances are domestic, flexible rates when disturbances are external, 
dummy variables for pegged and intermediate exchange rate regimes were combined with the 
measures of external shocks. In no case did any of the individual coefficients approach 
significance at standard confidence levels. And in no case did the group of regime dummies and 
interaction terms achieve joint significance at even the 90% confidence level.  
 
Investors’ expectations  
 
Another group of empirical studies focuses on investors’ expectations about financial 
markets.  Aizenman and Marion (2001) obtained suggestive evidence on investor beliefs about 
external debt levels in Thailand by constructing confidence bands around a debt forecast. 
Spiegel (2001) argues that this approach has some caveats, the first one being the lack of 
investment in the model. Therefore, an increase in borrowing invariably raises the probability of 
default. However, if the increased debt were profitably invested, the default implications of an 
increase in the stock of debt are unclear. Default risk would then be a function of shocks to the 
quality of investment undertaken rather than the stock of debt. Another caveat regards the 
relevance of the empirical evidence about the build-up of debt stocks in the two countries. The 
model predicts that the effective ceiling on net resource transfers to creditors will be the lesser 
of contractual repayments or the magnitude of the default penalty. However, the default penalty 
is proportionately increasing in debtor nation output. This implies that the relevant ceiling will 
be on the ratio of contractual debt obligations to output rather than the stock of outstanding debt. 
Analysing the ratio of total Thai debt service as a percentage of GDP over the build-up period, it 
is clear that debt-service-to-GDP ratios did not markedly increase because output growth 
matched increases in borrowing. Secondly, this ratio seems to be relatively stable over this 
period.  
 
On the other hand Eichengreen and Rose (1999) and Wei and Wu (2001) consider the 
impact of corruption, their argument is that it is bad for both international direct investors and 
creditors but direct investment suffers more from it and hence the composition of capital 
inflows favours financial over direct investment. Countries with this problem are more likely to 
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default on bank loans, or to nationalise the assets of foreign direct investors (on this point the 
authors do not explain if nationalisation is necessarily a consequence of corruption or if on the 
contrary it can obey to other considerations of economic and/or political necessity). The need 
for international investors to pay bribery and deal with extortion by corrupt bureaucrats tends to 
increase with the frequency and the extent of their interaction with local bureaucrats. Another 
deterrent for foreign direct investment is that international creditors are more likely to be bailed 
out than direct investors in the case of a crisis occurring. In summary, both studies found that 
corruption affects the composition of capital inflows in an unfavourable way to the country. A 
country with high levels of corruption receives substantially less foreign direct investment. 
However, it may not be as much disadvantaged in obtaining bank loans. In consequence, 
corruption in a capital importing country can tends to bias the composition of its capital inflows 
away from foreign direct investment and towards foreign loans. 
Capital mobility  
 
Eichengreen and Rose (1999) also address the role of external debt and stability of the 
financial system. It is usually thought that countries with large amounts of short-term, variable 
rate, foreign currency denominated debt are especially prone to exchange rate crises. There is 
evidence that the structure of the external debt matters for banking crises, even after controlling 
for a country’s other macroeconomic fundamentals. Regarding financial fragility, the authors 
argue that there are difficulties in measuring financial fragility in ways that are internationally 
comparable since countries do not report loan losses or loan-loss provisioning in a systematic 
way. The authors found that devaluations, as distinct from currency crises, have generally 
occurred after periods or overly expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. These expansionary 
policies lead to price and wage inflation, deteriorating international competitiveness and weak 
external accounts and to a loss of reserves, which jeopardises exchange rate stability and 
eventually forces the government to devaluate the exchange rate. This pattern is also to be found 
in Latin American crises during the 1980’s were the result of overly expansionary policies that 
led to high levels of government debt and inflationary policies but there were result as well of 
loss of confidence of the domestic currency and speculative attacks. What they characterise as a 
currency crisis is a speculative attack without apparent macroeconomic imbalances (the type of 
crisis that has been observed during the 1990’s in emerging markets) and is harder to predict. 
The result is that pegged exchange rate regimes are often abandoned for a free floating one and 
the parity is let to be determined by the market without further intervention of the monetary 
authority. On the other hand they test the suggestion of theoretical models that speculative 
attacks unfold differently in situations of high and low capital mobility. They confirm this 
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supposition; the presence of capital controls makes devaluations less likely and increases the 
likelihood that a government will be able to resist a speculative attack. 
 
1.3.1.2. Discussion  
 
One of the main problems that all studies face is the availability of data for many of the 
variables of interest; some key variables were not even directly observable, such as the riskiness 
of investment, the size of contingent liabilities and the share of bank capital, as opposed to 
foreign capital in domestic investment. To find evidence of increased capital inflows into 
countries that experienced a crisis may indicate that the financial markets may eventually face a 
liquidity constraint when these liabilities are required to be repaid. However, different channels 
of intermediation of these resources and risk sharing schemes of financial assets may have 
different impacts on the aggregate risk, both for the financial system and for the economy. 
Foreign direct investment was not as important as financial investment for multiple reasons: 
financial institutions, regulation of financial markets, types of allowed operations and the 
composition of direct and financial investment are key variables that determine the risk of 
financial integration processes and the investors’ decisions of where to allocate funds. The study 
by Kletzer and Chinn (2000) confirms that financial intermediation increased as a result of an 
increase in the availability of resources for lending; however, they fail to explain the 
implications that this phenomenon has for risk-taking in the economy. In other words, more 
availability of financial resources may distort risk-taking assessments and decisions when 
allocating resources, especially within the banking system.  
 
On the other hand, rather than asking if increased capital inflows occur before a crisis, the 
relevant question to ask is if an opening economy that is undergoing a financial integration 
process places itself in a vulnerable position where the risk of a reversal in capital flows may 
lead to a financial meltdown; this is because the very nature of the reform processes that these 
crisis countries implemented involves financing with external resources and capital inflows so it 
is tautological to ask if there were capital inflows before each of these crises. This problem 
arises as well in Chinn et al. (1999) who offer an insurance based explanation of investors’ 
behaviour that takes the analysis closer to a microeconomic explanation of market failure rather 
than the use of macroeconomic variables. However, the measurement and testing of their 
hypothesis still depend on the analysis of the behaviour of aggregate variables that have been 
considered in other studies with different theoretical approach. In this sense it is difficult to 
distinguish the underlying mechanisms that are affecting investors’ behaviour. Despite the 
efforts to include microeconomic-based explanations for the occurrence of financial crises, still 
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there is a lack of in-depth analysis of underlying mechanisms that are present in financial 
markets and that can lead to a sudden collapse. Some of the missing elements worthy to explore 
may be related to the institutional setup, the incentives to stay or withdraw from a country, risk 
pooling, asymmetric information and herding behaviour. All these issues have to be addressed 
to improve the understanding of financial crises in countries with apparently solid and 
successful reforms. 
 
Regarding the importance of debt markets and asymmetric information in the onset of a 
financial crisis, empirical evidence from Aizenman and Marion (2001) indicates that debt 
markets played a substantial role in the East Asian currency crises. However, the stability of the 
debt-service-to-GDP ratio may be not completely indicative of what was happening at the debt 
market. The data shows an important and interesting feature which is the lack of information 
and the inconsistency in figures before and after the crisis. This is an important feature that 
indicates that at the time of the onset of the East Asian crisis, investors and economic agents did 
not count with all the information relevant to take accurate decisions. This lack of information 
disclosure is a characteristic shared with the rest of the countries that had this type of crisis and 
implies the existence of a severe problem of asymmetric information that can be at the core of 
these episodes.    
 
Gourinchas, et al. (2001) and Eichengreen and Rose (1999) make important distinctions 
when analysing the data of different crises along a period of time. The study by Gourinchas, et 
al. (2001) links explicitly the occurrence of lending booms and currency crises, especially in 
Latin America. The distinction between types of crises is important if we try to understand these 
recent episodes. As we will see in following sections, currency crises models do not go further 
than using some financial variables (such as interest rates) to explain speculative attacks. This 
approach fails to explain what happens within the financial system that makes it vulnerable to 
crises. These authors try to find an explanation in the lending behaviour of the banking system. 
They succeeded to find it relevant in the case of Latin America where most currency crises have 
been intertwined with banking crises. However, the absence of evidence in other countries may 
not indicate that problems with financial markets are not present. One explanation may be that 
the problems that are so evident in the Latina American banking systems are to be found in 
other debt markets. One solution to this problem could be not only to consider lending booms as 
a risk source but also the increased access to international debt markets that are not 
intermediated by the domestic banking system. This broader definition of the credit market may 
also point to problems of insufficient risk sharing and therefore increased vulnerability to early 
recalls of the credits. A very important result from Eichengreen and Rose (1999) is that they 
highlight the differences between the crises during the 1980’s and the 1990’s; while during the 
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former decade currency crises were preceded by large fiscal deficits and incompatible monetary 
policies; during the latter one, it still not clear what happens to be the cause of sudden 
devaluations but it is clear that the credit lending system (in this particular case the banking 
system) plays an important role. However, it is still necessary to model the financial system as a 
whole, in particular the debt market, in order to fully understand the underlying question, does 
financial liberalisation implies that the financial system will grow more vulnerable to sudden 
liquidity shocks and under what circumstances this may be true?. 
 
While it is useful to explore alternative explanations linked to institutional factors, the stress 
that Wei and Wu (2001) put on government corruption as a determinant of financial crises may 
not be as relevant as the fact of the composition of the term structure of foreign borrowing. 
When a country finds itself with short-term liabilities, rolling over this debt involves a risk in 
terms of interest rates, liquidity shocks and profitability of the investment projects being 
financed. In general, it is safe to assume that in order to repay the short-term liabilities, firms 
and banks will decide to allocate resources in a socially suboptimal way in order to avoid 
finding themselves in a default position. Despite that corruption may be a plausible explanation 
to this bias in the composition of the borrowing portfolio, it is not limited to be the only reason. 
We can think for instance in regulation frameworks that incentive short-term investment over 
long-term investment; preferences of lenders are also important to take into account, if fund 
managers have incentives to compete on a short-term profitability basis as in Emmons, W. and 
Schmid, F. (2002) and Schleifer, A. (2000), then lending to emerging countries will be limited 
to this kind of term structure.  
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Table 5: Variables used by empirical studies with a financial markets approach  
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1.3.2. Macroeconomic indicators approach 
 
In the literature we can find as well empirical studies that rather than test for a specific 
theoretical model try to find some indicators that may allow predicting crises. These studies 
vary in the methodology used to estimate the probability of the occurrence of a crisis. It is 
important to highlight that contrary to the studies reviewed in the previous section, the studies in 
this section often do not begin with a specific well defined model to test but they check for 
robustness in the regression by including alternative explanatory variables. There are three main 
methodologies used by these studies: 
 
i) In probit and logit models the initial shock is an extreme value of an indicator of 
speculative pressures and the leading indicators approach, which attempts to select 
a parsimonious set of indices of vulnerability to external or internal shocks in order 
to forecast currency crises.  
 
ii) Leading indicators are part of a warning system proposed in the papers by 
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997) and Kaminsky (1998) which involves the 
evolution of a number of economic indicators that tend to systematically behave 
differently prior to a crisis. Every time that an indicator exceeds a certain threshold 
value, interpreted a warning “signal”, that a currency crisis may take place within 
the following 24 months. The threshold values are calculated in a way that they 
achieve a balance between the risk of having many false signals and the risk of 
missing many crises. The behaviour of the indicators that are issuing signals can 
also be used to identify some of the sources that underlie the probability of a crisis. 
 
iii) In Markov switching models crises are defined in terms of discontinuities in the 
data-generating process which directly test the presence of multiple equilibria, and 
tests on structural breaks in correlation. 
 
According to Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997) the most commonly used approach 
has been to estimate the one-step-ahead (or k-step) probability of devaluation in the context of a 
multivariate probit or logit model. This methodology has the advantage that it summarises the 
information about the likelihood of a crisis in one useful number, the probability of devaluation; 
it also considers all the variables simultaneously, and it disregards those variables that do not 
contribute information that is independent from that provided by other variables already 
included in the analysis. However, this methodology has important limitations: i) first, it does 
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not provide a metric for ranking the indicators according to their ability to accurately predict 
crises and avoid false signals; measures of statistical significance do not provide information on 
whether the relative strength of that indicator lies in accurately calling a high proportion of 
crises at the expense of sending numerous false alarms or instead missing a large share of crises; 
ii) it does not provide a clear reading of where and how widespread the macroeconomic 
problems are. Within this approach, it is difficult to judge which of the variables is out of line. 
An alternative approach is the focused on the ability of a set of macroeconomic and financial 
“indicators” to forecast the occurrence of a currency crisis correctly, this approach has been 
proposed by Kaminsky (1998) and Kaminsky Lizondo and Reinhart (1997). In line with the 
previous models, a crisis period is defined as a month in which the variable measuring the 
exchange rate market pressure reaches extreme values. For each indicator there is an established 
threshold, the indicator is said to release a signal whenever its value is larger than the threshold.  
 
Another part of the literature has focused in the use of GARCH models to analyse the 
transmission of shocks across financial markets, the phenomenon known as contagion (Pericoli 
and Sbracia, 2003). These studies try to analyse the transmission of volatility between markets 
and to determine if the observed volatility in any financial market has only country-specific 
correlation (heat waves) or is affected by spillovers from other countries (meteor showers). A 
third set of studies has used Markov-switching models to test discontinuities. The use of this 
framework has the advantage that discontinuities can be directly attributed to jumps between 
multiple equilibria.   
 
1.3.2.1 Results obtained 
 
In this section we discuss the main results of these studies. These empirical studies have an 
important difference with the studies that adopt a financial markets approach and it is that they 
test several hypotheses rather than a specific theory. Therefore, the results are limited to the 
estimation of the role that different variables have in the onset of a crisis; here we identified 
three main hypotheses that are tested and that relate to the following: i) the importance of debt; 
ii) the role of external imbalances; and, iii) the role of expectations and fundamentals. 
Additionally, there is a fourth kind of studies that do not assume any hypothesis a priory but it is 
limited to measure possible deviations from their long term trend of selected variables and tries 
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The impact of debt in the probability of a crisis 
 
Assuming a central hypothesis of financial market instability, Radelet and Sachs (1998a) 
could predict that countries with a high ratio of short-term debt to short-term assets would be 
more vulnerable to crisis. A high ratio of short-term debt to reserves, however, will not 
necessarily induce a crisis in a given year, but it indicates the vulnerability of the country to a 
crisis. Second, they measure the ratio of the financial system claims on the private sector 
relative to GDP, and then they calculate the change in that ratio over the preceding three years. 
Countries with sharply rising financial sector claims relative to GDP are expected to be more 
vulnerable to financial crisis. Third, in order to include the role of large current account deficits 
the current account ratio to GDP was included along with the capital account ratio with GDP. 
Other variables were also examined such as the real exchange appreciation and a comparative 
index of corruption. Their results found that the variables related to the onset of a crisis were: 
higher ratios of short-term debt (both private and public) to reserves and a rapid build up in the 
claims of the financial sector. This suggests that financing structural changes with debt are the 
elements that had put these economies in high risk.  
 
On the other hand, Ferreti and Razin (1997) did not find suggestions that reversals are 
systematically correlated with the GDP growth rate before the event. They also did not find 
significant links between the real exchange rate (or of its rate of change) and the current account 
reversals.  None of the variables directly measuring the burden of external debt comes in 
significantly in the probit regressions contrary to the results of Radelet and Sachs (1998a). 
These two studies with similar methodologies (namely probit models) and sets of variables 
apparently reach opposite conclusions, for Radelet and Sachs (1998a) the level of debt is an 
important predictor of a currency crisis, while for Ferreti and Razin (1997) it is not. However, if 
we pay attention to the time periods for which the estimations are carried out, we can see that 
they focus on different sets of crises. While Radelet and Sachs (1998a) focus on 1990’s 
emerging market crises, Ferreti and Razin (1997) focus on previous crises that have different 
causes and dynamics. If this is the case, then the two studies are not mutually exclusive, it could 
be the case that Ferreti and Razin (1997) are in fact studying another type of crises rather than 
the 1990’s phenomenon of crises in emerging markets. Therefore, there is a need of 
classification and identification of types of crises in order to understand this phenomenon. 
The role of external imbalances  
 
Ferreti and Razin (1997) argue that the Mexican experience and contagion effects on other 
emerging market economies have been the subject of a large number of studies; however, there 
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is no comprehensive cross-country study of sharp reductions in current account imbalances. A 
sharp reduction in external imbalances can be originated by the implementation of stabilisation 
plans or by sudden reversals in international capital flows. Fratzcher (1999) develops a model in 
which the exchange rate pressure in one country depends on a set of domestic fundamentals, 
some measures of real integration (such as trade) and of financial integration with other 
countries and the possibility of probability regime switching. In particular, the model indicates 
that the transmission of shocks plays a major role in determining exchange rate pressure both in 
tranquil and crisis periods.  Another conclusion is that for any country, a prediction of the 
severity of the exchange rate pressure during the Mexican and the Asian crisis and a rank of the 
vulnerability of countries for both episodes. According to Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) this 
model does not perform much better when compared with analogous predictions from some 
leading indicator models.   
 
The role of expectations and fundamentals  
 
Jeanne (1997) attempts to reconcile the usually opposed view that speculation is motivated 
by the fundamentals and the one that it is self-fulfilling. The analysis is based on a model that 
encompasses both views, i.e. in which speculation may be fundamental-based and/or self-
fulfilling. The logic of the self-fulfilling speculation is that it makes it more costly for the 
policymaker to stay in the system. An important property of the model is that self-fulfilling 
market spirits cannot arise under arbitrary circumstances, but only when the fixed exchange rate 
arrangement has been undermined by weak fundamentals. The case used to illustrate his method 
is the French franc that suffered several speculative attacks in 1992 and 1993 and could only 
stay in the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS at the cost of a considerable widening of the 
fluctuation margins at the beginning of August 1993. The data is monthly and runs from 
January 1991 to July 1993. The macroeconomic variables are: the real exchange rate, the trade 
balance GDP ratio and the unemployment rate. The model performs better in tracking 
devaluation expectations of the French franc in 1992-93 than a linear regression. They argue 
that if applied to episodes as the Mexican Peso devaluation in 1994, the model should perform 
similarly as in the case of the French franc because the fact that it was so sudden to be 
satisfactorily explained by fundamentals only.   
 
Jeanne and Masson (2000) characterise the equilibrium and give a simple criterion for 
existence of multiplicity. They show that the model they consider in their study can be brought 
to the data using a standard econometric approach, the Markov-switching regimes model. 
Linearising their model results in a Markov-switching regimes model for the devaluation 
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probability, in which the switch across regimes corresponds to jumps between different 
equilibria. This provides some theoretical justification for the use of the Markov-switching 
regimes approach in empirical work on currency crises, and can also help to assess the empirical 
plausibility of the multiple equilibria hypothesis. They  use the case of the French franc as in 
Jeanne (1997) but for the period 1987-1993 and find that a model allowing for sunspots 
performs better than a purely fundamental-based model, in particular by improving the 
relationship between the economic fundamentals and the devaluation expectations. 
 
Early warning systems 
 
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997) and Kaminsky (1998) study 76 currency crises 
from a sample of 15 developing and 5 industrial countries during 1970-1995 using their own 
methodology of “signals”. This approach involves monitoring the evolution of a number of 
economic variables. When one of these variables deviates from its normal level beyond a 
threshold value, it is said to be a warning signal about a possible currency crisis within a 
specified period of time. The authors define crisis as a situation in which an attack on the 
currency leads to a sharp depreciation of the currency, a large decline in international reserves, 
or a combination of the two. Hence, this definition of a crisis includes both successful and 
unsuccessful attacks on the currency; it also includes not only currency attacks under a fixed 
exchange rate but also attacks under other a crawling-peg regime or an exchange rate band. 
Crises are identified ex-post by the behaviour of an “index of exchange market pressure”. The 
signalling period is considered as that within which the indicators would be expected to have 
ability for anticipating crises. Regardless of the problems of working with different data 
settings, some conclusions can be drawn from the Kaminsky, et al. (1997) study:  
 
• First, an effective warning system should consider a broad variety of indicators; 
currency crises seem to be usually preceded by multiple economic, and sometimes 
political, problems. The evidence points to the presence of both domestic and external 
imbalances which span both the real side of the economy and the domestic financial 
sector.  
• Second, those individual variables that receive ample support as useful indicators of 
currency crises include international reserves, the real exchange rate, credit growth, 
credit to the public sector, domestic inflation, trade balance, export performance, 
money growth, M2/international reserves, real GDP growth and the fiscal deficit. 
Chapter 1: Currency and financial crises; Defining bad weather 
Financial and Currency Crises 
60 
• Third, only tentative conclusions can be drawn regarding the other indicators. The 
main reason being that the have been included in only one or two of the studies under 
review.  
• Fourth, the variables associated with the external debt profile did not fare well. 
Contrary to expectations, the current account balance did not receive much support as 
a useful indicator of crises.  
 
Berg and Patillo (1999) discuss Kaminsky’s assertion that her method of leading indicators 
can be applied successfully to the 1997 crises in South East Asia. However, they found that 
Kaminsky does not provide tests of the validity of this method against others. Furthermore, 
given the non-statistical nature of Kaminsky’s approach it is difficult to evaluate its success. 
The analysis carried out by Berg and Patillo (1999) suggests that the approach can indeed be 
useful but most crises are still missed and most alarms are false. In order to compare 
Kaminsky’s study, the authors apply a probit regression technique to the same data and crisis 
definition. They embed the Kaminsky, et al.  (1997) approach in a multivariate probit 
framework in which the independent variable takes a value of one if there is a crisis in the 
subsequent 24 months and zero otherwise. This has three advantages: the usefulness of the 
threshold concept can be tested; predictive variables can be aggregated into a composite index 
taking into account correlations among them; and, statistical significance of individual variables 
can be tested as well as the constancy of coefficients across time and countries. Two main 
conclusions can be drawn from this exercise: first, the probits tend to slightly outperform the 
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997) based probabilities. Second, the ranking among the 
various probit models is ambiguous.  
 
Applying the Kaminsky, et al. (1997) methodology to predict crises in four Asian countries 
in 1997 (Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) and one Asian and three Latin America non-
crisis countries (Philippines, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico), there were no particular indicators 
that flashed similarly in all of the crisis-countries. The only indicators to signal in more than one 
country were the growth rate of exports, which flashed in both Thailand and Korea, the growth 
of M2/reserves which signalled in both Thailand and Malaysia and reserve growth which 
flashed in Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. In sum, the findings were that the Kaminsky, et al. 
(1997) approach has some success to identify which countries are vulnerable in a period 
following a global financial shock. Still the overall explanatory power is low and the overall 
goodness of fit for the out-of-sample predictions illustrates the low predictive power of the test 
and probit-based alternatives perform slightly better.  As Berg and Patillo (1999) found, leading 
indicators methods still need to be perfected in order to provide useful warning systems for 
policy makers. It may be that dealing with aggregate indicators specific problems in certain 
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markets are not being given an appropriate weight since it may be idiosyncratic to the market 
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Table 6: Variables used by empirical studies with a macroeconomic indicators approach  
 
1.4. Conclusions of the chapter 
 
We have discussed macroeconomic feedback models and asymmetric information models 
of currency crises and banking. There is a common belief that first generation and second 
generation models of currency attacks fall short to explain crises in the 1990’s; this is because 
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they were developed to explain crises in countries with unstable macroeconomic conditions, 
high fiscal deficits and inflationary environments rather in countries that were heading to 
economic stabilisation when currency crises took place. Chapter 2 reviews the specific 
macroeconomic conditions and the timelines of crises in different countries during the 1990’s; 
in Chapter 3 we study the phenomenon of contagion at the same time that we use a leading 
indicators approach to determine the causes of currency and financial crises and the direction of 
the effects between currency and financial markets. An issue that has been less discussed and 
analysed is the impact on welfare that these crises have had; chapter 4 provides a measure of the 
welfare impact of these crises.  
 
Regarding financial crises, bank run models have been commonly used to explain crises in 
the past but these models have a narrow view of what constitutes a financial market crisis. The 
sole use of bank runs models may not be suitable for explaining the recent crises since none of 
the countries faced this kind of depositors’ attacks to the banking system. We can say that 
withdrawal of funds from the countries under study included the retiring from the domestic debt 
market (usually short term debt denominated in foreign currency) and the selling of securities 
which derived in crashes of the stock markets. It may be more plausible to explain these 
phenomena by focusing on the presence of asymmetric information that leads to a market failure 
and in the extreme case to a complete collapse of the financial markets. Models that address the 
issue of stock market crashes and rational bubbles focus on the mechanisms within the specific 
market and more often than not, postulate ad hoc demand functions which do not allow 
expanding the analysis into a more general framework; in order to provide a unifying 
framework to financial decisions (participation in loanable funds and stocks markets) chapter 5 
analyses the theoretical implications of intertemporal maximisation on financial markets that 
provides  at the same time solution to some of the puzzles created by the Euler equation 
approach.  
 
The importance of the study of these crises will allow not only to review the existing 
theories about currency crises, but also will allow to design better economic policies aimed to 
achieved stabilisation, control of inflation and integration to the international capital markets 
without the risk of inducing imbalances that sooner or later have negative consequences for the 
economy and the distribution of income, which is the main problem in most of emerging 
countries.   
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Chapter 2: Emerging markets in distress; from 
December’s blunder to the “corralito” 
 
 
“Wall St. Lays an Egg” 
Variety, NY 30/X/1929 
 
“Twenty months ago Mexico faced the most severe 
contraction since the Great Depression” 
Speech delivered in New York by the Mexican 
Minister of Finance and Public Credit, 7/X/1996 
 
“…a defining event in the economic history of East 
Asia. Like the Great Depression in the West, it has 
the capacity to change thought about economic 
development and economic policy in fundamental 
ways.” 




Past crises in emerging markets had important impact on the performance of affected 
economies. Most of the studies that address the issue of the effects of currency instability that 
can be deemed as crises but these studies refer only to OECD countries and their conclusions 
cannot be applied to emerging countries for a variety of reasons: i) the institutional and 
regulatory frameworks of non-OECD countries are usually in a developing process; ii) the 
private sector finances investment projects through debt instead of equity and this debt is 
usually denominated in foreign currency which makes them take larger exposure to exchange 
rate risk; iii) these economies suffer from the ‘original sin’ of not having a strong currency and 
therefore investors’ decisions take into account exchange rate risk as an important factor for 
investment in the country; and, iv) expectations about the viability of government policy is 
usually enough to arise turmoil periods in domestic financial markets. Because of the 
abovementioned reasons, it is important to study separately those cases of emerging markets 
that have faced crises and try to determine the effects of crises in the performance of the 
economy.  
 
In order to fully understand the recent crises we need first to review the conditions 
prevailing at the time in each of these countries. With this in mind, we discuss and provide a 
description of the economic background at the time of the crisis episode in Mexico, South East 
Asia, Russia, Brazil and Argentina. All of these countries share initially successful economic 
reforms and large capital inflows. All of them faced a financial crisis coupled with a currency 
crisis; all of these crises were unexpected and were at odds with the traditional fiscal expansion 
Chapter 2: Emerging markets in distress; from December’s mistake to the “corralito” 
Financial and Currency Crises 
66 
based models that can be applied to the 1980’s crises. The Argentinean crisis has some 
particularities that set it aside from the rest of the crises, principally because it was the case of 
macroeconomic disequilibria provoked by the adoption of a currency board; we briefly present a 
discussion of its characteristics because hitherto it has been the last major crisis in emerging 
markets.  
 
2.1. Mexico, 1994 
 
Debo, no niego; pago, ¡no tengo!
14
 
Mexican popular saying  
 
The stabilization process of the economy that took place between 1988 and 1994 included 
the privatisation of the state-owned enterprises, commercial liberalization and deregulation of 
the financial sector. To break the inertial component of inflation was necessary the adoption of a 
coordinated effort with the private sector in the form of the Agreement for Economic Solidarity 
(Pacto de Solidaridad Económica, PSE). Among the compromises taken were the elimination of 
public sector imbalances, the adoption of a crawling pegged exchange rate, the opening of the 
economy, coordination with the private sector in price and wage setting and the credit restriction 
for the public sector. According to the compromises taken by the government, it was necessary 
to set basic targets to achieve internal stability, one of the main was the reduction of inflation (in 
1988 it was reduced to 52%), economic growth and recovery of the real wage.  The financial 
sector was reformed to allow the privatisation of the banking system (process that took place 
between 1991 and 1992), and the autonomy in 1994 of the Central Bank (BANXICO)15 with the 
clearly defined primary objective of seeking stability of the purchasing power of the domestic 
currency. From 198916 and up to early 1994, favourable expectations, abundant liquidity low 
international interest rates and the exchange-rate band led to large capital inflows allowed a 
rapid increase in consumption and investment.  
 
By the end of 1994, Mexico was an economy where financial deepening had vastly enlarged 
the stock of liquid assts which could be turned into dollars in a moment of crisis. The ratio of 
M217 to GDP had increased from 25% in 1989 to over 33% by year-end 1993. Liberalisation of 
the capital account also contributed to the process of financial deepening and increasing 
financial vulnerability. Mexican law was changed in 1990 to allow foreigners to hold 
government bonds and to buy (non-voting) shares in almost all sectors of the economy. This 
                                                 
14 I owe, I don’t deny it; I pay… I don’t have with what! 
15 All figures from BANXICO and SHCP (Mexican Ministry of Finance and Public Credit) 
16 World Bank (2001) 
17 M2=Coins and notes in circulation and cheque accounts (M1) + domestic financial assets owned by 
residents. 
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policy and the improvement of the perception of Mexican economy increased the capital 
inflows in the short term. The central bank sterilised these inflows by issuing short-term Peso 
debt (Cetes). As a result, the ratio of M3 (M2 + non-bank short term securities) to GDP grew 
from 36% in 1989 to 41% in 1993. At the end of 1993, Cetes alone represented close to 100% 
of net international reserves and total M3 was six times larger than reserves. Until March 1994, 
the Mexican private sector was selling securities at a rate of more the $20,000 million pesos per 
year to foreign investors. After March those sales of securities stopped. Instead, the private 
sector sold securities to the Mexican central bank, at about the same pace and at interest rates 
below those demanded by the foreign investors. These sales of securities appear in the central 
bank accounts as domestic credit expansion to the private sector and to the government. The 
pesos generated by the credit expansion were used to fund the current account deficit. This 
implied a pressure to the reserves in the amount of the current account deficit. They conclude 
that it was the attempt of the central bank to resist a further rise in interest rates demanded by 
foreign investor through various channels of domestic credit expansion that led to the collapse 
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In summary, total government domestic debt grew moderately. Expressed in dollars, 
domestic debt amounted to 1.7 times December 1993 reserves and to 2.6 times September 1994 
reserves. Second, the average maturity of domestic debt shrank in the course of 1994 as a 
deliberate policy, the increased turmoil during the year made steeper the yield curve and issuing 
long term debt became increasingly expensive. Third, perceived devaluation risk increased after 
the assassination of the ruling party’s presidential candidate in March 1994. Facing growing 
reluctance to hold Peso debt, and hoping to avoid a further increase in domestic interest rates, 
the Mexican government began rolling over its short term Peso denominated debt (Cetes) into 
short term dollar indexed debt (Tesobonos). Starting at USD$1,000 million at the beginning of 
the year, by the end of September the stock of Tesobonos outstanding had reached the same 
amount as reserves. In December the stock of Tesobonos reached USD$18,000 million. 
 
The World Bank (2001) highlights some policies that had profound implications on the 
depth and characteristics of the Mexican financial crisis of 1994: a) the predetermined exchange 
rate regime, which encouraged large short-term capital inflows. This policy produced a real 
exchange rate misalignment, inducing an unsustainable current account deficit and a rapid surge 
of domestic bank’s credit to the private sector; b) interest rates were inflexible as the 
Government imposed caps on them in the primary auctions. Since the Central Bank open market 
operations were conducted based on the primary auction rates, the rigidity of interest rates 
extended to the secondary market; c) the surge in consumption and investment in non-tradable 
goods as a result of the rapid increase in bank credit and of the exchange rate misalignment, led 
to an asset price bubble, which attracted more short term capital flows; d) at the same time the 
fiscal stance was deteriorating, due primarily to a large expansion of a credit for the 
Development Banks; and, e) as a result, the domestic savings rate declined.  
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Mexican International Reserves













































































































































































































































March, 23: Assasination of the official party's
(PRI) candidate for Mexican Presidency
June, 24: Resignation of the
minister of the interior Sept,28: Assasination of the chairman
of the official party PRI
Nov, 15: Resignation of the
vice-general attorney denouncing
government's implication in political
assasinations
Dec, 20: Increase by 15% of the fluctuation band
for the Mexican peso/ USD exchange rate
Dec, 22: Abandonment of the fluctuation
band and adoption of a free floating scheme
Dec,15: Tensions
between







































































































































































































































Figure 2: Mexican international reserves, 1994 
 
Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1995) found that the real exchange rate had appreciated relative 
to the long term average. However, inflation had declined sufficiently (to around 5-8% per 
annum) that the extent of overvaluation had stabilised. The conclusion that they draw is that 
while a relative adjustment was necessary, it did not have to be very large, traumatic or sudden. 
The current account started deteriorating in 1990 reaching 6.8% of GDP in 1993 and 7.9% of 
GDP in 1994. The widening of the current account deficit was result of an increase in total 
investment – from 20.4 to 23.6 % of GDP – and a decline in the national savings rate, from 19 
to 15.7% of GDP. The increase in private consumption was largely financed by the capital 
inflows that took place. The link was the banking system that converted much of this additional 
flow of resources into real estate and consumption loans. Mexican public debt levels were 
moderate. It was reduced from 67% of GDP in 1989 to 30% of GDP in 1993. Of this, 19% of 
GDP was foreign debt (most of which was long term at the end of 1993 as a result of the 1989 
debt restructuring) and 11% was domestic debt.   
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Fluctuation Band of the 
Mexican Peso/USD Exchange Rate
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Figure 3: Mexican crawling peg before the crisis. 
 
2.2. South East Asia, 1997 
 
 
According to Corsetti et al (1998), the incentives embedded in the structure of the economy 
are central to understanding the financial crisis in East Asia. They describe the corporate, 
financial and international levels in order to clarify the problems faced by these economies. At 
the corporate level, there were political pressures to maintain high rates of economic growth that 
led to the existence of public guarantees to private projects. Some of these were effectively 
undertaken under government control, directly subsidised or supported by policies of directed 
credit to favoured firms or industries. Even in the absence of promises of bail out the practice 
was so extended that the projects overlooked costs and risk of the investment. Investment rates 
and capital inflows in Asia remained high even after the negative signals sent by the indicators 
of profitability. In the financial level, the banking system increased its borrowing from abroad 
and expanded domestic credit. Financial intermediation was channelling resources toward 
projects that were marginal if not unprofitable from the social point of view. In the international 
dimension, the international banks lent large amounts of funds to the region’s domestic 
intermediaries with apparent neglect of the standards for sound risk assessment. A very large 
fraction of foreign debt accumulation was in thee form of bank related short term uncovered 
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foreign currency denominated liabilities, by the end of 1996, a share of short term liabilities in 
total liabilities above 50% was the norm in the region. Moreover, the ratio of short-term external 
liabilities to foreign reserves was above 100% in Korea, Indonesia and Thailand.  
 
For Chang and Velasco (1999) the data on the Asean-5 countries (Korea, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines) does suggest that the international liquidity position of 
their financial systems deteriorated before the crisis. The evidence strongly suggests that the 
short-term external liabilities of the relevant Asian financial systems were growing faster than 
their liquid international assets. In their interpretation, this trend weakened the international 
liquidity position of these countries to the extent that a loss of confidence from foreign creditors 
could force the financial system into a crisis. With data from the IMF (IFS database) we can 
have a glance to the liquidity position of the banking system in foreign assets and liabilities with 
respect to the stock of international reserves. As we can see the countries that had the worst 
problems of international liquidity were Thailand, which is actually the crisis originating 
country, and Philippines followed by Korea. In general, the countries had similar problems, 
Thailand suffered a problem of international liquidity; Malaysia was experiencing a bubble 
burst in the real estate sector and Korea was facing important bankruptcies of its conglomerates 
– the chaebols- that impacted negatively the banking system. Relative to the other countries in 
the region, macroeconomic conditions were more solid in the Philippines. The government’s 
budget was in surplus. Bad bank loans were at a rate of 3.4 percent by the end of 1996. 
However, the current account deficit was large and the currency had significantly appreciated in 
real terms. A very rapid lending boom to the private sector had fuelled investment in risky 
projects, as well as a speculative boom in the property sector.  
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Figure 4: International Liquidity, Thailand 
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Figure 6: International Liquidity, Korea 
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Figure 7: International Liquidity, Malaysia 
 
 
With respect to the behaviour of interest rates, we can see that they follow different patterns 
in each country, but they have in common a period of instability and increased volatility before 
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Figure 8: Behaviour of interest rates in South East Asian countries 
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Figure 9: Behaviour of exchange rates in South East Asian countries 
 
 
In Thailand, by the end of 1996 there was a large external deficit, fragile finance conditions 
of corporate firms and finance companies that had heavily borrowed abroad to finance the 
speculative boom in real estate and equity investments. In Indonesia, high inflation rates and a 
drop in trade surplus accompanied an acceleration of growth in 1995. The Bank of Indonesia 
raised interest rates throughout 1995 and increased reserve requirements for commercial banks 
from 2% to 3% in January 1996. In September 1996, the BI announced that the reserve 
requirements would further increase to 5% in April 1997. In an effort to reduce the effects of a 
monetary contraction on capital inflows, the BI widened he Rupiah’s trading band from 2% to 
3% around the daily mid-rate The band was further widened from 3% to 5% in June 1996 and 
again to 8% in September 1996. But the broader bands did little to discourage capital inflows as 
expectations of higher interest rates pushed the Rupiah upward on each of these occasions.  
 
Restricted measures were implemented by the Malaysian central bank, Bank Negara, in 
order to avoid overheating of the economy. It placed administrative controls on consumer 
lending for cars and houses in October 1995 and tightened reserves on Malaysian banks. By the 
end of 1996 growth had marginally slowed down from 8.2% to 8%. In 1996, the short term 
capital inflows surged to M$ 11,300 million compared to an inflow of M$2,400 million in 1995 
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and an outflow of M$8,400 million in 1994. Malaysia also experienced an overall in bank 
lending as high as 27.6% with a sharp switch from lending to the manufacturing sector to 
lending for equity purchases.  
 
Korea experienced a serious deterioration of the macroeconomic conditions in 1995-96. 
The current account deficit widened from 1.55% of GDP in 1994 to 4.8% in 1996, leading to an 
unprecedented accumulation of short-term foreign debt. Export growth fell sharply especially 
after negative terms of trade shocks in 1996. The stock market fell sharply in the two period 
1995-96 down by 36% relative to the 1994 peak.  
 
Relative to the other countries in the region, macroeconomic conditions were more solid in 
the Philippines. The government’s budget was in surplus. Bad bank loans were at a rate of 3.4 
percent by the end of 1996. However, the current account deficit was large and the currency had 
significantly appreciated in real terms. A very rapid lending boom to the private sector had 
fuelled investment in risky projects, as well as a speculative boom in the property sector.  
 
By early 1997, the macroeconomic conditions had seriously deteriorated in most of the 
region (Chang and Velasco, 1999). Finance companies in Thailand experienced an explosive 
growth of lending to the real estate and property sector, mostly financed by borrowing from 
foreign financial institutions. Troubled financial institutions were receiving official backing. 
This public intervention implied a very large injection of liquidity in the economy. From 
January to June the government announced repeatedly its intention to bail-out the troubled 
financial companies. However on June 25 the new finance minister discovered that the stock of 
international reserves available was a fraction of the officially stated. During the spring, USD 
28,000 million out of USD 30,000 million had been committed in the course of forward market 
interventions to defend the value of the Baht. The government realised that the overall costs of 
defending both the domestic value of the financial firms and the external value of the currency 
were unsustainable given the available fiscal and quasi fiscal resources.  
 
The speculative attack on the Baht that followed forced Thailand to let the currency float 
on July 2. By August 5, the Thai Baht had already depreciated by 20%; Thailand unveiled a 
plan to revamp the finance sector as part of a more general plan agreed upon with the IMF. The 
central bank suspended 48 finance firms already bankrupt and eventually, 56 finance companies 
went bankrupt. However, despite the timing of the bankruptcy a large number of these financial 
institutions were bankrupt well before the currency crisis, when the sharp depreciation increased 
the burden of their foreign liabilities.  
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In early 1997, Korea was shaken by a series of bankruptcies of its large conglomerates 
(chaebols) that had heavily borrowed in previous years to finance their grand investment 
projects. The macroeconomic indicators in early 1997 showed an increasing current account 
deficit, export growth was falling and industrial production growth rate were way below 
previous levels. As a general pattern, chaebols that went bankrupt or had severe financial 
problems in 1997 had above average debt-equity ratios. The string of bankruptcies translated 
into serious financial difficulties for the banking system. These banks had heavily intermediated 
external funds, borrowing in foreign currency and lending to domestic chaebols in domestic 
currency.  
 
In Malaysia the problem was with the real estate sector. Facing a booming speculative 
bubble in real estate and equity lending, Bank Negara waited before intervening. On March 
1997, announced ceilings on lending to the property sector and for purchases of stocks and 
shares. The impact of these measures on the Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) which is 
heavily weighted toward property and financial shares was immediate and caused foreign 
investors to start selling their stocks. Within a week of the announcement the index had dropped 
6.6% and was 17.2% lower than the peak of February 25.  
 
In Indonesia, the signs of overheating did abate in 1996 leading the BI to cut rates by 0.5% 
in March 1997 in the hope to moderate the inflow of capital, to ease the debt burden on 
Indonesian firms and to foster exports. In the meantime, however, Indonesian companies kept 
borrowing very heavily in international capital markets. As late as December 24 a report that 
total Indonesian debt was likely to be closer to USD 200,000 million almost twice as much as 
the government’s official figure USD 117,000 million. This report estimated that the 
government data ignored the bulk of short term off shore borrowings and that the total foreign 
borrowing by the corporate sector was underestimated by USD 67,000 million. 
 
The first currency to come under attack in the spring was the Thai Baht. Once the Baht 
started to depreciate in July 1997, the currencies that came under speculative pressure were 
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. After several episodes of depreciation, in September 
the Baht was 43% under its January level, the Rupiah 37% below, the Ringgit 26% and the Peso 
29%. The first reaction of the authorities to speculative pressures in the foreign exchange 
market was to avoid a significant monetary contraction and a significant increase in the 
domestic interest rates. This policy was later abandoned when the extent of the currency 
depreciation was too high. The depreciation jeopardised the financial viability of financial and 
non-financial firms, which a loose monetary policy was meant to preserve, while increasing the 
cost of bail out beyond the fiscal means of these countries.  
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Key Economic Variables of East Asian Economies 
Source: The Asian Financial Crisis and the Architecture of Global Finance 
 Indonesia Korea Thailand Philippines Malaysia 




















Partial No Yes Yes Yes 
Capital account 
liberalisation 




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Current account 
deficit 1996 
Moderate Moderate Large Moderate Moderate 
Table 7: Key economic variables of East Asian economies, Glick et al. (2001) 
 
 
2.3. Russia, 1998 
 
In 1992, the Russian government launched a package of measures influenced by reforms in 
Poland. It included a general liberalisation of prices and trade, and an attempt to restrict 
aggregate money supply in order to halt the possible price-wage inflation spiral. In the 
liberalisation of prices, production and trading, Russia was relatively slow. One estimate is that 
at the beginning of 1995 as much as 30 percent of GDP was still covered by price controls. 
Privatisation has proceeded comparatively rapidly. The spheres in which Russian economic 
reform has most clearly lagged behind the more successful ex-communist economies are 
macroeconomic stabilisation, the building of market institutions and the restructuring of 
enterprises.  
 
According to Hanson (1999) financing the state deficit in a non-inflationary way was not 
seriously attempted between mod-1992 and late 1994. Then it was done, under IMF guidance, 
by issuing short-term government securities, mainly treasury bills. It is important to mention 
that both the government’s spending and its revenue-raising have been compromised by weak 
administration and corruption. Regarding financial supervision and control, the attempts made 
by the government were made by the Federal Securities Commission (FKTsB) and the Central 
Bank of Russia (TsBR). The FKTsB made strong efforts to protect minority shareholders and 
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enforce some financial transparency in corporate affairs. The TsBR, meanwhile, was slowly 
tightening the bank’s capital and other requirements and withdrawing licences from weaker 
banks. Banking was the fastest growing industry in post-Communist Russia. During the banking 
boom of 1988-1994, which spawned 2,500 commercial banks, a major part of banks’ profits 
were earned through speculation in foreign currency, money laundering and manipulation of 
state loans.10 In the absence of a traditional treasury system, many large banks were authorized 
to carry out transactions for national, regional and city governments. Given high inflation and 
high interest rates, authorized banks were able to earn favourable returns in the interbank market 
if they held government funds on their books for a few months. The profits made on delaying 
government payments created fortunes for the owners of Russian banks. 
 
By 1997, the Russian State Statistics Committee (Goskomstat) reported $10.5 billion in new 
foreign investment, a 60 percent increase over 1996, and that foreign direct investment 
amounted to $6.2 billion. The United States was the top source of both portfolio and direct 
foreign investment in 1997. 
 
Officially recorded GDP, after declining continuously from 1989 through 1996, had shown 
a marginal increase of 0.9 percent between 1996 and 1997. Consumer price inflation had been 
brought down from 224 percent in 1994 to 11 percent in 1997. It slowed further in the first half 
of 1998. The rate of change of the broad money supply (M2) had been reduced from 224 
percent growth during 1994 to a slight decline in the first half of 1998. In 1998 GDP was 4.6 
percent below that of 1997, and consumer price inflation was 84 percent over the year as a 
whole.  
 
Hanson (1999) points out that the release of the IMF loan on July 13, 1998 was the trigger 
of the turmoil. The IMF deal was supposed to persuade investors to stay in the markets. Instead, 
however, it provided both Russian and foreign investors with more liquidity in the foreign 
exchange market. Once the deal was made and the first $4.8 billion was released investors ran 
for the exit even faster, and panic set in. Because speculation is leveraged with borrowed 
money, declining prices lead to margin calls and liquidation. Russian banks found themselves in 
a vulnerable position as markets plunged following the release of the IMF package. In the first 
two weeks of August 1998, Russian banks paid out an estimated $3 billion to meet margin calls. 
Adding to the impending disaster was the banks’ position in currency forwards, essentially 
speculative bets on the stability of the Ruble against the dollar and other foreign currencies. 
This bet was so large that 10 percent devaluation would have wiped out one third of the banking 
sector’s $6.4 billion in capital.35 On July 14, 1998, financier George Soros published an open 
letter to the Russian government in the Financial Times recommending that Russia devalue the 
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Ruble by 15 to 25 percent and introduce a currency board. When the markets opened on 
Monday August, 17 morning, most of the biggest banks would be insolvent, the Central Bank 
would be forced to spend over $1 billion each day to support the Ruble at the rate of 6.2 to the 
dollar, $5 billion worth of GKOs would come due on Wednesday and $4 billion in pensions and 
wages were already long overdue.  
 
2.4. Brazil, 1998 
 
In 1992, after the administration of President Collor de Mello left the presidency of Brazil 
in the middle of a corruption scandal, inflation reached 1,000 percent per year. A stand-by 
agreement was signed with the IMF in January, 1992. However, it failed and in 1993 when 
inflation exceeded 2,000 percent the Plan Real was launched in 1993. Under the Plan Real, 
stabilisation went through three stages: a brief fiscal adjustment, monetary reform, and the use 
of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor. In January 1994, Brazil’s Congress approved a fiscal 
adjustment that included cuts in current spending and creation of the emergency social fund. 
The second component, the temporary monetary reform measure, linked contracts prices, wages 
and the exchange rate to a single daily escalator and unit of account (URV). Finally, on July 1, 
1994, a new currency the real was introduced by converting contracts denominated in the URV 
into Reais at a rate of one to one. 
 
The Plan Real brought inflation under control with remarkable speed: it fell from four digits 
in 1994 to two digits in 1995 and to less than two percent in 1998. GDP averaged 4 percent per 
year between 1994 and 1997, compared to flat or declining output in the prior five years. 
However the interest rates remained high, with average passive real interest rates of 22 percent 
per year. Fiscal problems were compounded by the emergence of substantial quasi-fiscal 
deficits in federal and state banks. With the end of inflation, bad loans from state banks to state 
governments became a serious problem. Measures to stabilise weak state banks further 
increased the federal government’s vulnerability to capital shocks. Although the economy was 
growing on average above 3 percent per year between 1994and 1998, the ratio of net public debt 
to GDP increased from 28 percent in 1995 to 44 percent in 1998 and jumped to more than 50 
percent after the devaluation in January 1999.  
 
Stabilisation under the Plan Real was supported by tight monetary policy, including and 
increase in reserve requirements. The required reserves to deposit ratio rose from an average of 
26 percent during January-June 1994 to 64 percent during November 1994 April 1995. With the 
rise of lending restrictions the share of total seignorage seized by the Central Bank increased 
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from an average of 60 percent in the first half of 1994 to 84 percent a year later. The increase in 
required reserves and the lending restrictions to the banking sector in part explains the increase 
of interest rate spreads, of active real interest rates and nonperforming loans after stabilisation. 
During the early 1990s, Brazil followed the lead of other Latin American countries and opened 
trade by reducing tariffs, eliminating non-tariff barriers and abolishing subsidies and incentives 
to exports. The combination of liberalisation and exchange rate appreciation implied that the 
trade balance, which for ten years had been in surplus, showed a deficit during the last two 
months of 1994 that persisted through 1995 and contributed to a rising current account deficit. 
When Mexico’s crisis hit in December 1994, Brazil’s high foreign reserves gave the economic 
authorities some latitude in choosing how to respond to the crisis. 
 
Fiscal and monetary measures were taken in March 1995 to control aggregate demand and 
to improve the balance of payments. Fiscal measures included spending cuts for federal and 
state enterprises, restrictions on federal payroll outlays and changes in legislation to increase tax 
revenues. Measures were also taken to control credit growth including a mandatory 60 percent 
deposit with the Central Bank on bank assets used for collateral guarantees and select loans; an 
increase in the tax rate on financial operations involving bank loans from 6 percent to 18 
percent.; a prohibition on financial intermediation involving commercial paper by banks; and, 
an increase in the reserve requirement for time deposits. The policy measures to reduce the 
impact of Mexican crisis had the desired outcome. Economic growth slowed and by August 
1995 the monthly trade balance was positive. 
 
The control of inflation was associated with real exchange rate appreciation. The rapid 
appreciation under the Plan Real occurred at the end of 1994. The strong currency harmed the 
industrial sector and increased unemployment. The government reacted by creating subsidised 
credit to exporters through the National Development Bank (BNDES) and by approving 
legislation to exempt primary and semi-manufactured exports from indirect taxes. This 
phenomenon of accumulated real appreciation has been observed in other Latin American 
stabilisation programs using the exchange rate as a nominal anchor such as in Chile during the 
period 1975-81; Mexico during 1987-93; and, Argentina during 1990-95. The Plan Real’s 
strategy to contain inflation by using monetary and exchange rate policies reduced domestic 
savings and created unsustainable current account deficits. These policies in turn, led to an 
increase in capital flows that initially helped stabilisation. Capital flows that averaged $39 
million per month between 1988 and 1991 increased up to a monthly net flow of $970 million 
between 1992 and 1995. In 1996 and 1997, total net annual capital flows reached US $33 
thousand million and US $ 26 thousand million respectively.  
 
Chapter 2: Emerging markets in distress; from December’s mistake to the “corralito” 
Financial and Currency Crises 
81 
High interest rates accompanied a sharp increase in the debt of the public sector. In 1995, 
the stock of Central Bank securities and treasury securities outside the Central Bank grew 53 
percent in real terms. Between 1994 and 1996 the ratio of the net debt of the public sector to 
GDP increased from 28.5 percent to 35 percent. Net debt continues to grow in the following 
years, reaching 44 percent of GDP in 1998. Prior to 1998, most domestically denominated debt 
was at fixed rates, and about 15 percent was dollar indexed. By early 1999, 21 percent was 
dollar denominated and 70 percent was indexed to the overnight interest rate. Moreover 
maturities fell: the interest due on domestic debt in January 1999 alone exceeded 6 percent of 
GDP. According to Cardoso and Helwege (1999) the Mexican crisis led to a significant loss of 
investor confidence, which gradually returned over the course of 1995; the 1997 Asian crisis 
caused a brief panic but he real jolt came with the Russian crisis in August 1998, Brazil’s 
foreign currency reserves fell by $30 thousand million as the government struggled to defend 
the real.  
 
2.5. Argentina, 2001 
 
The decision of the government to peg the Peso to the US dollar through a currency board in 
1991 set into motion a process of rapid financial deepening. Argentina introduced banking 
system reforms quickly and effectively. The result was an internationalized and much more 
resilient banking system. However, according to De la Torre, Levy and Schmukler (2002) the 
banking system had some important weaknesses that undermined its capacity to deal with 
shocks. First, it lacked prudential norms explicitly designed to address the adverse effects on the 
capacity to pay of the non-tradable sector of a major adjustment in the real exchange rate 
towards a more depreciated equilibrium level. In the absence of a nominal devaluation such an 
adjustment had to take place through slow nominal deflation and unemployment. Second, the 
financial system became significantly and increasingly exposed to the public sector and thus 
vulnerable to a sovereign debt crisis. Third, the liquidity safeguards for the banking system, 
which were by design available to any depositor on a first come first served basis, proved 
inadequate to protect the payments system in the context of a depositor run.  
 
A series of external shocks as well as high fiscal spending set the economy overvalued the 
currency, made growth stagnant and the public debt hard to service. The new government that 
assumed power in December 1999 tried to induce growth through a tax-based fiscal adjustment 
and consequent confidence effects. It complemented fiscal adjustment with labour flexibility 
measures to overcome the exchange rate overvaluation and with a new IMF supported 
international package to refinance the debt. However, as De la Torre Levy and Schmukler 
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(2002) highlight, labour flexibility did not materialised, the fiscal package had an adverse effect 
on growth, the debt became unsustainable and there was a run on the currency and bank 
deposits. Policies taken after April 2001, also failed to revive growth, instead uncertainty about 
the currency and the value of debt led to a depositor run and the imposition of the “corralito” 
(popular name given to the freezing of all bank deposits) to avoid the collapse of the banking 
system, several changes in the country’s presidency, a default on government debt and the 
abandonment of the currency board.  
 
2.6. Conclusions of the chapter 
 
In this section we presented the timelines of events that preceded the abandonment of 
currency pegs in selected countries. There are countless accounts of this nature and the objective 
was to provide the reader a brief outlook of these events. However, there are few empirical 
studies that test the implications of new methodologies on this data; as we have discussed in the 
previous chapter, most of the leading indicators studies focus on OECD countries and all the 
comparisons of new developments are made using the OECD data set. One of the reasons is the 
reliability of the data available for emerging countries; the IMF database provides a standard for 
reporting national statistics but there are still many gaps in series and several inconsistencies 
still remain. The data used in the next chapters covers only from 1991 till 2002 which is the 
period with the most complete and reliable information. Chapter 3 analyses the causes of crises 
and enquires into the causes of crises (both in currency and financial markets) in order to 
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Chapter 3: Contagion; when a storm brings a flu 
 
 “When the US sneezes,  
Mexico catches pneumonia” 
Mexican popular saying 
 
“No one could have predicted that a local conflict, 
in a remote city, in the limits of the Hellenic world 
would lead to the devastation of the Peloponnese 
War, which was the equivalent of a World War in 
the 20th century” 
Donald Kagan, On the origins of war and the 
preservation of peace. 
 
 
Since the 1980’s crises in different countries have spread to other countries that are often 
geographically distant. There are several immediate questions that arise from the occurrence of 
these phenomena; first, which are the channels for the international transmission of these 
shocks? Second, are these channels only active during a crisis? And third, should international 
investors and policy makers worry about the propagation of these shocks? In order to answer 
these questions it is necessary to define the concept of contagion in the first place. According to 
Rigobon (2001) the issue of contagion has been one of the most debated topics in international 
finance but there is still no accordance on what contagion means. However, one interesting 
aspect of this discussion, which the author highlights, is the strong agreement among 
economists on which events have constituted instances of contagion: the debt crisis in 1982, the 
Mexican Tequila effect in December of 1994, the Asian Flu in the last half of 1997, the Russian 
Cold in August 1998, the Brazilian Sneeze in January of 1999 and the NASDAQ Rash in April 
of 2000. Contagion has been measured in different contexts; one is on asset returns: interest 
rates, exchange rates or linear combinations of them emphasising correlation between returns or 
contagion through volatility. On the other hand, contagion has been measured in frameworks 
that try to determine the probability of a currency crisis occurring in a country of interest given 
domestic and international information. As a result there are two branches of contagion 
literature: the financial markets literature and the macroeconomic indicators one.  
 
According to Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) contagion has taken different forms across 
different studies and it has been used to describe different kinds of phenomena. Pesaran and 
Pick (2005) and Kaminsky, Lyons and Schmuckler (2000) agree on grouping the literature on 
contagion in three major categories depending on the causes of the spreading of the crises and 
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Type of 
“contagion” by cause 
Characteristics Linkage Predictability 
1. Common cause  
(monsoonal effect) 
Financial crises appear to be 
contagious because they suffer a 
common external shock.  
2. Spillovers 
A crisis occurs to multiple, 
economically interdependent 
countries through external links such 
as trade. 
Interdependence 
Crises resulting from 
interdependence could, in 
principle be predictable using 
macroeconomic fundamentals. 
If the interdependence during 
non-crisis periods is known, the 
effect of a financial crisis in 
one country on the likelihood 
of a crisis in another country 
can be evaluated. 
3. Pure contagion 
The market jumps from a “good” to a 
“bad” equilibrium. It can stem from 
any kind of disturbance; the defining 
characteristic is that the rapid 
transmission to multiple countries is 
beyond what is warranted by 
fundamentals 
Contagion 
Largely unpredictable, higher 
correlation during crises times 
compared to normal times. This 
implies that a crisis in a country 
increases the likelihood of a 
crisis in another country over 
and above what would be 
implied by existing 
interdependence between those 
countries during non-crisis 
times.  
Table 8: categories of contagion 
 
 
As we can see, the two first categories correspond to the phenomenon of interdependence, 
while the third one is the one which we can properly call contagion; in this study we use the 
classification by linkage, which is that one of inter-dependence and pure contagion. We found 
that most of these studies use interchangeably pure contagion and interdependence while none 
of them measure these two phenomena separately. We need a useful framework to include the 
distinction between interdependence and contagion; in other words, apart from common links 
(international variables) and domestic factors that may lead to a crisis we want to include a 
variable that captures pure contagion effects. Pesaran and Pick (2005) propose a canonical 
model of contagion and provide a solution in a two-country setting. Their main argument is that 
in order to identify contagion effects in the presence of interdependencies the equations for the 
individual markets or countries must contain country specific variables; country specific 
fundamentals are needed to distinguish contagion from interdependence. Therefore, contagion 
tests that do not include fundamentals (domestic or international) cannot be valid, an example of 
these are pure correlation based tests18. Pesaran and Pick (2005) show that ignoring the 
endogeneity of the contagion indicator and/or interdependence can introduce a substantial bias 
in the estimate of the contagion coefficient.  
 
                                                 
18 Correlation based tests of contagions attempt to overcome the identification problem by assuming that 
the crises periods can be identified a priori and that they are sufficiently prolonged and contiguous so that 
cross-country market correlations can be consistently estimated and compared. The authors argue that 
they are strong assumptions that are unlikely to hold in practice and their implementation tends to be 
subject to sample selection bias. 
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Another problem we found is that these methodologies address contagion present either in 
financial data or in macroeconomic data so currency and financial crises are treated separately. 
As we will discuss later on, some of these methodologies are not susceptible of modification to 
be applied to certain type of data (e.g. GARCH models use high frequency data from markets 
where heteroscedasticity is more likely to arise while models using fundamentals use low 
frequency data) and therefore cannot be expanded to include both types of crises in order 
control for the effects of a twin crisis. Because of the characteristics of crises in emerging 
markets during the 1990s ignoring these facts could be introducing a strong bias when 
measuring contagion.  
 
Pesaran and Pick (2005) provide a useful framework that can be modified to nest different 
methodologies. This is a methodology based on simultaneous equations where crises in each 
country are transmitted as signals to other countries. Hence, it provides a useful extension of 
existing models that are estimated as a single equation for one country which requires some a 
priori assumptions about the direction of contagion and about the role of different variables. The 
main feature of this model is that it provides with a clear contagion definition which can be 
summarised as: the effect on a domestic performance indicator of an extreme value of other 
country’s indicator given the effects of domestic variables and common links. This definition 
does not depend on the channel of transmission of contagion since the performance indicator 
can take the form of probability of a crisis event happening, a composite index, changes of a 
variable or the variance of disturbances. Depending on this assumed via of contagion the 
corresponding econometric approach is to be applied. However, the clear distinction between 
interdependence and contagion remains a critical issue in the estimation.  
 
First we present an overview of the different methodologies and definitions of 
contagion that have been applied in the literature. Secondly, we present the derivation of 
the Pesaran and Pick (2005) model, some estimation issues and how this approach 
compares to other studies. Third, we apply the Pesaran and Pick’s (2005) model to 
Mexican, Brazilian and South East Asian data in order to estimate the contagion effect 
while controlling for interdependence and we try to find a link between financial and 
currency crisis. As we will see, the estimations are compatible with the findings by Chang 
and Velasco (1998a) when analysing the causes of the crises in these countries. We used 
the Exchange Rate Pressure index proposed by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) as 
the main indicator for a currency crisis and propose a Financial Market Pressure index 
for a financial crisis. We use the standard set of macroeconomic variables used in the study 
and analysis of crises in OECD countries. Finally, we present the conclusions of the study.   
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3.1. The study of contagion: are crises airborne or do they 




According to Dornbusch, Park and Claessens (2003) although research has progressed, there 
is not yet a uniform definition of contagion. However, contagion in general is used to refer to 
the spread of market disturbances from one country to another; this process can be observed 
through co-movements in exchange rates, stock prices, sovereign spreads and capital flows. 
Kaminsky, Lyons and Schmuckler (2000) argue that the non-fundamental explanation of 
contagion has attracted more attention than the fundamental-driven approach. This theoretical 
work focuses on rational herding. In Calvo and Mendoza (1998) and Calvo (1999), the costs of 
gathering country-specific information induce rational investors to follow the herd and 
uninformed investors replicate selling by liquidity-squeezed informed investors because the 
uninformed mistakenly (but rationally) believe these sales are signalling worsening 
fundamentals. Kodres and Pritsker (1999) focus on investors who engage in cross –market 
hedging of macroeconomic risks. International market co-movement can occur in the absence of 
any relevant information and even in the absence of direct common factors across countries. 
Kaminsky and Schmuckler (1999) find that spill-over effects unrelated to market fundamentals 
are quite common, and spread quickly across countries within a region.  
 
On the other hand, following a fundamental-driven approach Eichengreen, Rose and 
Wyplosz (1996) examine whether contagion is more prevalent among countries with either 
important trade links or similar market fundamentals. In the first case, devaluation in one 
country reduces competitiveness in partner-countries, prompting competitive devaluations 
(which are a case of fundamental spill-over contagion). In the second case, devaluation acts like 
a wake up call: investors seeing one country collapsing learn about the fragility of ‘similar’ 
countries, and speculate against those countries’ currencies (common cause contagion). 
Following this reasoning, Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998), claim that trade links drive the 
strong spillovers during the Asian crisis.  
 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) focus instead on financial-sector links; in particular, they 
examine the role of common bank lenders and the effect of cross market hedging (a type of 
common cause contagion). They find that common lenders were central to the spreading of the 
Asian crisis as they were to the spreading of the Debt Crisis of the 1980’s. Choe, Kho and Stultz 
(1998) use transaction data in the Korean equity market to examine whether foreign investors 
destabilise prices. They find evidence of herding by foreign investors before Korea’s economic 
crisis in late 1997, but these effects disappear during the peak of the crisis and there is no 
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evidence of destabilisation. However, these authors cannot examine the transmission of crises 
across countries.  Dekle, R., Hsiao, C. and Wang, S. (2001) examines the role of contagion in 
the Asian currency crisis. These authors use a more precise definition of contagion as an 
excessive co-movement across countries in asset returns, including exchange rates, the co-
movement is said to be excessive if it persists even after fundamentals have been controlled for. 
Baig and Goldfajn (1998) find that during the crisis period, the Southeast Asian currencies were 
highly correlated with each other but not with the Korean won. However, Forbes and Rigobon 
(1998), find that correlation coefficients are not significantly higher during crisis periods.  
 
In medical terms a disease can be transmitted either by contact or the infecting agent can be 
airborne. Similarly a crisis can be transmitted by interdependence and existing linkages 
(contact) or by pure contagion (airborne), how it is transmitted has different policy implications 
for protecting the economy against these external shocks. Similarly, when studying possible 
contagious crises we need to determine: i) which were the external factors that may have 
contributed to fuel the crisis; ii) which were purely domestic factors; and, iii) if both external 
and domestic factors are not enough to explain the crisis, if there was contagion. Returning to 
medical terms, we need to determine not only if two persons are coughing at the same time but 
also their diseases; if one of them has a common cold and the other one lung cancer then we can 
discard contagion and interdependence.  
 
Out of the literature, Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) identify five representative definitions of 
contagion that are commonly used when testing empirically for its existence. These definitions 
follow the categorisation by cause of contagion rather than by linkage; hence, they do not 
correspond entirely to the definition we are using. Depending on the definition of contagion 
there are different methodologies used to measure it. In this sense contagion is not a unique 
phenomenon, some channels of transmission may be present in turmoil periods and other may 
be inactive. This has as consequence that some studies can contradict each other when 
accounting for contagion; in other words, this can be attributed more to the different definitions 
of contagion and the type of linkage they imply rather than contradicting evidence. It is 
important to mention that although these definitions of contagion may differ and focus either on 
interdependence, pure contagion or a mixture of both, the type of linkage do not determine the 
methodology to use. In other words, any methodology can be adapted to include the effects of 
interdependence and pure contagion; the choice of methodologies is given by the mechanism of 
transmission that contagion is assumed to follow: volatility, states of nature, fundamentals, etc.  
 
As we can see, there is not a unified approach of what constitutes contagion (usually it is 
used as a synonymous of interdependence) or which is the mechanism it spreads through. This 
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lack of consistency in the results is exacerbated when interdependence and pure contagion are 
not measured as separate effects and the results are compared with studies that do and 
everything is labelled “contagion”. In this section we discuss each approach and try to follow 
when possible the notation that is consistent with Pesaran and Pick (2005) for future 
comparison: 
 
 Variables Parameters 
Dependent variable of country i ity   
Independent common variables tz  iδ  
Independent country-specific variables itx  iα  
Pure contagion dummy variable (.)itI  iβ  
Country specific error terms itu   
Table 9: Definitions of variables and parameters 
 
 
We discuss the different definitions of contagion, the underlying assumptions and the 
econometric approach used for its estimation. This will allow us to examine the implications of 
each definition and its adequacy to describe the phenomenon.  
3.1.1. Correlation 
 
Definition of contagion: contagion is a significant increase in co-movements of prices and 
quantities across markets, conditional on a crisis occurring in one market or group of markets. 
 
Empirical examination on the evidence for contagion has largely focused on co-movements 
in asset prices. By stressing the quantitative dimension (a significative increase), this definition 
conveys the notion of contagion as ‘excessive co-movements’, relative to some standard. The 
open issue is thus to draw a distinction between normal co-movements due to simple 
interdependence and excessive co movements in prices and quantities due to some structural 
break in the data. Correlation based tests are the most common when using this definition. 
However, because of its simplicity and lack of economic structure these tests provide with no 
meaningful interpretation. Another important setback is that it only captures the existence of a 
linear relationship and ignores higher orders. Several other problems arise because they require 
a priori assumptions about the length and occurrence of crises, as we will discuss.  
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These tests consist of estimates of correlation coefficient of changes in interest rates, stock 
prices and sovereign spreads of different economies (Dornbusch, Park and Claessens, 2003). 
Under this approach, an increase in the correlations among different countries markets is 
considered as evidence of contagion. Forbes and Rigobon (2001) found evidence of contagion 
in one case out of 27 cases in 1997; zero out of 27 cases, in 1994; and none in 1987, out of 9. 
Boyer, Gibson and Loretan (1999) fail to find any case of contagion; furthermore, these authors 
show that changes in correlations over time or across different regimes cannot be detected 
reliably by splitting a sample according to the realised values of the data. This result is 
consequence of the selection bias when splitting a sample.   
 
Studies of co-movements in financial markets are based in the following idea: consider the 
rates of return in countries i and j and assume a single-factor model with constant variance 
(Pericoli and Sbracia, 2003): 
i i i i i
j j j j j
y A x u






Where αi>0 and αj>0 and where x , iu and ju  are mutually uncorrelated random variables. 
The correlation between 
i
r  and jr  is: 
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Var y Var y
=     (3.1) 
However, a close look to this measure reveals that a significant increase in the sample 
correlation of rates of return is not necessarily evidence of contagion, as it may be caused by an 
increase in the variance of the global factor. During crises periods some increase in co-
movements across markets is merely an implication of interdependence as both countries 
depend on x. On the other hand, contagion will occur when the observed pattern of co-
movement in asset prices is too strong with respect to what it can be predicted when the 
international transmission mechanism is constant. Hence, in these studies it is necessary the 
specification of an appropriate theoretical relationship that can capture interdependence and 
contagion separately; correlation alone cannot distinguish between both phenomena since there 
is no theoretical structure behind the explanation of co-movements. In other words, correlation 
can only tell us when the series of returns of different countries move together but not if this is 
due to common factors affecting returns in both countries, to interdependence or to neither 
contagion nor the direction of the effects.  
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3.1.2. Volatility spillovers  
 
Definition of contagion: Contagion occurs when volatility of asset prices spills over from 
the crisis country to other countries. 
 
This definition exploits the increase in asset price volatility which occurs during periods of 
financial turmoil. Accordingly, it identifies contagion as a volatility spill-over from one market 
to another. Asset price volatility is generally regarded as a good approximation of market 
uncertainty. Hence, in an interpretation of this definition, contagion also refers to the spread of 
uncertainty across international financial markets.  However, a simultaneous rise in volatility in 
different markets might be due to normal interdependence between these markets or to a 
structural change affecting cross-market linkages. GARCH models are used to model contagion 
via volatility of asset prices returns.  
 
Engle, Ito and Lin (1990) carry out volatility-contagion tests on exchange rate data. This is 
based on the idea that volatility of disturbances in one market can spread and affect the volatility 
of disturbances in other markets. They assume that news affecting markets can follow two 
different processes. The first is like a heat wave so that a local disturbance won’t affect global 
conditions. An alternative behaviour is a meteor shower, which is a disturbance that spreads 
from one market to another with some lag. The heat wave hypothesis is consistent with a view 
that major sources of disturbances are changes in country-specific fundamentals and that one 
shock even if it is large will remain in the affected market. On the other hand, the meteor 
shower hypothesis could be consistent with failures of market efficiency; expectations of 
currency movements in one market can trigger speculative movements across global markets. 
Another interpretation of meteor showers is cooperative or competitive monetary policies. If the 
policy switch by the Fed increases the uncertainties of the monetary stance of the Bank of 
Japan, or vice versa, then this would show up as the meteor shower and in this case efficiency is 
not affected.  
 
GARCH models provide a useful tool to measure the spread of shocks across financial 
markets. In particular when using a GARCH specification we are looking for contagion 
transmitted via intra-day volatility of asset returns; in other words, it is applied to measure the 
effects of domestic financial market instability on international financial markets. As Engle 
(1982) argues, when modelling financial and currency markets there are clusters of small errors 
and periods with greater variability in the errors this indicates the possibility that recent past 
might provide information about the conditional disturbance variance. In other words, a series 
may exhibit periods of large volatility followed by periods with less volatility; in these cases the 
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assumptions of serial independence and homoscedasticity of errors is inappropriate. In a 
GARCH (p, q) model the variance would follow the process that depends on lagged squared 
disturbances and on lagged conditional variances:  
 
2 2 2 2 2
0 1 1 1 1t t p t p t q t qu uσ φ ϕ φ γ σ γ σ− − − −= + + + + + +… …    (3.2) 
 
In the simplest specification, a GARCH (1, 1) there is an error that can be defined as:  
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The non-negativity conditions for the variance are 0 1 10, 0, 0α α γ> ≥ ≥ . Substituting 






















u has zero mean. 





























4. The auto-covariances of  u are zero ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 0t t u u t tE u u u E u− − − −= =  
Hamao, Masulis and Ng (1990), Engle, Ito and Lin (1990) and Fleming and Lopez (1999) 
study the transmission of volatility between the US, the UK and Japan for the same period with 
mixed results, the first study found that the direction goes from the US and UK to Japan; the 
second study found that Japanese news are more likely to spill-over; finally the latter found that 
New York is not affected by the other two but in a lagged basis. Edwards (1998) studies the 
transmission of shocks through interest rates. Weekly and monthly data is used to analyse 
interest rate behaviour in Argentina, Chile and Mexico during the 1990s. The GARCH model of 
interest rates used is: 
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Where y  in this case corresponds to the nominal interest rate; x  is a vector of variables 
that affect changes in the interest rate, which may include lagged values of y , domestic and 
international variables; u  are innovations to interest rate changes with zero mean and 
conditional variance 2
t
σ ; and ,y jσ is a vector of variables of country j other than past squared 
innovations or lagged forecast variance that can explain interest rate volatility. The interest of 
the study is to investigate whether there has been “volatility contagion” from Mexico to the two 
South American nations. This is done by including Mexico-specific volatility variables in the 
estimation of the conditional variance equation for each country. The estimation of the first 
equation yi, t for Argentina and Chile is done by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The analysis of 
the residuals clearly showed the presence of conditional heteroscedasticity. The second equation 
requires the selection of a group of indexes of Mexican volatility. In order for volatility to be 
positive at all times, these indexes and their estimated coefficients should be nonnegative. For 
this reason, four indicators were chosen: 
 
- The estimated conditional variance from a fourth order GARCH model for changes in 
Mexican short-term interest rates.  
- A dummy variable that took the value of one in any week when the Mexican Peso 
depreciated by 3 percent or more and zero otherwise19. 
- The absolute value of weekly changes in Mexican short term nominal interest rates; 
and, 







y y time u
A u MEXVOL
θ α α
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− −
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Where MEXVOL refers to any of the Mexican volatility indicators defined above. 
 
As we can see, in this case it is possible to make a distinction between global factors, 
domestic variables and possible contagion affecting returns depending on the specification of 
the vector x. To the extent that the model to estimate includes relevant variables it would be 
possible to separate interdependence effects and pure contagion effects.  
 
                                                 
19 This is an arbitrary threshold that could be moved to check for robustness.  
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3.1.3. Probability of crises  
 
Definition of contagion: Contagion is a significant increase in the probability of a crisis in 
one country, conditional to a crisis occurring in another country.  
 
This definition is usually associated with empirical studies of the international implications 
of exchange rate collapses. It accounts for the observation that exchange rate crises tend to 
involve a large set of countries, while some of the countries in the set may be able to avoid 
devaluation despite being hit by strong waves of speculative pressures. One of the approaches 
used in the literature is to estimate the probability of a crisis happening, as this includes external 
variables, it can be used to measure contagion. Kaminsky (1999) and Kaminsky, Lizondo and 
Reinhart (1998) use a set of macroeconomic and financial indicators in order to predict currency 
crises. This approach uses a leading indicator that often takes the form of a weighted average of 
changes in the exchange rate, in short-term interest rates and in international reserves in order to 
capture speculative pressures in currency and money markets. A crisis in a country is then 
defined as an extreme value of this indicator (n-standard deviations above the mean).   Then a 
set of control variables can be used to estimate the probability of a crisis happening, this set of 
variables include domestic and external macroeconomic variables.  
 
Johnston and DiNardo (1997) explain that probit models are based on the idea of 
transforming a set of variables and their parameters X β  into a probability measure:  
 
( ) ( )i iprob y F X β=  
 
This function can be the cumulative standard normal distribution function, and with this 

















Another specification for the probit model is to have a binary variable as the dependent 
variable y* that takes the value of 1 if y>c a certain threshold. In this case the model to estimate 




y X uβ= +  
 
Chapter 3: Contagion; when a storm brings a flu 
Financial and Currency Crises 
94 
We can define the probability if y>c as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )* 1 = = i ii i i i
u c X









Where 2σ is the variance of u. The standard normal distribution is symmetric therefore we 
can rewrite it as:  
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     (3.4) 
 
This model can be estimated then by maximum likelihood, where the likelihood function is 
derived as follows: first we define ( )* 1iprob y φ= =  and ( )* 0 1iprob y φ= = − . If we have 
i.i.d. sampling the likelihood is just the product of the probability of each observation. If we 
have n observations from which m observations are y*i=0 and the rest n-m are y*i=1. The 
likelihood function is denoted by:  
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Finally, the log-likelihood function is given by:  
 




L y yφ φ= + − −∑     (3.5) 
 
Berg and Patillo (1999) obtain composite leading indicators of a currency crisis by 
estimating a probit model with individual indicators as independent variables. These authors 
estimate the probability of a crisis to happen within the next 24 months as a function of the set 
of N indicators x as:  
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Where ( )ip x  is the percentile of the indicator, iT  is a threshold value for the percentile of the 
indicator and Ii is a binomial variable that takes the value Ii=1 if ( )i ip x T> and zero otherwise.  
According to Berg and Patillo (1999) results, the linear probit generates a probability of crisis 
above 25% in 80% of the periods that precede a crisis which although is “better than a chance 
guess”(sic) still leaves unaccounted for around 70% of the probability of a crisis occurring.  
 
In another set of studies Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996), Caramazza, Ricci and 
Salgado (2000) and Van Rijckmen and Weder (2001) reach similar conclusions, that trade 
linkages explain contagion better than macroeconomic similarities. The main finding of these 
studies is that financial and trade linkages are the most important elements to explain crises; 
these effects, according to our previous discussion, constitute cases of interdependence rather 
than contagion. In other words, studies based on probit models have not discriminated between 
interdependence and contagion because of the omission of a pure contagion variable that 
accounts for transmission channels different from the already existing linkages. 
 
3.1.4. Regime switching 
 
Definition of contagion: Contagion occurs when cross-country co-movements of asset 
prices cannot be explained by fundamentals.  
 
This definition of contagion is theoretically precise in the framework of models that allow 
for multiple instantaneous equilibria in the presence of a coordination problem. If the spread of 
a crisis reflects an arbitrary switch from an observed equilibrium to another, fundamentals alone 
cannot explain its timing and modalities. The state of fundamentals may nonetheless explain 
why some countries are vulnerable to crises while others are not. This definition is the closest to 
capture pure contagion since fundamentals and interdependence do not account for the 
occurrence or the depth of a crisis.  
 
Many economic variables exhibit episodes in which the behaviour changes radically. These 
changes may be attributed to different exogenous shocks, such as wars, panics or different 
government policies. The behaviour of the series in each period can be described with two 
different models. However, this does not take into account the process of the switch of regimes 
itself. Moreover, the change in regime may not be a deterministic event but a random variable 
and we would need a complete time series model to describe the governing dynamics of the 
change between regimes. Therefore, we need to include in the process an unobserved random 
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variable corresponding to the state or regime that the process was at date t (Hamilton, 1994). 
Fratzscher (2002) gives the most complete description of the standard model of regime 
switching which is used by Jeanne (1997) and Jeanne and Masson (2000) to study OECD 
countries. In order to describe this process the parameters Ω of a VAR process are assumed to 
be time invariant until the state changes and this set changes as well; this set Ω contains the 
variables that will allow us to estimate the transition probabilities of the unobserved states that 
are governing the Markov process. With 2 regimes st (corresponding to the crisis and non-crisis 
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Where Yt-1 is the set of past observations of the vector yt, Ωk is the VAR parameter vector 
for regime k=1,2 and f(.) describes the density function of the normal distribution conditional to 
the state and the set of parameters 
k
Ω  that correspond to that state (this parameters correspond 
to the mean, variance and probabilities at each state). In order to determine the regime-
generating process, i.e. what determines which regime st prevails at any one point of time. The 
regime-generating process is assumed to follow a Markov chain with transition probability pkl of 
the form: 
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Where pkl is the probability of being in regime k in period t if the regime l prevailed in 
period t-1; the Markov chain of the equation above states that the probability of being in state k 
in period t is solely dependent on which regime prevailed in the previous period (t-1). 











Every row in this matrix describes a different state k in period t and each column stands for 
a different regime l in t-1. Markov switching models specify a number of regimes for relevant 
economic variables and estimate the probabilities (described by a Markov transition matrix) of 
moving from one regime to another. When using this approach any discontinuity can be 
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attributed to jumps between multiple equilibria. However, the number of regimes is often 
arbitrarily fixed and the switch across equilibria is regulated by an exogenous process so that the 
nature of the phenomenon effectively captured is not clear.  
 
Using this principle, Fratzscher (2002) builds a model in which the exchange rate pressure 
in one country depends on a set of fundamentals of this country, some measures of its real 
integration (real linkages) and financial integration with other countries all with the possibility 
for regime switching. One of the most important findings is that although Markov switching 
models without real and financial integration perform well for most countries, any regime-
switching is ruled out when real and financial integration is included in the analysis. In other 
words, integration (which is a case of interdependence) in many cases explains regime changes 
that cannot be accounted for by domestic fundamentals. This suggests that the factors that 
explain currency crises (i.e. regime changes) are not unobservable but in many cases are 
captured through the inclusion of integration variables. The data generating process as specified 
by Fratzscher (2002) focuses on changes in the intercept vi, and in the error variance 
2σ  which 
are both state dependant; the state space form equation to be estimated is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), 1 , 1 , 1 ,' ' 'i t i t t R j t ij F j t ij t i t
j j
y v s x y REAL y FIN s uα β β σ− − −= + + × + × +∑ ∑   
(3.6) 
Where ,  and 
R F X
β β β denote the parameters for real and financial interdependence 
variables and domestic fundamentals respectively. Jeanne (1997) and Jeanne and Masson (2000) 
consider a second generation model of currency crises in which multiple equilibria arise and 
determine three different probabilities of a devaluation. Jumps between equilibria correspond to 
jumps between probabilities. In this setting, once macroeconomic fundamentals enter into a 
multiple equilibria zone, jumps can occur as a result of a sunspot without any further change in 
the economy. Moreover, such a sunspot can be represented by a 2 x 2 Markov transition matrix, 
which defines the probability that the economy jumps between equilibria. In these studies, a 
multiplicity of fundamental-based equilibria makes it possible to construct equilibria in which 
the economy jumps across states with different levels of devaluation expectations. A priori, 
jumps between states may be related to the fundamentals but this is not necessarily the case; 
they may also be driven by a sunspot variable which coordinates the private sector expectations 
on either state.  
 
The probability of devaluation is estimated, in percentage, as the one-month interest 
differential between Euro–franc and Euro–DM instruments, after assuming a devaluation 
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threshold size of 5%. This “probability” is in reality a proportion of the observations that 
crossed the threshold with respect of the total observations; this ensures that the “probability” is 
bounded between 0 and 1. Jeanne (1997) and Jeanne and Masson (2000) consider sunspot 
equilibrium with n states and a devaluation probability in state-space form: 
 
( ) t|    state at date t s 1...tt t s t tp y s x u nγ α= + + ∀ =   (3.7) 
Where 
ts
γ a constant that depends on the state s; x is a vector of relevant macroeconomic 
fundamentals and ut is an i.i.d. shock, all of which can be written as function of the structural 
parameters of the model. Regime shifts affect the devaluation probability by changing the 
constant term on the right-hand side of the equation but leave the coefficients of the 
fundamentals unchanged.   
3.1.5. Changes in the transmission mechanism 
 
Definition of contagion: Shift-contagion takes place when the transmission channel 
intensifies or, more generally, when it changes after a shock in the market.  
 
In this approach, contagion occurs when a crisis at country i spreads through a transmission 
mechanism that i) didn’t exist before the crisis or ii) intensifies the effects of previously existing 
links, e.g. trade links or financial integration. Dornbusch, Park and Claessens (2000) discuss the 
factors that may constitute transmission channels for a crisis to propagate from one country to 
another. One channel involves trade links, any major trade partner of a country where a 
financial crisis has caused large currency depreciation could experience declines in asset prices, 
large capital outflows or become the target of a speculative attack, because investors foresee a 
decline in its exports to the crisis country and hence a deterioration in its trade account. A 
second channel related with trade links can be competitive devaluations. A devaluation of a 
country stricken by a crisis can reduce the export competitiveness of other countries which 
compete in third markets and can put a pressure on other countries’ currencies; then a policy 
decision could be to compete via devaluation of the others’ currency.  Financial links can be 
another transmission mechanism, especially in countries that have extensive integration in 
capital and debt markets. The higher the degree of financial market integration, the more 
extensive could be the contagious effect of a common shock.  The first shock (a domestic crisis) 
that is country specific becomes ‘regional’ or ‘global’ affecting another country or set of 
countries. If we imagine a factor 
i
x for which factor loadings are zero in all countries but one 
during calm periods and become positive during crisis periods.  
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δ α ε
δ α ε
= + + +
= + + +




x , εi, εj are mutually uncorrelated random variables. If there is interdependence, 
αj=0 so the process for country j is equivalent to the data generating 
process
j j j j
y A z uδ= + + . Contagion occurs when the country specific shock xi becomes a 
global factor and then αj ≠ 0.  
 
Within the framework of Pesaran and Pick (2005) this is purely an interdependence test 
from the definition of “contagion”. The assumption is that trade and financial links and 
competitive “games” are the source of international transmission and these channels intensify 
during the crisis event. Additionally, since the variable 
i
x  is country specific we have to assume 
a priori that a given country is the source of the disturbance rather to test from the direction of 
possible contagion.  
 
As we can see, in the reviewed literature there is no clear-cut way to distinguish between 
interdependence and contagion. Pesaran and Pick (2005) argue that the identification of 
contagion in the presence of interdependence requires that the equations for the individual 
countries contain country specific forcing variables to control for normal market interactions 
and their effect in the economy in times without crisis; if we ignore interdependence we can 
introduce an upward bias in the estimate of the contagion coefficient that could be substantial. 
We can summarise the assumptions of the different methodologies and their implications as 
follows: 
 
Approach Definition of  “contagion” 
Channel of 
transmission 
Type of linkage 
1. Correlation 
Increased correlation of a relevant 
variable.  Undetermined Undetermined 
2. Volatility 
spillovers 
Increased volatility in one market given 
an increase in another market.  Volatility 
Interdependence or 
contagion 
3. Probability of 
crises 
Increased probability of a crisis on one 






Change of regime in one country given a 







5. Changes in 
transmission 
mechanism 
Existing channels intensify or change 




Table 10: Definitions of contagion, channels of transmission and type of linkage 
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In the next section we present the Pesaran and Pick (1995) model which separates 
interdependence from contagion this allows to have a clear understanding of the phenomenon, 
regardless the vector of infection (volatility, probability, fundamentals, etc).  
 




Measuring correlation between variables does not have a solid economic interpretation and 
indicates only the extent of co-movements between variables; when applied to macroeconomic 
data we miss the explanation given by other variables that may be affecting co-movements and 
what may be characterised as contagion under the definition of higher correlation may in fact be 
due to common international factors; the effect of domestic variables is overlooked as well and 
therefore macroeconomic contagion measured  by this method may be misleading. On the other 
hand, when dealing with financial data, we could be overlooking possible effects due to market 
conditions and possible cross-country effects of linked sectors that trade in different markets. 
One issue is that some methodologies are designed to measure contagion in very specific 
conditions; one example is the GARCH methodology that when it is applied in the context of 
measuring contagion in financial markets (contagion in this context is defined as a volatility 
spill-over across asset price movements in different markets) requires high frequency intraday 
data, sequential opening of markets and overlapping periods of trade; because of these 
requirements this methodology cannot be easily applied to macroeconomic data with lower 
frequency and often simultaneous events that require another econometric approach. In general, 
probit and transmission mechanism models already try to identify the variables that may cause a 
crisis taking place, this allows us to determine the fundamentals involved in the process of a 
crisis and to understand the underlying mechanisms that lead to one happening such as the 
Pesaran and Pick (2005) approach does. However, a problem is that the direction of contagion is 
assumed beforehand and that there is not a real difference between finding interdependence and 
pure contagion that is why trade links are found to be the most significant “contagion” source.  
 
In this section we present first the outline of the Pesaran and Pick (2005) model; second, we 
present the derivation of the theoretical solution to the model which implies different solutions 
and more important different possibilities of contagion; third, we proceed to discuss how OLS 
estimators are inconsistent and to derive the solution using Two Stages Least Squares (2-SLS). 
Finally, we discuss briefly the differences and similarities of this framework with the ones 
already discussed.  
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3.2.1. The model 
 
 
Methodologies looking for changes in the transmission mechanism have a more complete 
approach to determine the presence of common factors that may contribute to the spill-over of a 
crisis. However, pure contagion remains an unidentified variable and indistinguishable from 
interdependence; this is a central feature of the models since they look for a channel of 
transmission that intensifies, in other words interdependence. An improved measure of 
contagion would have to meet certain criteria to address issues of model specification, 
separability of effects and frequency flexibility; we defined these criteria as follows:  
 
1. Explicit separation of interdependence and pure contagion effects.  
2. Determination of the country source of contagion.  
3. Inclusion of local and international variables to determine not only common factors 
(as in changes in the transmission mechanism approach and regime switching 
models) but local conditions that created a crisis (as in probit models and regime 
switching models). 
4. Applicability to other type of contagion processes (as in GARCH-type models). 
 
Pesaran and Pick (2005) set a canonical model of contagion for a two country framework 




1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2, 1 1
' '
2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1, 1 2
'
'
t t t t t t
t t t t t t
y z x I y c u
y z x I y c u
δ α β σ
δ α β σ
−
−
= + + − +
= + + − +
   (3.9) 
 
Where yit is a performance indicator for country i=1,2 at time t=1,2,...,T, this indicator can 
be an index of market pressure or some other measure;  cit is a threshold value for the standard 
deviation; u1t and u2t  are serially uncorrelated errors with zero means, conditional  variances 
2
1, 1u tσ − and 
2
2, 1u tσ −  and a non-zero correlation coefficient ρ. The regressors (xit) are ki country-
specific observed factors assumed to be predetermined and distributed independently of ujt for 
all i and j. Country-specific dynamics can be allowed for by including an autoregressive process 
yi, t-j in xit; (zt) is an s x 1 vector or predetermined observed common factors, such as 
international oil prices, or other common features. I (A) is an indicator function that takes the 
value of unity if A>0 and zero otherwise. Finally, 2, 1 1var( | )i t it tyσ − −= Ω where 1t−Ω is the set of 
information available at time t-1.  
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In a standard simultaneous equations model, the disturbances are assumed to be distributed 
normally, with ( )| 0t tE u x = and ( )' |t t tE u u x = Σ  (Greene, 2000). One of the problems of 
simultaneous equations is given by the fact that although 
1



















which means that OLS 
estimators are inconsistent20. This is known as the simultaneous bias of least squares.  Greene 
(2000) discusses several methods for consistent and efficient estimation. Pesaran and Pick 
(2005) choose the 2-SLS which according to Greene (2000) is the most common method to 
correct the problem of inconsistency. Other methods include the Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimation, this method is one way to address heteroscedasticity in the errors 
better than 2-SLS, because 2-SLS estimation is consistent but inefficient when 
heteroscedasticity is present; other alternative is to use Davidsons and MacKinnon’s  
“Heteroscedastic 2-SLS” or H2SLS  (Greene, 2000). When the model is nonlinear in variables, 




i j ji i i
j
y f y x X uγ
=
= + +∑  (where n is 
the number of nonlinear variable), OLS estimators are inconsistent but 2-SLS can be applied 
and the instruments would consist of ( )1, ..., ,i ni if f X . This is the case of the Pesaran and Pick 
(2005) approach where the elements ( ), 1'i jt j j tI y cβ σ −− for the pairs (i, j) = (1, 2) and (2, 1) 
introduce the nonlinearity (being a dichotomic function of the observations of the other 
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Pesaran and Pick (2005) provide with some examples of performance indicators such as 
market returns used by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Corsetti, Pericoli and Sbracia (2002) 
and the “index of exchange rate market pressure” (EMP) used by Eichengreen, Rose and 
                                                 
20 We will prove the inconsistency of the Pesaran and Pick (2005) model in a following section.  
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Wylosz (1996) which is a weighted average of exchange rate depreciation, interest rate 
differential and international reserves ratios (the precise definition is shown in the empirical 
section). We introduce another measure to capture the pressure on financial markets (FMP) that 
has a similar construction with the weighted average of the price of industrial shares and 
domestic credit. Pesaran and Pick (2005) assume that yit is defined in such a way that a crisis is 
associated with extreme positive values of yit and ci>0. In this framework, interdependence is 
captured through non-zero values of ρ given that we included domestic variables to control for 
the effects of domestic fundamentals, and is distinguished from contagion effects characterised 
by non-zero values of βi contrary to other methodologies where interdependence and contagion 
effects are indistinguishable from each other. This takes into account that contagion takes place 
only at times of crises, whilst interdependence is the result of normal market interactions.  
 
An important definition is that country i is said to be in crisis if the performance index rises 
above the threshold value and contagion is said to occur if a crisis in country 2 increases the 
probability of a crisis in country 1 over and above usual market interactions, and vice versa. To 
test for contagion, it is necessary to establish conditions under which the contagion coefficient 
(βi) can be identified. Once such conditions are met, a test of contagion in country i can be 
carried out by testing βi=0 against the one-sided alternatives βi>0.  
3.2.2. Solution and multiple equilibria 
 
It is possible to define a new variable that groups international and domestic variables and 
the error term ' '
it i t i it it
w z x uδ α= + + . As well, for simplicity, we can define the threshold value 
as time unvarying ci (in other words, we will consider that a crisis occurs when the EMP or 
FMP values exceed a fixed non time-dependant value); with these two simplifications we can 
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  This is a system of non-linear, non-differentiable simultaneous equations and the simplest 
and unique solution is when either β1 or β2 is zero. For example, suppose that β2=0. Then the 
solution of the system is given by: 
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However, there is another non-unique solution, when neither of the contagion coefficients is 
zero; in other words when there is mutual contagion (contagious feedback), in this case the 
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= = .  
 
This means that if there is a crisis, in country 1, then Y1t >0 and the indication function takes the 
value I (Y1t) =1 and the sign of W1t can be either positive or negative with different implications 
depending on its sign and magnitude: 
 
Region Characteristics Implication 
Solution for 
country 1 
A 2 0tW >  
- Crisis in country 2  
- Undetermined in country 1 but 
increased risk of contagion 
B 2 11 0, 0t tW W− < ≤ >  
- Crisis in country 1 (and contagion 
feedback) 
- Crisis in country 2 by contagion 
*
1 11t tY W= +  
C 2 1tW ≤ −  
- Undetermined in country 1 
- No crisis in country 2 
D 2 11 0, 1t tW W− < ≤ < −  
- No crisis in country 1 
- No crisis in country 2 
*
1 1t tY W=  
E 2 11 0, 1 0t tW W− < ≤ − < ≤  
- Undetermined in country 1 
- Undetermined in country 2 
Non-unique 










Figure 10: Regions of contagion Pesaran and Pick (2005) 
 
 
In region A, there is possibility of a crisis in country 1 given a crisis in country 2 but this 
depends on the value of 1tW . In region B there is a crisis with pure contagion in country 2, in 
other words if there is a crisis in country 1 and even if country 2 has macroeconomic indicators 
not consistent with a crisis occurring because of contagion it faces one.  In region C there may 
be a crisis in country 1 but because of fundamentals in country 2 even though there is pressure 
via contagion to the performance indicator there is no crisis. Region D is a stable one without 
crisis in either country. Non-uniqueness arises in region E if macroeconomic conditions (that 
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W ) are in the limit of being consistent with a crisis occurring and get contagion but this 
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3.2.3. Estimation issues 
 
This section presents some of the problems that can arise during the estimation of the 
model. As we are dealing with a simultaneous equations model OLS estimators are inconsistent, 
as we will show. In second place, the solution to the inconsistency requires the use of 
instrumental variables techniques (in this case 2-SLS estimation) which requires the use of 
strong instruments; we present a brief discussion on this issue.  
 
3.2.3.1. Inconsistency of OLS estimators 
 
Pesaran and Pick (2005) demonstrate21 that the OLS estimation of βi in the simultaneous 
equation model is not consistent because the regressor ( )2 2 2, 1t tI y c σ −−  is not independent 
from the disturbance term u1t. However, consistent estimation of βi can be achieved by using 
instrumental variables (IV). The IV estimator in this case may be seen as the result of a two-
stage least-squares procedure using the same variables in the data set as instruments. According 
to Greene (2000) 2-SLS is the most common method used for simultaneous equations models 
and that in the absence of autocorrelation or heteroscedasticity this is the most efficient 
estimator that can be formed using only the included variables in the model. 
3.2.3.2. 2-SLS estimation 
 
As Johnston and DiNardo (1997) explain, 2-SLS is the result of applying two times OLS: i) 
during the first stage, the endogenous variables of the system are regressed on the instruments 
(the set of all exogenous variables within the system) and obtain a matrix of fitted values; and, 
ii) in the second stage, the endogenous variables are regressed against the exogenous variables 
and the fitted values we obtained during the first stage and we obtain the vector of estimated 
parameters. There are three conditions that the instruments must fulfil, i) that they are 
exogenous; ii) they are independent of the disturbance; and, iii) they are relevant.  
                                                 
21 See annex A3.1 (annex 1 to chapter 3) for a complete demonstration of the inconsistency of OLS 
estimators. 
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First stage 
In order to obtain a consistent estimator, we build the instrument matrix 
( )', ', 'i jZ X XΩ =  and the matrix that we have already defined ( )', ', 'i i jH Z X D= but now we 
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The effect of yj on yi in the structural equations is a non-linear one; hence, we need calculate 
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In the second stage we define the fitted matrix  ( )', ', 'Η =i jiZ X D  which includes 
international variables, domestic variables and the estimated values of the contagion indicator. 
We regress the observations of the performance indicator with this estimated matrix. Then the 
2-SLS estimator for each country of ( )', ', '=i i i iθ δ α β is obtained as: 
  ( ) 
1
2 ' 'i i iSLSi iH H H yθ
−
=  
3.2.3.3. Weak instruments  
 
 
Stock and Yogo (2002) and Hahn and Hausman (2002) stress the importance not only of the 
instruments being exogenous, but also the second condition, that is relevance holds. In the 
presence of weak instruments, this refers when the instruments used do not have a high 
explanatory power for the endogenous variables, the 2-SLS method can present problems of 
inference. Even in large samples, if instruments are weak the 2-SLS is biased, this problem 
accentuates with small samples. In this model, instruments are zt and xit for each equation; these 
variables serve as instruments for themselves xit in equation i=1, 2 and zt in both equations; and 
because of the construction of the performance index, xjt is correlated with ( )jt jI y c− in both 
equations. If the variables included in the regression are the most relevant to explain pressure in 
                                                 
22 In the previous section we only included the domestic variables X and this matrix was defined 
as ( )', 'i i jH X D= .  
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currency and financial markets then the identification problem should be minimised. In this case 
we are including variables that capture the performance of the economy, trade links, monetary 
policy, fiscal policy and financial and exchange market pressure as explanatory variables.  
 
Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) explain the concentration parameter as a unit-less measure 
of the strength of the instruments.  This parameter is distributed as chi-squared distribution with 
degrees of freedom K (number of instruments) and this method tests the null hypothesis that the 
instruments are weak; hence a large value of the concentration parameter rejects the null. For a 
multivariate model such as the one at hand, the concentration parameter is a KxK matrix defined 
as:  
 










Σ is the covariance matrix of the vector of errors and is given by 
 






and M IΩ ΩΩ= − Σ . In order to reject the hypothesis that θ =0 (weak 
instruments) this matrix must be large in the sense that its smallest eigenvalue is large. 
According to Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) a useful interpretation of the concentration 
parameter is in terms of the F statistic of the first stage for testing the null hypothesis that the 
parameters are equal to zero. This method is straightforward and we will use it to test for weak 
instruments with our data.  
 
There are other methods, such as Hahn and Hausman (2002) who reverse the null 
hypothesis and instead they postulate H0=strong instruments. These authors found that when 
there is a single endogenous regressor and the instruments are strong, the choice of dependent 
variable should not matter. In other words, the 2-SLS regression of y on Y (forward regression 
of the observed variable regressed against its fitted values) and the 2-SLS estimator of Y on y 
(reverse regression) are asymptotically equivalent if the instruments are strong.  Hahn and 
Hausman (2002) develop a statistic comparing the forward and the reverse estimators (with the 
extensions for 2 exogenous variables) that when tested and the null hypothesis is rejected there 
is indication that the instruments are weak. Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) point out that when 
there are relevant instruments but they are weak, then the estimators are biased towards the OLS 
estimator.  
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3.2.4. Comparing Pesaran and Pick (2005) and other methods 
 
 
An interesting question we can ask is whether this method can be used as a generalisation of 
the ones we have discussed before. In this section, we discuss briefly the possible adaptations 
that could be made to this model in order to include elements of the other methodologies and to 
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Most of the methodologies estimate single country models; this is not an extremely 
important difference that invalidates the other approaches. That approach may be necessary 
depending of the model chosen and that is more adequate for the transmission mechanism (i.e. 
variance, probability or state of nature). We have to bear in mind that Pesaran and Pick (2005) 
main argument is that there should be an explicit separation between interdependence effects 
and contagion effects, independently of the form that the model takes. In other words, not 
distinguishing explicitly between interdependence and contagion: 
 
i) Constitutes a misspecification of the model and the estimators will be biased and 
inefficient.  
ii) Assuming a priori the direction of interdependence and/or contagion effects may 
constitute a sample selection bias which carries the same problems.  
 
This is a common critique to all methodologies, independently of the form they take, when 
they do not recognise the two different effects.   
 
The other main difference is the choice of contagion definition that it is assumed. The 
performance indicator can take the form of probability of a crisis event happening, a composite 
index (such as the EMP), changes in a variable or the variance of disturbances. Depending on 
this assumed via of contagion the corresponding methodology is to be applied. However, the 
distinction between interdependence and contagion remains a critical issue in the estimation.  
 
Correlation  
Correlation based models just focus the correlation between 1ty and 2ty omitting all the 
effects of common, domestic and contagion variables. These omissions imply that this 
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methodology is not really a contagion or interdependence measure but it is only a statistical 
description of the co-movement of the two series. Pesaran and Pick (2005) argue that they suffer 
from sample selection bias because the “crisis” and the “tranquil” periods are assumed a priori 
rather than estimated within the model. Another problem is that the observations corresponding 
to the crises periods are too few because of their short life span to be meaningful. Finally, the 
most important critique is the lack of economic structure behind it that prevents its use not only 
in forecasting but in the understanding of the causes of crises and the estimation of the direction 
of contagion effects. 
 
Volatility spillovers  
 
GARCH models are used to measure volatility spillovers between financial markets in 
different countries, specifically movements in asset prices. Because financial data often presents 
heteroscedastic and autocorrelated disturbances it is commonly modelled as following a 
GARCH process. Contagion in this setup is then assumed to happen via volatility of the 
disturbances. For instance, Hamao, Masulis and Ng (1990), Engle, Ito and Lin (1990) and 
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Where contagion from country j is captured by the term ,y jσ .  
 
This setup presents three main differences with Pesaran and Pick (2005), two of them refer 
to the structure of the model and one is of specification: 
 
i) Errors are correlated and heteroscedastic (which is the essence of GARCH 
processes);  
ii) Contagion is transmitted precisely via the volatility of the disturbance term rather 
than on the performance variable; and,  
iii) International variables are often not included. 
 
The last point is easy to address, t is possible to include in the regressors a set of 
international variables z; if these variables are significant then we would solve a problem of 
omitted variables and have efficient and unbiased estimators. The other two points refer to 
which model is the correct one, it would be convenient to test on whether or not contagion 
effects are transmitted via volatility or if including them to explain the dependent variable y can 
account for the heteroscedasticity of the residuals. If this is not the case, and contagion 
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effectively transmits via volatility, an extended version of a GARCH model including domestic 
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Another critique that can be made is if this model is estimated only for one country 
assuming the direction of contagion a priori rather than estimating the possible contagion on the 
other direction. 
 
Probability of crises 
 
Berg and Patillo’s (1999) probit model takes the form: 




i i i i i i i
i i i
ob c f p x I I p x Tα α α
= = =
 
= = + + + × − 
 
∑ ∑ ∑  
In terms of Pesaran and Pick (2005), this is equivalent to assume that the performance 
indicator is the probability of a crisis; hence, all contagion effects will take place via probability.   
 
In this model the set of explanatory variables can be decomposed in three subsets with 
different effects over the probability:  
 
i) The first one indicates the effect of the variables which are expressed in percentiles 
of the observations; 
ii) Another one that indicates a shift in the intercept due to a crisis; and, 
iii) Another one that captures changes in the slope.  
 
The set x can include domestic variables and international variables; if we want to make 
explicit this separation then we can write the model:  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 1 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
P 1 0
N N N N N N
i i i i i i i i i i z i z
i i i i i i
c f p x I I p x T p z I I p z Tα α α δ δ δ
= = = = = =
 
= = + + + × − + + + × − 
 
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
 
This approach does not consider the effect of other countries’ crisis in the form of pure 
contagion variables, which could be a misspecification problem as already discussed. However 
it may consider factors such as trade and financial linkages as part of ( )ip x  but these are 
normal transmission mechanisms that indicate interdependence rather than contagion.  Ignoring 
pure contagion effects would have as consequence to bias the estimators and falls into the 
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critique of Pesaran and Pick (2005).  We can write a probit specification for country i that 
includes contagion effects from country j can be written as: 
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
1 2 1 2
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Fratzscher (2000) uses an empirical specification that takes the form:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , 1 , 1 1 ,' ' 'i t i t R j t ij F j t ij X t t i t
j j
y v s y REAL y FIN x s uβ β β σ− − −= + × + × + +∑ ∑  
There is a state-dependant variable which is not included in the Pesaran and Pick (2005) 
model and errors are state dependant, assuming heteroscedasticity.    
 
We can see that contagion is defined as linkages in the real and in the financial sectors 
rather than pure contagion. This definition of contagion is not compatible with that one of 
Pesaran and Pick (2005) which defines linkages specifically as a case of interdependence and 
not of pure contagion. In this sense, estimators would be biased because of the omission of these 
latter effects. Jeanne and Masson (2000) use as dependent variable an estimate of the 
devaluation probability.  This probability is defined as the one-month interest differential 
between Euro–franc and Euro–DM instruments, and corrected for the expected movement 
toward the centre of the fluctuation band by adjusting the series for a drift, the devaluation 
threshold is of 5% which was the average realignment of the franc between 1979–1986. If we 
remember, the model these authors estimate is denoted by:  
( ) t|    state at date t s 1...tt t s t tp y s x u nγ α= + + ∀ =  
Where x are relevant economic fundamentals; it is not difficult to think that between this 
fundamentals there can be a subset of international variables that may affect the probability of a 
crisis (currency type in this case) taking place. In order to measure contagion from another 
country, the dependent variable fulfils the requirement of being a performance indicator that 
when crossing a threshold indicates a “high” probability of a crisis happening, we can interpret 
the contagion effect as: how the probability of a crisis in country i affects the probability of a 
crisis in country j. We can set an equation system such that the probability of a crisis can be 
thought as the performance indicator:  
( ) ( )( )| |  
itt t s i t i it i t t itit jt
p y s z x I p y s c uγ δ α β= + + + + +  
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If we set 0
i j
β β= = then we are left with Jeanne and Masson (2000) specification for 
separate countries, that is:  
( )|  
itit it s i t i it it
p y s z x uγ δ α= + + +  
 
This specification again suffers from the problem of not discriminating between 
interdependence and contagion effects which results in the estimators being biased. The 
omission of the contagion effect makes the estimators biased and inefficient. However, this 
omission is not due to the methodology but to the specification of the model, there is no reason 
why a contagion variable could not be included in this framework.  
 
Changes in the transmission mechanism 
 
This method is the closest in form to the Pesaran and Pick (2005) approach in its 
simultaneous character and the assumptions of the model. Contagion in this setup is defined as 
the effect of country i fundamentals on the performance indicator of country j; Pesaran and Pick 
on the other hand define contagion a spill over from an extreme value of the performance 
indicator observed at country j to the performance indicator of country i and vice versa. Strictly 
speaking Pesaran and Pick (2005) is a generalisation of this methodology, in which both 
countries are explained by their domestic fundamentals, common links and a crossed-effect of 
pure contagion. If we remember, under the specification: 
i i i i i i
j j j j i j
y A z x
y A z x
δ α ε
δ α ε
= + + +
= + + +
 
The dependent variable depends on international variables, z and domestic variables of 
country i, this poses two main problems: 
 
i) The direction of contagion is assumed a priori rather than estimated. In other words, we 
are omitting possible crossed effects from country j and incurring in sample selection 
bias.  
ii) There is no distinction between interdependence and pure contagion. 
iii) It is possible that there are omitted variables which make the estimators biased and 
inefficient.  
 
As in the case of the other methodologies, this omission of pure contagion effects and its 
mixing of interdependence is not a characteristic of the methodology per se but of the 
specification of the model to estimate. 
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To summarise the differences and similarities of these approaches we can compare the 
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Table 12: Comparison between methodologies 
 
3.3. Contagion during the 1990’s 
 
The data to be used in the remainder of this work comes from the IFS database of the IMF; 
it consists of quarterly data ranging from 1993 till 2002 for Mexico, Brazil, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Philippines and Korea and is based on the variables contained in the data set Eichengreen, Rose 
and Wyplosz (1996) which has become in the standard data set for studying currency crises. The 
variables to build the performance indicator (the regressand) are total non-gold international 
reserves (f), Exchange rate with the US dollar (e); money market rates (r); domestic credit (DC); 
the industrial stock price index (ISP); and, the financial account (FA) measured by the IMF25. 
On the regressor side, the matrix X contains domestic series: data on quarterly unemployment is 
unavailable for these countries (Eichengreen et al. (1996), use this series in their data set) we 
used instead the output gap measured as the real GDP deviations from the Hodrick-Prescott 
trend (OGAP); money (M2); current account (CA); and, the central government budget position 
                                                 
23 Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity.  
24 Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
25 Financial account is the net sum of the balance of direct investment, portfolio investment, and other 
investment transactions. 
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(GOV). World variables to use in the matrix Z are: LIBOR, oil prices (OILP), world inflation 
(WINF) and industrialised countries’ production growth (WIPG). These variables are 
considered to capture all the possible risk sources for the economy; they include financial risks 
in international markets, trade links that play an important role in the international transmission 
of shocks, world economy indicators that affect the competitiveness of the country and domestic 
variables that capture liquidity, financial constraints and performance of the economy.  
 
In order to apply the Pesaran and Pick (2005) methodology, we need a performance 
indicator. The standard approach to model currency crises is based on the behaviour of the 
Exchange Market Pressure (EMP) index proposed by Eichengreen et al. (1996). Similarly, we 
propose an additional measure the Financial Market Pressure (FMP) index to capture 
disturbances in the financial sector. These two indices are used as dependant variables when 
testing currency and financial crises respectively. Eichengreen et al. (1996) define the EMP 
index as: 
 
 ( ) ( )1 2 3% % % %it it it US it USEMP e r r f fλ λ λ= ∆ + ∆ − − ∆ − ∆   (3.11) 
 
Where eit is the exchange rate to the US Dollar, rit the risk free interest rate, and fit the 
international reserves of country i. Subscript US indicates variables for US, which is taken as 
the centre country. The weights are set to equalise the volatility of the three components. This is 
accomplished by setting λi=1/σi where σi is the standard deviation of component i. We use a 
similar definition which captures the financial market pressure to include the distinction 
between currency crises from financial ones:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 3% % % %it it US it itFMP DC DC ISP FAγ γ γ= ∆ − ∆ − ∆ − ∆ . (3.12) 
 
Where DCit is domestic credit, ISPit is the industrial stock price index for country i and FAit 
is the financial account in country i. The positive sign in domestic credit captures the exposure 
of the economy due to an expansion of credit; the sign corresponding to the financial account 
captures the possible adverse effect of diminishing investment. A close look to the FMP 
provides a definition of what is a financial crisis under these assumptions: losses in the stock 
market, increased exposure through domestic credit and/or a decrease in the financial account of 
the country. Increases in the interest rates are captured as part of the EMP.  
 
The dummy variable for a currency crisis is calculated as: 
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µ is the mean and 
EMP
σ is the standard deviation of the exchange rate market 
pressure index; when the exchange market pressure exceeds the threshold, then we consider that 
it is indeed a crisis. Commonly it is consider that 1.65 times the standard deviation is the 
threshold because bigger observations above are only 5% in a normal distribution, later on we 
vary this threshold to see how the crisis variables change. And the dummy variable for a 
financial crisis: 
 













µ is the mean and 
FMP
σ is the standard deviation of the financial market pressure 
index. 
 
As we already discussed, we calculated the dummy variable for a currency crisis when the 
EMP reaches a threshold of 1.65 times the standard deviation above the mean, by doing this we 
consider a crisis deviations from the mean with a probability of 5% occurring. We tried other 
thresholds, in particular we allowed for the upper tail having a probability of 10% (1.28 times 
the standard deviation) and 2.5% (2.17 times the standard deviation). By lowering the threshold, 
we allow for more observations to be considered as a crisis which can be at odds with the 
definition of an extreme value of the EMP (FMP). On the other hand, we don’t gain in 
variability on the regressor, on the contrary since the threshold defines the value of a dichotomic 
variable we lose the information contained in the realisations of extreme variables, a higher 
threshold has the same effect by considering crisis periods as non-crisis periods. We opted to 
maintain the 5% threshold for two reasons: i) when raising the threshold, we could observe that 
most of the extreme values of the EMP didn’t disappear but when doing the same exercise with 
the FMP series Malaysia and Brazil showed no extreme values at 2.5%26 ; and, ii) to be 





                                                 
26 See annex A3.2 
Chapter 3: Contagion; when a storm brings a flu 
Financial and Currency Crises 
116 
3.3.1. Currency crises conditional on financial market crises 
 
We calculated the EMP following the Eichengreen et al. (1996) specification and obtained 































































Figure 11: Exchange Market Pressure, 1994-2002.  
 
3.3.1.1. Contagion  
 
We applied the Pesaran and Pick (2005) methodology to test for contagion in currency 
crises given financial crises. The model that we estimated is: 
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 5 6 1
1 2 1
              2
              
−
−
= + + + +
+ + + + + +
+ +
it t t t
it it it it it it
jt jt t
EMP LIBOR WINF WIPG OILP
OGAP GOV CA M FIN FIN
CURR CURR u
δ δ δ δ




- EMP= Exchange Market Pressure index 
- LIBOR= London Inter-Bank Offer Rate 
- WINF= World Inflation 
- WIPG= Industrialised Countries’ Production Growth 
- OILP=Change in Oil Prices 
- OGAP=Output Gap 
- GOV=Government Position 
- CA= Change in the Domestic Financial Account 
- M2=Change in Money M2 
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- FIN= Financial Market Crisis Dummy 
- CURR= Foreign Currency Crisis Dummy 
An example case: Mexico and Thailand 
 
Due to reasons of space we only present as an example of the process for the estimation of 
the Pesaran and Pick (2005) model for the EMP the case of the pair formed by Thailand and 
Mexico. Because of reasons of space it is not possible to include all the pairs of countries (15 
estimations of the second stage, 30 of the first stage and 30 instruments tests). We chose these 
two countries because they are representative of the 1990’s crises. Thailand was the first 
country to suffer a crisis in South East Asia and Mexico in Latin America. As we derived the 
solution earlier, the first stage of the 2-SLS consists in estimating the EMP of each country i 
using as instruments the matrices Z, Xi and Xj. For this case the set of instruments is formed by 
the current observations of domestic and international variables and includes lagged 
observations of the financial crisis dummy. Our dependent variables to estimate are denoted 
EMPMEX and EMPTHA for Mexico and Thailand respectively. The results of these 






Variable Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   
LIBOR 18.4755 0.3066 26.9993 0.0929
WINF 7.998055 0.7976 -54.17457 0.0565
WIPG 8.740851 0.7994 -41.72428 0.1725
OILP 2.358198 0.6255 0.257538 0.9509
OGAPMEX -3.139438 0.8495 20.91777 0.1562
GOVMEX 0.012365 0.7880 0.038721 0.3373
CAMEX 0.14303 0.7782 -0.689651 0.1288
M2MEX -35.1637 0.0038 -5.25801 0.5766
FINMEX 2.947234 0.0985 0.000471 0.9997
FINMEX(-1) -1.859297 0.3699 0.881819 0.6215
OGAPTHA 5.582366 0.7080 26.98553 0.0476
GOVTHA -0.00532 0.9020 -0.000272 0.9942
CATHA -0.003875 0.8330 0.001586 0.9207
M2THA 2.642778 0.6318 0.771733 0.8715
FINTHA 1.258857 0.4469 -1.10654 0.4411
FINTHA(-1) 0.85798 0.6146 0.240717 0.8703
 
The purpose of this stage is to eliminate the correlation between EMP and the residuals that 
arise in a simultaneous equation model, the errors in this first stage estimation must be i.i.d N 
(0, 1).  We performed a Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation test to discard autocorrelated 
residuals; the null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation, as we can see we cannot reject 
the null. As well, we performed a Jarque-Bera under the null hypothesis that residuals are 
normally distributed and found that we cannot reject the null for Thailand at the 90% level of 
significance but for Mexico we cannot reject it only at the 1% level:  
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Breusch-Godfrey 1.8122 0.5033 
Probability  0.1934 0.6132 
Jarque-Bera 6.3774 0.1687 
Probability 0.0412 0.9191 
 
We have to check for the strength of instruments and we can see that in both cases they are 
strong instruments. Even though the coefficients may not be all statistically significant, at this 
stage we are not interested in explaining the dependent variable but to obtain strong instruments 
in order to be able to obtain the best fit with the available variables.  
 









Each of the fitted EMP series are renamed to denote the country they are conditional to; in 
other words, the estimated EMP for Mexico given the information of Thailand is labelled 
MEXTHAMEMP and the estimated EMP for Thailand given the information of Mexico is 
labelled MEXTHATEMP. With the fitted values of the EMP we obtain new series of the non-
linear variables for a currency crisis. In this particular case these are labelled: CURRTHAMEX 
which is the currency crisis variable of Thailand given the information of Mexico; and, 
CURRMEXTHA for the currency crisis variable of Mexico given the information of Thailand.  
 
Dependent Variable: EMPMEX Dependent Variable: EMPTHA 
 Coefficient Prob.    Coefficient Prob.   
LIBOR 24.82843 0.1204 LIBOR 18.36033 0.1008 
WINF 6.953114 0.7963 WINF -42.14898 0.1470 
WIPG 14.81416 0.625 WIPG -21.23943 0.4750 
OILP 1.307815 0.7301 OILP -3.541082 0.4326 
OGAPMEX -9.561929 0.5881 OGAPTHA 15.4906 0.1220 
GOVMEX 0.015742 0.6565 GOVTHA -0.008015 0.8210 
CAMEX 0.395362 0.6639 CATHA 0.007451 0.5500 
M2MEX -36.91455 0.0032 M2THA -0.843577 0.8612 
FINMEX 2.612183 0.1095 FINTHA -1.288277 0.3340 
FINMEX(-1) -2.780241 0.4593 FINTHA(-1) 0.769448 0.5588 
CURRTHAMEX 2.50154 0.5997 CURRMEXTHA -1.354231 0.4477 
CURRTHAMEX(-1) -1.119572 0.5529 CURRMEXTHA(-1) 1.977689 0.2309 
R-squared 0.6176  R-squared 0.4529 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4347  Adjusted R-squared 0.1912 
 
As we can see the results show that there is no contagion between countries. In the case of 
Thailand the adjusted R-squared is of 0.1912 only, this means that this specification may not 
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explain very well the behaviour of the EMP in Thailand. However, when using other countries 
as pair for Thailand we see that the explanatory power improves. This is due to the contagion 
effect that is captured and can explain the behaviour in each country.  We tested as well for 








Breusch-Godfrey 1.6294 0.1337 
Probability  0.2198 0.8755 
Jarque-Bera 4.0049 0.6648 
Probability 0.1350 0.7171 
 
Results for all countries 
 
We estimated these equations (5 equations for each country paired with the other countries, 
in total 30 equations) and used the F-statistic to test for null hypothesis of the joint probability 
of all the coefficients being zero (weak instruments as defined by Stock, Wright and Yogo, 
2002). In total we are estimating 5 sets of instruments for each country. We found that in the 
case of Philippines, the instruments were weak in all cases with the specification of the model 
above; hence, we modified the structural equation for Philippines in order to include lagged 
values of international and Philippine domestic variables which improved considerably the 
quality of the instruments27. In the next table we present the probability of the F-statistic of the 
first stage estimations, since the null hypothesis is having weak instruments, lower probability 
rejects the null; we can consider probabilities around 20% relevant but weak instruments 
following Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002). Probabilities for each country are shown in columns 
while each row represents the source of contagion.  
 
Probability f-statistic; Contagion between countries 
(Threshold 1.65 SD) 
To 
From 
Mexico Brazil Malaysia Thailand Philippines Korea 
Mexico  0.0438 0.0285 0.0714 0.0443 0.2777 
Brazil 0.0118  0.0005 0.1825 0.1490 0.0775 
Malaysia 0.0618 0.1162  0.0061 0.0165 0.1303 
Thailand 0.0608 0.2830 0.0126  0.1100 0.1513 
Philippines 0.0002 0.0112 0.0573 0.0360  0.3720 
Korea 0.0780 0.0070 0.0110 0.2602 0.1082  
Table 13:  Strength of instruments EMP  
 
                                                 
27 Other 2 cases were Brazil and Korea when paired with Mexico; we included lagged international 
variables and lagged Brazilian and Korean domestic variables respectively. Modifying the specification in 
other pairs with already strong instruments resulted in the weakening of the instruments; therefore, those 
were not modified.  
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We found no evidence of contagion from Mexico to neither of the South East Asian 
countries. On the other hand we found contagion from Brazil to Malaysia and Korea with a (-) 
sign; due to the “bad” implication of the word contagion we will define this result as “positive 
contagion” which means that they benefit from other country’s movement of the EMP; such is 
the case of Malaysia and Thailand that benefit from Brazil. There is contagion from Malaysia to 
Thailand, Philippines and Korea; from Thailand, positive contagion to Malaysia; from 
Philippines to Thailand and Korea; and from Korea to Thailand and Philippines and positive 
contagion to Malaysia. As we can see contagion is not unidirectional but can result in feedback 
effects. We found evidence of contagion between countries in the South East Asian region and 
this suggests that contagion is a regional phenomenon rather than a global one. In the next table 
we show those countries where contagion was significant either with a (+) or (-) sign in its 
effect, at a given level of significance; (N) denotes that it is non-significant at that level.  
 
Direction of currency contagion during the 1990’s  
Contagion effect sign with different levels of significance 
(Threshold 1.65 SD) 
Mexico Brazil Malaysia Thailand Philippines Korea                To 
From 5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 
Mexico   N N N N N N N N N N 
Brazil N N   (-) (-) (-) (-) N N N N 
Malaysia N N N N   (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
Thailand N N N N (-) (-)   N N N N 
Philippines N N N N N N (+) (+)   (+) (+) 
Korea N N N N (-) (-) (+) (+) (+) (+)   
Table 14:  Currency crises’ contagion  
 
3.3.1.2. International and domestic variables  
 
This methodology allows measuring the impact of international and domestic variables in 
the behaviour of the crisis variable, such as the EMP. In this case, where countries are set in 
pairs, the magnitude and sometimes the significance change depending on the country it is 
paired with. This could be addressed in a multi country setting, however this methodology still 
needs better development and problems of determinacy arise in the estimation of arise when the 
number of countries increases. Here we present some of the results that proven to be robust 
enough to indicate the possible significance of the parameters taken into account, the sign of the 
effect is between brackets and it includes only those effects significant at 10%. 
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IMPACT ON THE EMP 
 (contagion variable not included) 
(Threshold 1.65 SD) 
 Mexico Brazil Malaysia Thailand Philippines Korea 
International Variables       
LIBOR (+)   (+) (+)  
World Inflation (WINF)    (-)   
World Industrial Production Growth 
(WIPG) 
 (+) (-) (-) (-) (-) 
Oil prices (OILP)     (-)  
Domestic Variables        
Output Gap (OGAP)   (+)  (-) (+) 
Government position (GOV)  (+) (-)  (-)  
Current account (CA)   (+) (-)   
Money (M2) (+)  (-) (+)   
Financial crisis index (FIN) (+) (+) (+) (+)  (+) 
Table 15: Impact on the EMP, international and domestic variables  
 
Some of the conclusions that we can draw from are: i) international interest rates, such as 
the LIBOR, had a positive impact on the exchange rate market; ii) world inflation affected 
Thailand with a negative sign; iii) world industrial production growth affected positively Brazil 
and negatively Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines and Korea; iv) oil prices were significant in 
Philippines; v) output gap was significant for Malaysia, Korea and Philippines; vi) government 
budget position was significant in Philippines, Brazil and Malaysia; vii) M2 is significant in 
Mexico, Malaysia and Thailand; and, viii) financial crises are significant in all countries. One of 
the main features of these crises and is that there were seemingly strong fundamentals and 
ongoing structural reforms to liberalise financial markets and trade whilst controlling 
government deficits. In Mexico it is clear that the political turmoil during 1994 coupled with 
loss of confidence in the government’s policy measures lead to the crisis in December28. In 
South East Asia, Chang and Velasco (1999) and Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998) coincide 
that the detonator of the crises was the devaluation of the Thai Baht, which spread to other 
countries sequentially. According to Chang and Velasco (1999) Thailand was the victim of 
severe mismanagement from the private sector that required backing from the government but 
more important, when the government was trying to bail out troubled firms, it discovered that 
reserves were less than required and opted for a devaluation of the currency. Korea suffered 
from contagion and the main factor that Chang and Velasco (1999) attribute to the crisis is the 
worsening of the current account which is confirmed by the estimated coefficients. Malaysia 
was the country that was facing a worsening in its fundamentals since 1995 and there were fears 
of the economy becoming overheated. Philippines had solid fundamentals according to Chang 
and Velasco (1999) and its crisis is more to blame on contagion.  
                                                 
28 As it is discussed earlier. 
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3.3.2. Financial crises conditional on exchange market crises 
 




































































Figure 12: Financial Market Pressure, 1991-2002 
3.3.2.1. Contagion  
The other possible channel for transmission of contagion is the financial system; we carried 
out the same test to find evidence of contagion but now the dependent variable is the financial 
market pressure index. We estimated the model29: 
1 2 3 4
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Where:  
- FMP= Financial Market Pressure index 
- LIBOR= London Inter-Bank Offer Rate 
- WINF= World Inflation 
- WIPG= Industrialised Countries’ Production Growth 
- OILP=Change in Oil Prices 
- OGAP=Output Gap 
- GOV=Government Deficit 
- CA= Change in the Domestic Financial Account 
- M2=Change in Money M2 
- CURR= Exchange Market Crisis Dummy 
- FIN= Financial Market Crisis Dummy 
                                                 
29 Due to reasons of space we only present in annex A3.3 the complete procedure of estimation of the 2-
SLS for one case, Mexico and Thailand.  
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We performed the same test as the previous section we estimated each of the equations of 
the 6 countries with the 5 contagion variables by OLS as the first stage of the 2-SLS. Again we 
are testing 5 different sets of instruments per country. In this case we found that Mexico, 
Malaysia Philippines and Korea have strong instruments regardless of which one is the other 
country. Brazil show relevant but weak instruments when paired with Brazil and improved with 
Philippines, with the rest of the countries they are weak. Thailand presents the strongest 
instruments when paired with Mexico and Malaysia, weaker with Philippines and Korea and the 
weakest with Brazil. We present the F-statistic probabilities of the first stage equations in the 
following table.30 
Probability F-statistic 
Contagion between countries 
(Threshold 1.65 SD) 
To 
From 
Mexico Brazil Malaysia Thailand Philippines Korea 
Mexico  0.1938 0.0070 0.0105 0.0000 0.1114 
Brazil 0.0601  0.0150 0.3860 0.0343 0.0005 
Malaysia 0.0327 0.5454  0.0985 0.0594 0.0083 
Thailand 0.0923 0.5505 0.0059  0.0648 0.0052 
Philippines 0.0532 0.1070 0.0032 0.1189  0.0004 
Korea  0.0686 0.4309 0.0058 0.2164 0.1774   
Table 16: Strength of instruments FMP  
 
In this case we found less evidence of contagion, being the most affected Malaysia which 
receives contagion from Thailand, Philippines and Korea. Brazil received positive contagion 
from Thailand; and Philippines received positive contagion from Korea. In the next table we 
show those countries where contagion was significant either with a (+) or (-) sign in its effect, at 
a given level of significance; (N) denotes that it is non-significant at that level.  
Direction of financial contagion during the 1990’s  
Contagion effect sign with different levels of significance 
(Threshold 1.65 SD) 
Mexico Brazil Malaysia Thailand Philippines Korea                To 
From 5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 
Mexico   N N N N N N N N N N 
Brazil N N   N N N N N N N N 
Malaysia N N N N   N N N N N N 
Thailand N N (-) (-) (+) (+)   N N N N 
Philippines N N N N (+) (+) N N   N N 
Korea N N N N (+) (+) N N (-) (-)   
Table 17: Financial crises’ contagion  
 
3.3.2.2. International and domestic variables  
 
As in the case of the EMP, we present here the estimated parameters of international and 
domestic variables on the financial market pressure index. Here we present some of the results 
that proven to be robust enough to indicate the possible significance of the parameters taken into 
                                                 
30 Probabilities for each country are shown in columns while each row represents the source of contagion. 
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account, the sign of the effect is between brackets and it includes only those effects significant 
at the 10%.   
IMPACT ON THE FMP 
5% SIGNIFICANCE  
(contagion variable not included)  
(Threshold 1.65 SD) 
 Mexico Brazil Malaysia Thailand Philippines Korea 
International Variables       
LIBOR       
World Inflation (WINF) (+) (+)   (+)  
World Industrial Production Growth 
(WIPG) 
(+)      
Oil prices (OILP) (-)  (-) (-)   
Domestic Variables        
Output Gap (OGAP)   (+)  (-) (+) 
Government position (GOV)   (-) (-) (-)  
Current account (CA) (+)   (-)  (-) 
Money (M2)       
Currency crisis (CURR) (+) (+) (+) (+)  (+) 
Table 18: Impact on the FMP, international and domestic variables  
 
In this case we found that: i) world inflation affects Mexico, Brazil and Philippines; ii) an 
increase in oil prices benefit Mexico, Malaysia and Thailand; iii) increases in the output gap 
pressures on the FMP in Malaysia and Korea; iii) a public deficit affects Malaysia, Thailand and 
Philippines; iv) increases in the current account pressures the FMP in Mexico, the effect has a 
negative sign in Thailand and Korea; and, v) currency crises consistently spread to financial 
crisis. Chang and Velasco (1999) recount of the currency crises in South East Asia argue that 
the currency crises uncovered and made evident the weakness in financial sectors once they 
were well underway and the economy was receding. This does not generalise to say that 
financial crises are easier to predict, according to Hillebrand (2004) the probability of the crash 
of Wall Street occurring in 1987 was only of 7%.  
3.3.3. Relaxing the definition of a crisis: robustness 
 
As an additional exercise we compare the results with the ones corresponding to the 10% 
threshold (that is a crisis happens when an observation exceeds 1.28 times the standard 
deviation from the mean) Regarding the EMP the countries that have significant changes (i.e. 
new period crises appear) are Philippines, Korea and Brazil; Mexico increases the length of the 
1994 crisis in one quarter while Thailand and Malaysia are unaltered. With respect to the FMP, 
only Malaysia and Philippines show new crisis periods and the rest of the countries are 
unaltered. 
3.3.3.1. Currency crises conditional on financial market crises 
 
As we can see, the strength of the instruments is not greatly affected; the main differences 
are to be found in the strength of instruments when Philippines and Malaysia are involved. The 
Chapter 3: Contagion; when a storm brings a flu 
Financial and Currency Crises 
125 
reason why instruments are not affected is because the number of financial “crises” (which are 
used as instruments) only increases in Malaysia and Philippines as we lower the threshold. This 
is clear in our example of the pair Mexico and Thailand (see annex A3.3) the results of the first 
stage are identical because when lowering the threshold for the financial crisis there is no 
change in the number nor the length of the crisis signals in either country. 
Probability F-statistic 
Contagion between countries 
(Threshold 1.28 SD) 
To 
From 
Mexico Brazil Malaysia Thailand Philippines Korea 
Mexico  0.0438 0.0093 0.0714 0.0700 0.2777 
Brazil 0.0438  0.0004 0.1825 0.0974 0.0775 
Malaysia 0.0118 0.1023  0.0695 0.0022 0.3016 
Thailand 0.0608 0.2830 0.0040  0.0542 0.1513 
Philippines 0.1987 0.0380 0.0069 0.0295  0.2591 
Korea 0.0780 0.0070 0.0092 0.2602 0.1260  
Table 19: Strength of instruments EMP (threshold 1.28 SD) 
 
When calculating the second stage, the results differ greatly because the lower threshold 
allows for more currency crisis periods when applying the filter to the fitted series obtained in 
the first stage; if we compare the number of “crises” signalled we can see that it there is a 
significant difference (see annex sections A3.3.1 and A3.3.2).When comparing the contagion 
effect with different thresholds we can see that we lose all contagion effects that Thailand 
receives (except the one received from Korea); Philippines does not show contagion from any 
country when the threshold is lowered; Malaysia now receives contagion from Philippines and 
there is positive contagion with Mexico; Mexico receives contagion from Brazil at 10% 
significance; Brazil receives contagion from Malaysia; Korea receives contagion only from 
Philippines and there is positive contagion from Brazil and Mexico at 10%. The reason of these 
differences is that with a lower threshold we are now including periods other than the ones 
corresponding to the main crises of interest and possible contagion effects are being measured 
with respect to those other “crises” as well.  
Direction of currency contagion during the 1990’s  
Contagion effect sign with different levels of significance 
(Threshold 1.28 SD) 
Mexico Brazil Malaysia Thailand Philippines Korea                  To 
From 5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 
Mexico   N N (-) (-) N N N N N (-) 
Brazil N (+)   N N N N N N N (-) 
Malaysia N N (+) (+)   N N N N N N 
Thailand N N N N N N   N N N N 
Philippines N N N N (+) (+) N N   (+) (+) 
Korea N N N N N N (+) (+) N N   
Table 20: Currency crises’ contagion (threshold 1.28 SD) 
 
As we can see, the countries where the effect of other variables on the EMP changes, are 
those where the new threshold introduces new “crises”, an example of this is the effect of WIPG 
on the Philippines’ EMP. 
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IMPACT ON THE EMP 
 (contagion variable not included) 
 (Threshold 1.28 SD) 
 Mexico Brazil Malaysia Thailand Philippines Korea 
International Variables       
LIBOR (+) (-)  (+)  (+) 
World Inflation (WINF)  (-)  (-)  (+) 
World Industrial Production Growth (WIPG)  (+) (-)  (+) (-) 
Oil prices (OILP)  (+) (-) (-) (-)  
Domestic Variables        
Output Gap (OGAP)   (+) (+) (-) (+) 
Government position (GOV)  (+) (-)  (-)  
Current account (CA)   (+) (-)   
Money (M2) (+)  (-) (+)  (-) 
Financial crisis (FIN) (+) (+) (+) (+)  (+) 
Table 21: Impact on the EMP, international and domestic variables (threshold 1.28 SD) 
 
3.3.3.2. Financial crises conditional on currency market crises 
 
 
When doing the same exercise on financial crises, we obtained that with respect to the 
strength of the instruments, we can see that it is more affected than in the case of the EMP 
because the number of currency “crises” (which is an instrument in this stage) is higher in 
Philippines, Korea and Brazil and in Mexico the length of the crisis increases as well. In this 
case our example of Thailand and Mexico shows differences from the first stage because of the 




Contagion between countries 
 (Threshold 1.28 SD) 
To 
From 
Mexico Brazil Malaysia Thailand Philippines Korea 
Mexico  0.0797 0.0314 0.1328 0.0001 0.0423 
Brazil 0.1618  0.0355 0.3812 0.0151 0.0670 
Malaysia 0.2071 0.3927  0.2584 0.0001 0.0131 
Thailand 0.1740 0.3775 0.0167  0.0002 0.0039 
Philippines 0.1354 0.0801 0.0144 0.0968  0.0002 
Korea 0.3539 0.5868 0.0222 0.2021 0.0276  
Table 22: Strength of instruments FMP (threshold 1.28 SD) 
 
We can see that the second stage results differ as well because of the increase in the number 
of crisis signals when filtering the fitted FMP obtained during the first stage (see annex A3.3.3 
and A3.3.4). We have now positive contagion from Malaysia to Mexico and from Philippines to 
Brazil while the one from Thailand to Brazil disappears; in Malaysia, only the contagion from 
Philippines remains significant; Thailand now shows contagion at 10% significance from 
Philippines and Brazil; Philippines shows contagion only from Mexico; and, Korea now 
receives contagion from Brazil and Thailand.  
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Direction of financial contagion during the 1990’s  
Contagion effect sign with different levels of significance 
 (Threshold 1.28 SD) 
Mexico Brazil Malaysia Thailand Philippines Korea                  To 
From 5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 
Mexico   N N N N N N (+) (+) N N 
Brazil N N   N N N (+) N N (+) (+) 
Malaysia (-) (-) N N   N N N N N N 
Thailand N N N N N N   N N (+) (+) 
Philippines N N (-) (-) (+) (+) N (+)   N N 
Korea N N N N N N N N N N   
Table 23: Financial crises’ contagion (threshold 1.28 SD) 
 
In this case, the effect of international and domestic variables change mainly in Philippines 
where the results are completely different, in other countries they remain similar.  
 
IMPACT ON THE FMP 
5% SIGNIFICANCE  
(contagion variable not included)  
 (Threshold 1.28 SD) 
 Mexico Brazil Malaysia Thailand Philippines Korea 
International Variables       
LIBOR       
World Inflation (WINF)       
World Industrial Production Growth (WIPG) (+)     (+) 
Oil prices (OILP) (-)  (-) (-)   
Domestic Variables        
Output Gap (OGAP)   (+)   (+) 
Government position (GOV)   (-) (-) (-)  
Current account (CA) (+)  (+) (-)  (-) 
Money (M2)    (+)   
Financial Market Pressure (FMP) (+) (+)  (+) (+) (+) 
Table 24: Impact on the FMP, international and domestic variables (threshold 1.28 SD) 
 
3.4. Conclusions of the chapter 
 
An important discussion is how to define contagion: different studies have different 
definitions of contagion. Using the distinction that Pesaran and Pick (2005) make between 
interdependence and contagion, we propose a reclassification of existing studies by taking into 
account the type of linkage that they focus on. As a result we can see that most of them either 
mix both linkages into the definition of “contagion” they use or they omit pure contagion effects 
and focus on interdependence. Once the type of linkage is made clear, we can see that 
incorporating the distinction is not difficult and could improve the estimation of this 
phenomena, at the very least it would provide with a unified definition of which one is the 
phenomenon under study.  
We applied the Pesaran and Pick (2005) methodology in order to look for evidence of 
contagion. A variable often disregarded in the study of currency crises is that linked to financial 
markets performance; we propose the Financial Market Pressure index that includes the role of 
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domestic credit, capital account and stock market index as a measure of this variable. The FMP 
allows not only to measure contagion on the currency market but provides with an index of the 
financial market that allows measuring the performance of financial markets as a 
macroeconomic indicator and define a financial crisis and apply the same contagion 
methodology as with the EMP.  
 
We found the following sources of contagion, both for financial and currency crises. 
Source of contagion 
CURRENCY MARKET  
Affected countries 
FINANCIAL MARKET  
Affected countries 
Mexico Philippines (-)  
Brazil Malaysia (-)  
 Thailand (-)  
 Philippines (-)  
Malaysia Thailand (+)  
 Philippines (+)  
 Korea (+)  
Thailand Malaysia (+) Brazil (-) 
 Philippines (+) Malaysia (+) 
Philippines Thailand (+) Malaysia (+) 
 Korea (+)  
Korea Malaysia (-) Malaysia (+) 
 Thailand (+) Philippines (-) 
 Philippines (+)  
Table 25: Currency and Financial markets contagion  
 
With regard to currency crises, the results of sources of contagion together with the figures 
from Brazil being a source of positive contagion suggest that the South East Asian and Latin 
American regions are to some extent immune to each other’s crises.  
 
Regarding the role of domestic variables in the behaviour of the EMP, we found that they 
were consistent with the findings of Chang and Velasco (1999) in their study about the South 
East Asian crisis and with the Bank of Mexico analysis of the Mexican crisis. That is, in some 
cases fundamentals were not at the hub of the all the currency attacks that these countries 
suffered. On the other hand, fundamentals are more successful explaining the behaviour of the 
FMP. If we think about the characteristics and the timeline of the crises, Chang and Velasco 
(1999) and Corsetti et al. (1998) document that financial crises followed the currency crises and 
financial imbalances in the private and bankruptcies were made evident after the crises 
occurred. As Morgan-Witts (1979) argues: “there are the same number of fraud and financial 
problems in calm times than in crisis times, the difference is that in a crisis there are no 
mechanisms to cover possible losses and failure is more frequent”.  
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“The more there is of mine, the less is of yours” 
Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland,  
Lewis Carroll (1865) 
 
 
Most of the available studies that address the costs of crises are concerned with the impact 
of sudden fluctuations in the exchange rates in output in OECD31 countries. These fluctuations 
can be accounted as currency crises but in neither case the impact on GDP or consumption are 
comparable to those observed in emerging markets. Almost all studies about financial crises 
address the events and causes that lead an apparently successful country to a financial and 
currency meltdown and a subsequent contraction of income. All this literature has produced 
several methodologies to predict a crisis, although not all of them successfully. Some other 
studies have focused on the measurement of costs associated with these periods. However, costs 
have been associated mostly with variables such as the level of international reserves; public 
debt; fiscal deficits and the loss of output. The effects on welfare have been less studied and 
only in the case of Indonesia Frankenberg, Thomas and Beegle, (1999) conducted an in-depth 
survey to determine the effects of a crisis at the microeconomic level. We are going to measure 
welfare costs following Lucas’ (1987) framework in order to measure the impact of crises on 
both, utility and consumption and hence this will allow us to have a proper measure of these 
events’ impact on welfare.  
 
As we will discuss in the following section, almost none of previous empirical studies have 
focused on measuring the costs of welfare but only in how much do output varies and/or its 
growth rate and how much of these variations can be explained by a crisis. As well there is no 
clear relationship between output losses incurred during crises and the fiscal costs of resolution 
associated with it. On the one hand, the larger the banking crisis the larger would be expected to 
be both the output losses and the fiscal costs; there could be a positive association between these 
costs but not clear causation. On the other hand, to the extent that fiscal costs are a good proxy 
for effective crisis resolution, the more spent by the authorities in resolving a given banking 
crisis the lower perhaps would be the output losses incurred during the crisis period. In order to 
fill this gap in the literature, we follow Hoggarth et al. (2002) recommendation about measuring 
the welfare cost rather than the change in output and consumption32 by using Lucas (1987) 
measures of welfare cost when the consumption process suffers an alteration in its parameters. 
                                                 
31 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  
32 This is discussed more in-depth in section 4.1. 
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Lucas (1987) developed two simple measures to determine the cost of permanent changes in the 
average growth rate and on the variability of real consumption. These tools provide: first, a 
measurement of the required increase in consumption at all dates that is necessary for 
consumers to accept voluntarily a reduction in the growth rate; and secondly, the required 
increase in consumption that would make consumers indifferent between a perfectly smooth 
consumption path and a process with some instability. Lucas (1987) used US parameters in 
order to estimate the costs of some hypothetical changes in the growth rate and in the variability 
of consumption with different risk aversions. However, there are some caveats in this 
methodology; Lucas (1987) did not include the effect of a change in the level of the trend of the 
consumption path and the costs are calculated separately which means that there is not a 
measure for the total cost of an event that changes simultaneously all these parameters.  
 
We expanded the calculations of the cost to include the combined effect of a change in 
the level, growth and variance of consumption; additionally, we adjust the calculation of 
the cost associated to increased variability to measure only the additional variability that 
can be attributed to the crisis and we do not assume, as Lucas (1987) does, that the initial 
state is one without variability. We apply this welfare measure to the observed parameters 
before and after the crisis period in some of the most relevant countries that have suffered 
a crisis during the 1990’s and we will try to determine the cost these crises in terms of loss 
of real consumption. The countries to study are Mexico, Thailand Philippines, Malaysia, 
Korea and Brazil.  
 
When comparing the costs obtained with the Lucas’ (1987) methodology with the adjusted 
methodology we observe that these costs increase significantly. With both methodologies we 
calculate the compensation in consumption required to leave the consumer indifferent between 
the pre and the post crisis periods, a positive number imply a required increase in post-crisis 
consumption (therefore a loss with respect to the pre-crisis period) while a negative number 
implies a gain in consumption after the crisis such that the consumer has to pay to be left 
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4.1. Empirical evidence on costs after financial and currency 
crises  
 
Some of the studies that address the performance of emerging economies after a crisis are 
those of Caballero and Hammour (2000), Dornbusch (2001) and Tornell (2001), who conclude 
that recurrent crises in developing economies have large welfare consequences. Some of these 
are immediately apparent, while others manifest their damage over time and thus are often 
overlooked. A potentially major impact of the latter type is the disruptive effect that crises may 
have on restructuring and reform processes. The Costs that have been addressed by empirical 
studies can be grouped as follow: 
 
1. Increase in public debt associated with crises: according to Dornbusch (2001) this 
phenomenon is observed because the government has the compromise to bail out banks and 
often bankrupting companies and while acquiring the necessary resources to do this, the public 
debt increases substantially. The period of high interest rates in the run-up to the crisis and in 
the stabilisation phase, and the fall in output and hence tax revenue, further contribute to the 
deterioration in public finances. Finally the increase in debt may itself contribute to a future 
crisis if it occurs in a situation in which the government is unable to meet the higher debt 
service burden through taxation or a reduction in spending.  
 
2. Economic disruption and loss of output: Caballero and Hammour (2000) found 
evidence that lead to conjecture that crises slow down the restructuring process of the economy; 
if this is so, then crises are even more costly than their temporary impact on unemployment and 
other aggregate indicators may suggest. Their interpretation is that the main underlying factors 
that drive crises are financial constraints. While liquidations and the open failure of bankrupt 
firms make the news and may be regarded as the triggers of a crisis, recessions also deplete the 
financial resources needed to create new and more advanced production units. As the latter 
takes place, the competitive pressure from new production units slows down and low-
productivity units can survive more easily. The scarcity of financial resources during the 
recovery limits the socially useful transfer of resources from low to high productivity units.  
 
Although Caballero and Hammour (2000) do not have data available to assess the impact on 
recent crises in emerging markets it is likely that in general, crises constitute major obstacles to 
a well-functioning restructuring process, and that this disruption is closely associated with 
problems in financial markets. The result is a productivity-based social cost of economic crises 
that is incurred in addition to the traditional cost based on under-employment and the under-
utilisation of other resources. Therefore, the cost of crises in terms of restructuring is twofold: i) 
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crises are likely to result in a significant amount of privately inefficient liquidations, leading to 
large costs of job loss and liquidations of organisational capital; and, ii) crises are likely to result 
in a freezing of the restructuring process and years of productivity stagnation; Dornbusch (2001) 
adds that there is also a large loss of reserves, which are depleted while defending the currency. 
If they are captured by the private sector, they merely amount to a transfer within the economy. 
However, when the counterparts are foreign investors, these reserves are actually transferred out 
of the economy which is a net loss. To the extent that a crisis experience deteriorates a country’s 
credit rating, there is also a lasting cost in terms of a higher cost of accessing international 
capital. 
 
3. Redistribution of income and wealth: in terms of income distribution, a currency crisis 
redistributes both, wealth and income. Dornbusch (2001) points out that, emerging market crises 
enrich those who are able to quickly convert their assets into foreign policy or to get the 
government to assume their debt while retaining their assets and almost always there is a 
dramatic fall in real wages and employment and bankruptcy of small debtors. In consequence, 
periods of recurrent currency crises translate into poor growth performance, short horizons, and 
slow increases in the standard of living, a deteriorating social and economic infrastructure that 
ultimately medium term growth rates, far from reflecting catch-up, reflect the costs of 
persistently poor finance.  
 
4. Measuring the impact on households, a microeconomic indicators approach: an 
exception to the usual approach of identifying stylised facts is the analysis that Frankenberg, 
Thomas and Beegle (1999) do of the Indonesian crisis of 1998. The authors analysed the costs 
of the Indonesian crisis using the Indonesia Family Life Surveys (IFLS) corresponding to 1997 
and to 1998; the objective of their study was to answer three main questions: i) which was the 
population sector most affected by the crisis; ii) how were they affected; and, iii) how they 
responded to it in terms of adjusting consumption patterns. The IFLS is an on-going 
longitudinal survey of individuals, households, families and communities in Indonesia. The data 
provide unambiguous evidence that the crisis had a far-reaching effect on the purchasing power 
of all respondents, regardless of their position in the income distribution. This first result is not 
surprising since the resulting inflation after the currency crisis of 1998. When one considers 
changes not in overall levels of spending, but in the allocation of this spending, the results 
suggest that the poorest households have been most affected. The share of the household budget 
spent on food has increased significantly and these increases are largest for the poorest. On the 
other hand, non-food expenditures have declined significantly, especially among the poorest. 
However, short and medium term effects are likely to differ across sub-groups of the 
population. This is true especially because expenditures on health and education since there 
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were significant declines in enrolment rates for young children from poor households and the 
use of government health clinics and community health posts has declined sharply.  
 
The linkage between currency and bank crises (twin crises phenomenon) has been 
addressed more recently in theoretical literature. Most third generation currency crisis models 
with some combination of corporate credit flows, balance sheet currency mismatches (as in 
dollarisation of liabilities), bank runs into foreign assets, international illiquidity or international 
financial transaction costs raise the possibility of a twin crisis with adverse effects on the real 
economy. This joint occurrence may reflect a response to common factors or spill-over effects 
running from currency to financial crises and vice versa. According to Hutchinson and Noy 
(2002) the cost on the real economy associated with a twin crisis may be measured separately as 
the additive effects of independent currency and banking crises.  However, there may be some 
other channels of transmission that increase the impact on output. In other words, twin crises 
may be associated with disproportionately large output costs such that the sum of the parts is 
indeed greater than either of the two types of crises acting alone.    
 
According to Hoggarth et al. (2002) a crisis in the banking sector may impose several costs 
on the economy: i) stakeholders in the failed bank will be directly affected; ii) taxpayers may 
incur direct costs as a result of public sector crisis resolution. Costs affecting particular sectors 
of the economy may just reflect a redistribution of wealth, but under certain conditions banking 
crises may also reduce income and wealth in the economy as a whole. Caprio and Klingebiel 
(1999) and Barth et al. (2000) estimate fiscal costs incurred in the resolution of 24 major 
banking crises over the past two decades. These fiscal costs reflect the expenditure that 
governments incur when trying to rehabilitate or bail out the financial system; this can include 
bank recapitalisation, payments made to depositors either implicitly or explicitly and acquisition 
of banks’ debt by the government in bail out schemes; in order to finance the support to the 
financial system, governments use fiscal resources and in some cases, as in Mexico, an increase 
in tax rates was used to: i) finance the cost of rescuing banks; and, ii) to slow down 
consumption and contain inflation. The average resolution cost for a twin crisis is 23% of 
annual GDP compared with 4.5% for a banking crisis alone. Moreover, all countries that had 
fiscal costs of more than 10% of annual GDP had an accompanying currency crisis.  
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Fiscal and Quasi-Fiscal Costs 
Country Years 
Non-performing loans  
(% of total loans) 
Fiscal and quasi-fiscal 
costs/GDP 
High income countries   
FINLAND 1991-1993 9.0 11.0 
JAPAN 1992-1998 13.0 8.0 
KOREA  1997- 30-40 34.0 
NORWAY 1988-1992 9.0 8.0 
SPAIN 1977-1985 N/A 16.8 
SWEDEN 1991 11.0 4.0 
UNITED STATES 1984-1991 4.0 3.2 
AVERAGE  13.5 12.1 
Medium and low income countries   
ARGENTINA 1980-1982 9.0 55.3 
ARGENTINA 1995 N/A 1.6 
BRAZIL 1994-1996 15.0 5-10 
CHILE 1981-1983 19.0 41.2 
COLOMBIA 1982-1987 25.0 5.0 
GHANA 1982-1989 N/A 6.0 
INDONESIA 1994 N/A 1.8 
INDONESIA 1997- 65-75 50-55 
MALAYSIA 1985-1988 33.0 4.7 
MEXICO 1994-1995 11.0 20.0 
PHILIPPINES 1981-1987 N/A 3.0 
SRI LANKA 1989-1993 35.0 5.0 
THAILAND 1983-1987 15.0 1.5 
THAILAND 1997- 46.0 42.3 
TURKEY 1994 N/A 1.1 
URUGUAY 1981-1984 N/A 31.2 
VENEZUELA 1994-1995 N/A 20.0 
AVERAGE  27.8 16.0 
Average all countries  17.7 4.6 
Table 26: Non-performing loans and fiscal costs in Barth et al. (2000) 
 
According to Hoggarth et al (2002), resolution costs may not always be a good measure of 
the costs of crises to the economy, but rather a transfer cost. Also, large fiscal costs may be 
incurred to forestall a banking crisis or, to limit its effect. In this case, the overall costs to the 
economy at large may be small.  On the other hand, the government may incur only small fiscal 
costs and the effect on the overall economy of a banking crisis may be greater and longer. In 
sum, high fiscal costs may imply low welfare costs for households while low fiscal costs may 
imply high welfare costs for households. There is an additional element that has not been 
consider and is the financing of these costs in the long run, whether by debt, monetary 
expansion or higher taxes this is likely to have an indirect impact in consumption. Because of 
these two features of fiscal costs, they are not a reliable indicator of the impact that a crisis may 
have over the economy and in welfare.   Similarly, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) find that bail-
out costs in countries which experienced a twin crisis were much larger (13% of GDP), on 
average, than those which had a banking crisis alone (5%). The cumulative resolution costs of 
banking crises appear to be larger in emerging economies (on average 17.7% of annual GDP) 
than in developed ones (12.1%). The difference may be due to the fact that developed countries 
face smaller shocks to their banking systems; some data suggests that non-performing loans 
have been much larger in emerging market crises. Alternatively, both the banking system and 
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the real economy may have been better able to withstand a given shock because of more robust 
banking and regulatory systems. Chang and Velasco (2000) emphasize the interaction between 
banking crises and real exchange rate movements (currency crises) in a model with a banking 
sector and tradable and non-tradable goods producers. A crisis of one type may occur with or 
without the other occurring but that increases the likelihood of a twin crisis occurring with 
additional output costs to the economy. Self-fulfilling international bank runs are possible when 
short-term bank assets are large relative to central-bank reserves, but may also induced by the 
refusal of domestic and foreign investors to roll over other short-term assets. Alternatively, a 
banking crisis may be exacerbated if a currency crisis occurs concurrently- in the way of a sharp 
devaluation at the time when many banks are on the edge of bankruptcy and a currency crisis 
may push them into bankruptcy.   
 
According to Hutchinson and Noy (2002) there is little empirical literature systematically 
testing the extent to which financial crises impact output growth. Some of the literature 
reviewed by these authors concentrates in the effect of a single type of crisis in output. One 
example is McDill (2000) who investigates the effect of banking crises on a panel data set 
comprising industrial, emerging and developing economies; in this study the approach consists 
in regressing output growth on contemporaneous banking crises and several control variables 
(such as lagged exchange rate depreciation, real interest rate, lagged money growth and lagged 
change in stock price). This study finds that banking crises are associated with 1.2-1.8% point 
decline in output growth during each year of the banking crisis. Demirguç-Kunt et al (2001) 
consider a cross section of 36 banking crises, investigating macroeconomic developments 
before, during and after a crisis; they find that a banking crisis is associated with a 4-percentage 
point decline in output growth. Barro (2001) and Bordo et al. (2001) measure the output costs of 
a currency crisis and a banking crisis in the same model. Barro (2001) considers the pattern of 
5-year average output growth in a broad panel covering industrial, emerging and developing 
economies; this study regresses 5 year output growth averages on conventional control variables 
(per capita GDP, schooling, life expectancy) and contemporaneous and lagged currency banking 
crises. The crisis variable measures a (1,0) dummy for a crisis anytime during the focal 5 year 
period; a currency (banking) crisis is associated with a 1.3% point decline (0.6% decline) in 
average output growth over the 5 year period, when a combination of crises occurs reduces 
current growth by about 2% per year. Bordo et al. (2001) study a sample from 1973 to 1997; 
they find that the cumulative output loss for a twin crisis over and above the average recession 
is 16% of GDP. This effect is measured separately from the 13% cumulative output loss that is 
found to be combined effect of a banking (4.4%) and currency crisis (8.7%). Hutchinson and 
Noy (2002) focus on the output costs associated with twin crises in emerging market economies. 
Their objective is to examine separately the effects of a currency and of a banking crisis and 
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their joint effects. The main finding is that crises are very costly; currency crises reducing by 
about 5-8%, while banking crises do so in 8-10% over a two-four year period. Overall, they are 
able to explain 35-50% of the variation in annual GDP growth in emerging markets during 
1975-1997. The combined effect of the two crises occurring simultaneously is therefore about 
13-18% of output. However, twin crises do not appear to contribute additional negative impact 
on output growth above and beyond the combined effect of the two crises. In table 27 
Hutchinson and Noy (2002) present the behaviour in average of some selected indicators for the 
countries they studied.     
    
Impact of crises on selected indicators 
Hutchinson and Noy (2002) 
  t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 
A. Currency crises  
Currency 4.0 2.7 1.4 1.7 3.6 
Currency (no banking) 3.6 2.4 1.9 1.7 3.6 Real GDP growth rate (%) 
Twin crisis 4.3 4.9 0.7 1.0 2.1 
Currency -1.2 -1.4 -1.1 -1.0 -1.1 
Currency (no banking) -0.9 -1.1 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 Change in budget surplus (%) 
Twin crisis -1.4 -2.1 -1.1 -1.9 -0.5 
Currency 30.5 31.6 31.6 43.4 42.0 
Currency (no banking) 28.1 25.9 23.8 33.0 35.0 Inflation rate (%) 
Twin crisis 43.2 53.2 67.9 57.6 50.1 
Currency 8.0 14.7 1.6 -6.8 -4.3 
Currency (no banking) 12.1 18.1 4.1 -6.7 -4.8 RER overvaluation measure 
Twin crisis -0.4 7.4 3.0 4.0 -2.8 
B. Banking crises 
Real GDP growth rate (%) 5.1 5.1 1.0 5.9 6.5 
Change in budget surplus (%) -0.5 -1.3 -0.8 -0.4 -0.2 
Inflation rate (%) 29.7 32.5 33.6 29.0 26.5 
RER overvaluation measure 1.5 8.3 4.1 -6.5 -3.7 
Table 27:  Impact of crises on selected indicators 
 
With regard to output losses, Hoggarth et al. (2002) say that cross-country comparisons of 
the broader welfare losses to the economy associated with a banking crisis are usually proxied 
by losses in GDP comparing GDP during the crisis period with some estimate of potential 
output. According to Hoggarth et al. (2002) welfare costs should ideally reflect losses to 
individuals’ current and discounted future consumption over their lifetime; and, changes 
in the level of income may have more impact in individuals’ utility at lower income levels 
than higher ones. These authors describe three methods to estimate output losses: i) GAP1, the 
sum of the differences between the growth in potential and actual output (IMF, 1998b), 
potential growth is defined as the arithmetic average of GDP growth in the three years period 
prior to the crisis; ii) GAP2, the cumulative difference between the level of potential output and 
actual output over the crisis period (Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996 and 1999) output potential is 
measured using a Hodrick-Prescott filter; and, iii) GAP3, this method measures output losses as 
the cumulative difference between the counterfactual and the level of actual output during the 
(exogenously defined) crisis period The counterfactual is based on the forecast of GDP growth 
during the crisis period made before the outset of the crisis rather than potential or trend GDP. 
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Taking the sample of 47 countries the average estimates of GAP1 losses is 14.5%; the mean 
average losses using GAP2 are in the order of 16.5%. Hoggarth et al. (2002) used the GAP3 
only in OECD countries so there are no comparisons available for emerging economies. 
However, for those OECD countries GAP3 estimates are higher than those of GAP1. In contrast 
there are marked variations, in both sign and magnitude, between GAP3 and GAP2 estimates.   
Accumulated Output Losses 
Country Years GAP1 GAP2 GAP3 
High income countries    
Australia 1989-1990 0.0 -1.4 0.0 
Canada 1983-1985 0.0 -10.5 0.0 
Denmark 1987-1992 22.3 31.9 47.5 
Finland 1991-1993 22.4 44.9 24.6 
France 1994-1995 0.0 0.7 0.0 
Hong Kong 1982-1983 23.1 9.8  
Hong Kong 1983-1986 1.1 4.3  
Hong Kong 1998 9.6 9.0  
Italy 1990-1995 18.2 24.6 36.1 
Japan 1992-1998 24.1 71.7 30.7 
Korea 1997- 16.7 12.8 15.7 
New Zealand 1987-1990 16.0 16.3 4.5 
Norway 1988-1992 9.8 27.1 11.2 
Spain 1977-1985 15.1 122.2  
Sweden 1991 11.8 3.8 2.5 
United Kingdom 1974-1976 34.6 26.5 31.1 
United States 1984-1991 0.0 -41.9 56.0 
Average  13.2 20.7  
Medium and low income countries    
Argentina 1980-1982 20.7 25.9  
Argentina 1985 7.9 7.1  
Argentina 1989-1990 14.0 16.1  
Argentina 1995 11.4 5.8  
Bolivia 1986-1987 0.6 0.4  
Bolivia 1994 0.0 -26.8  
Brazil 1994-1996 0.0 -12.7  
Chile 1981-1983 41.4 24.3  
Colombia 1982-1987 6.7 31.4  
Egypt 1991-1995 1.0 22.8  
El Salvador 1989 0.6 -1.3  
Ghana 1982-1989 5.5 -47.4  
India 1993- 0.0 -41.1  
Indonesia 1994 0.0 -2.2  
Indonesia 1997- 24.5 20.1  
Madagascar 1988 0.0 -3.1  
Malaysia 1985-1988 14.5 39.2  
Mexico 1981-1982 110.4 -0.2  
Mexico 1994-1995 9.5 5.4  
Nigeria 1997 0.0 0.1  
Peru 1983-1990 12.5 94.0  
Philippines 1981-1987 35.2 111.7  
Sri Lanka 1989-1993 0.6 -10.0  
Thailand 1983-1987 0.0 -2.8  
Thailand 1997- 25.9 28.1  
Turkey 1994 10.4 9.2  
Uruguay 1981-1984 42.0 64.1  
Venezuela 1980-1983 27.6 52.2  
Venezuela 1994-1995 14.7 10.6  
Zimbabwe 1995- 0.4 -3.3  
Average  15.0 13.9  
     
Average all countries  14.4 16.4  
Table 28:  Accumulated output losses in Barth et al. (2000) 
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4.2. Structural change in consumption  
 
In order to check for stationarity, we performed two unit root tests; one over the complete 
sample and the other following Perron on the residuals of the de-trended series.  According to 
Enders (1995) one econometric procedure to test for unit roots in the presence of a structural 
break involves splitting the sample into two parts and using the Dickey-Fuller test on each part. 
The problem with this procedure is that the degrees of freedom for each of the resulting 
regressions are diminished; it is preferable to have a single test based on the full sample. We 
used a Perron specification to estimate alternative representations of structural change with the 
use of the full sample.  
 
0 2 3 4t L L tc t D a t Dγ γ γ ε= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ +     (4.1) 
 
Where ct is a trend stationary process with a one time jump in the intercept and change in 
the slope of the trend and DL represents a level dummy variable such that DL= 1 if t>τ and zero 
otherwise. The implementation of Peron’s technique is summarised by Enders (1995) as follow: 
 
Step 1: de-trend the data by estimating the model above and calling the residuals 
t
ε  
Step 2: estimate the regression 1 1t t ta vε ε −= + . Under the null hypothesis of a unit root, 
the theoretical value of a1 is unity. Perron (1989) shows that when the residuals are i.i.d., the 
distribution of a1 depends on the proportion of observations occurring prior to the break. Denote 
this proportion by /  where T=total number of observations. t Tλ =  
 
Step 3: perform diagnostic checks to determine if the residuals from Step 2 are serially 





t t i t i t
i
a a vε ε ε− −
=
= + +∑  
 
Step 4: calculate the t-statistic for the null hypothesis. This statistic in absolute terms can 
be compared to the critical values calculated by Perron. If a t-statistic greater than the critical 
value calculated by Perron is found it is possible to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root; this 
critical values tend to reject the null hypothesis more than the McKinnon critical value, in other 
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 Mexico Thailand Malaysia Philippines Korea Brazil 
UNIT ROOT TEST OVER 
THE WHOLE SAMPLE 
    
Augmented D-F test -2.3557 -2.2776 -2.1961 -2.5996 -2.2631 -1.8788
McKinnon critical value 5% -3.5162 -3.5426 -3.5162 -3.5162 -3.5066 -3.5614
PERRON TEST     
Augmented D-F test -3.3635 -2.5330 -3.3450 -2.2400 -2.9339 -2.8660
McKinnon critical value 5% -1.9486 -1.9507 -1.9486 -1.9488 -1.9478 -1.9526
Table 29: Unit root test results consumption series 
 
Perron (1989) used his analysis of structural change to challenge the findings of 
Nelson and Plosser (1982). With the same variables used, Peron’s results indicate that 
most macroeconomic variables are not characterised by unit root processes. Instead the 
variables appear to be trend stationary processes coupled with structural breaks. In every 
case, it was possible to reject the null hypothesis of a Unit-Root with the Perron test 
specification. As we can see, when we test over the whole sample we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis for unit roots; however, when de-trending the series and including a structural 
breakpoint, we found that the series become stationary and we can reject the null hypothesis of a 
unit root. We estimated three possible breakpoints for each country around the quarter in where 
the crisis occurred in each of these countries33.  
 
We chose the optimal breakpoint using the adjusted R-squared, the Akaike and the Schwarz 
information criterions. The adjusted R-squared measures the proportion of the sample variation 
in ct that is explained by the set of regressors; while the Akaike and Schwarz criterions are used 
to compare between different specifications of the model when economic theory provides no 
guidance on selecting the appropriate model (i.e. they are used to choose the most parsimonious 
model in terms of information provided) they provide evidence that support the conclusions of 
R-squared and adjusted R-squared (Verbeek, 2000).  The results are shown in table 3034. In 
most, of these cases, consumption was affected only in the quarter of the year where the crisis 
happened except in Philippines where slowdown in consumption happened one quarter earlier, 
and in Brazil that had a lagged effect; however, in Philippines the effect on consumption was 
not as strongly adverse as in other countries and in Brazil it may be due to the crisis happened 
towards the end of the quarter. But in all cases, we do not have evidence of slowdown as an 




                                                 
33 See annex A4.1 for the unit root tests for the other breakpoints.  
34 For complete results see annex A4.2. 
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    Akaike info 
criterion 
    Schwarz 
criterion 
1994/12 0.8981 0.8912 -3.5640 -3.4081 
1995/01 0.9139 0.9080 -3.7327 -3.5767 
1995/02 0.8928 0.8853 -3.5920 -3.4346 




    Akaike info 
criterion 
    Schwarz 
criterion 
1997/03 0.8499 0.8370 -4.1365 -3.9659 
1997/04 0.8894 0.8802 -4.3528 -4.1840 
1998/01 0.8218 0.8065 -3.9173 -3.7467 




    Akaike info 
criterion 
    Schwarz 
criterion 
1997/04 0.9542 0.9510 -3.8434 -3.6859 
1998/01 0.9652 0.9628 -4.0808 -3.9249 
1998/02 0.9452 0.9414 -3.6587 -3.5013 




    Akaike info 
criterion 
    Schwarz 
criterion 
1997/04 0.9966 0.9964 -7.0532 -6.8958 
1998/01 0.9961 0.9958 -6.8822 -6.7263 
1998/02 0.9960 0.9957 -6.9040 -6.7465 




    Akaike info 
criterion 
    Schwarz 
criterion 
1997/04 0.9767 0.9752 -3.6998 -3.5482 
1998/01 0.9928 0.9924 -4.8150 -4.6649 
1998/02 0.9874 0.9866 -4.2680 -4.1165 




    Akaike info 
criterion 
    Schwarz 
criterion 
1997/04 0.9061 0.8971 -4.0227 -3.8450 
1998/01 0.9262 0.9192 -4.0345 -3.8586 
1998/02 0.9332 0.9267 -4.1240 -3.9462 
Table 30: Optimal crises’ breakpoints in consumption  
 
Thus, the pre and post-crisis periods are, defined as follows: 
 
 
    Table 31: Pre and post-crisis periods in consumption  
 
In the graphs below we show the log of real consumption for each of the selected countries, 
the observed path, the trend and the de-trended series.  
  Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
Mexico  1991:1 to 1994:4 1995:1 to 2002:4 
Thailand  1993:1 to 1997:3 1997:4 to 2002:4 
Malaysia  1991:1 to 1997:4 1998:1 to 2002:4 
Philippines  1991:1 to 1997:3 1997:4 to 2002:4 
Korea  1990:1 to 1997:4 1998:1 to 2002:4 
Brazil  1994:1 to 1998:1 1998:2 to 2002:4 
Chapter 4: Impact on welfare; What about the consumer? 














91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02

























































90 91 92 9 3 9 4 95 96 97 98 99 00 0 1 0 2



































93 94 95 9 6 9 7 9 8 9 9 00 01 0 2







Figure 13: Consumption in Mexico, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Korea and Brazil: Actual, trend and 
residual 
 
We now need to check if the residuals are auto correlated. We estimated the process:  
 
0 1t t ta vε ε −= ⋅ +  
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Table 32: Consumption autocorrelation in Mexico, Philippines Malaysia, Thailand, Korea and Brazil.  
 
 
4.3. Lucas’s (1987) methodology 
 
Lucas (1987) introduces consumer preferences in the context of business cycles theory 
and develops some measures on the welfare loss caused by deviations from the average growth 




Diagram 8: changes in the consumption pattern, Lucas (1987) 
 
 
In order to do this, Lucas (1987) uses a simple model of intertemporal consumption where 
a typical household consumes a collection ct of goods at date t, possibly contingent on 
probabilistically determined events between dates zero and t, and will evaluate a process { ct } 












∑        (4.2) 
 
Where ( )1,0∈β  is a constant discount factor. Lucas (1987) identifies ct as the real consumption 
at time t; we will continue the analysis using a utility function of the form 
( ) ( )11
1t t




        (4.3) 
 


















∑       (4.4) 
  Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Mexico 0.163628 1.121572 0.2679 
Thailand 0.305841 1.991737 0.0536 
Malaysia 0.456692 3.608860 0.0008 
Philippines 0.491935 4.069068 0.0002 
Korea 0.645734 5.822002 0.0000 
Brazil 0.318821 2.019411 0.0516 
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where 0ρ >  is the constant coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
 
In order to examine the attitude towards different consumption fluctuations, it is necessary 
to define a particular consumption process. The proposed consumption process contains a 
deterministic stationary35 ‘trend’ and a ‘cycle’ components and takes the form: 
 









c C g Var
ρ
ρρ ρ ε ε
−
−− −   = + −  
  
   (4.5) 
 
Lucas (1987) derives two instruments to measure the possible welfare costs of a decrease 
in consumption growth and of an increase of consumption instability (In annex A4.2 we verify 
and present the complete solution of the model). With these two measurements we can assess 
the impact that financial crises have had in welfare. On the one hand, the function 
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     (4.6) 
will allow us to measure the costs of a reduction in the growth rate; on the other 
hand, the function  
( ) ( )
1
11








     (4.7) 
 
is an indicator of the costs of increased variability in consumption instead of having a 
stable and smooth consumption path. 
 
4.4. Deriving alternative measures of welfare costs 
 
As we already discussed, the Lucas (1987) methodology only deals with changes in 
different parameters caeteris paribus, that is, it does not address the possibility of simultaneous 
changes in the growth rate and variance of consumption. As well, because these measures are 
designed to be applied in the context of business cycles and smooth changes in parameters 
rather than catastrophic meltdowns of the economy, they do not include the possibility of 
permanent changes in the level of the consumption trend. In order to address these problems in 
the following sections we develop several alternatives of calculating the cost of an event where 
                                                 
35 Lucas (1987) discusses the importance of this assumption since a perfectly predictable deterministic 
trend has implications to this model. In particular, Nelson and Plosser (1981) argue that most year-to-year 
variability in the US can be attributed to a random walk or stochastic trend. However, Cochrane (1986) 
argue that these authors overstate the importance of a random walk component. 
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the level, the growth rate and the variance around the trend are affected simultaneously. As well 
we will introduce habit formation in preferences and will explore the implications of the 
existence of autocorrelation and uncertainty. The permanent utility function we will use takes 
the form given by equation 4.4. 
 
4.4.1. Loss in lifetime utility 
 
With this specification, the permanent utility of projected consumption with the parameters 
before the crisis (u0) and the observed consumption parameters after the crisis (u1) can be 
reduced to the following expressions (as we did earlier, the infinity sum can be simplified easily 
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  (4.8) 
 
With these two utility functions, the first proposed measure of the cost is simple to calculate 








∆ = = −             (4.9) 
Which simplifying yields the expression:  



















   − +  ∆ = − − −     − +  
  (4.10) 
This equation represents the total change in utility; we can calculate the effect of separate 
changes in the growth rate, the level and the variance of consumption.  
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  (4.12) 
 
Chapter 4: Impact on welfare; What about the consumer? 
Financial and Currency Crises 
145 
Change in variance, when 0 1C C= and 0 1  g g=  
( )( )( )0 11exp 1 12U Var Varρ ρ ∆ = − − −     (4.13) 
 
4.4.2. Compensation required due to changes in utility after a crisis: 
A comprehensive welfare loss measure (WLM)  
 
 
The above measure provides with the total costs incurred because of a crisis, however it 
does not measure how much is the compensation that will leave the individuals indifferent 
before and after a crisis as Lucas (1987) does. Hence, we now turn to derive a similar measure 
but including not only a change in the growth rate and in the variance, but also a change in the 
level of consumption and a measure of the total cost of these parameters changing together as 
diagram 9 shows.  
 
 
Diagram 9: changes in the consumption pattern, WLM 
 
In order to do that, we use the same utility and the same consumption process as in the 
above section. And define the indifference as:   
 
( ){ } { }1 01 01U C U Cτ+ =       (4.14) 
When we substitute the utility functions we have:  
( )( )
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Solving for τ we obtain:  

















   − +
= − − − −   
− +  
          (4.15)  
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We can now obtain the effect of separate changes in the growth rate, the level and the 
variance of consumption.  
 





















                    (4.16)  
 











                        (4.17)  
 
Compensation for changes in growth when C0=C1 and g0=g1.  
 




1exp 1 1 2Var Var Var
ρτ ρ ρ − = − − − −
 
        (4.18)  
 
 
As in the original version, τ represents the compensation that the individual needs to receive 
to be indifferent between the new and the previous consumption process. As we can see, we 
now have two new measures that Lucas (1987) did not include in his estimations, a change in 
level and the total compensation needed. We can now identify the costs of the 1990’s crises 
both in absolute terms, as loss of permanent utility, and relative to the consumption process 




4.5. Habit formation in preferences 
 
 
According to Dynan (2000), many studies have used household panel data on consumption 
to examine behaviour when preferences are assumed to be time separable. More recently there 
has been growing interest in the implications of preferences that are not time separable. One 
specific class of time non-separable preferences are those which exhibit habit formation; in this 
kind of preferences, current utility depends not only on current expenditures, but also on a habit 
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stock formed by lagged expenditures. For a given level of current expenditure, a larger habit 
stock lowers utility. Habit formation may be modelled by assuming that consumers’ current 
utility is determined by current consumption relative to a reference level of consumption. Habit 
forming consumers dislike large and rapid cuts in consumption. As a result, the premium that 
they will require to hold risky assets that might force a rapid cut in consumption will be large 
relative to that implied by the time separable utility model (Furher, 2000).   
 
Among its potentially important empirical implications, habit formation causes consumers 
to adjust slowly to shocks to permanent income. According to Chetty and Szeidl (2004), 
representative consumer habit formation models have attracted much interest in many areas of 
economics. In asset pricing, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) use habit formation to understand 
the mean equity premium and the joint dynamics of equity returns and aggregate consumption. 
In monetary economics, habit preferences are used to match the hump-shaped response of 
consumption to interest rate shocks, including Fuhrer (2000).  There are two important features 
of habit formation preferences that distinguish this theory from previous models:  
 
1. Habit affects risk preferences: A higher level of habit implies that marginal 
utility is more sensitive to consumption shocks, making the representative consumer 
more risk averse. 
2. Habit is a slowly adjusting state variable: shocks can therefore have lasting 
effects on future consumption.  
 
Chetty and Szeidl (2004) show that consumption commitments -goods such as houses, cars, 
furniture and service contracts whose consumption cannot be freely adjusted in the short run- 
amplify household’s risk aversion and make total consumption respond slowly to shocks. In an 
economy populated with agents with heterogeneous commitments, the aggregate dynamics of 
portfolios and total consumption coincide precisely with those that arise from a representative 
consumer model with habit formation preferences. Hence, consumption commitments provide 
neoclassical foundations for habit in the aggregates. Other implications are that consumption 
goods that are easier to adjust –such as food- should exhibit weaker evidence of habit formation 
in the aggregate than more broadly defined categories of consumption. Campbell and Cochrane 

















       (4.19)  
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The parameter δ measures the strength of habit formation; when δ is larger, the consumer 
receives less lifetime utility from a given amount of expenditure.  
 





















∑       (4.20) 
 






c C g Varε ε
  
= + −  
  
where εt is an 
uncorrelated stationary stochastic process with a stationary distribution given 
by ( )( )~N 0,Varε ε . The discounted lifetime utility stream takes the form:  
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+ − + × − +  + − + − − 
− −    + − − +

















represents the utility at the period immediately after the 
breakpoint and C is the consumption prior to the breakpoint; in other words the infinite sum 
captures the utility from tomorrow onwards (that depends on today’s consumption) while this 
terms captures the utility today that depends on yesterday’s consumption and it captures an 
additional effect on utility of a change in level due to the existence of habit.  
 
4.5.1. Lucas (1987) with habit formation 
 
 
In this section we solve the Lucas model substituting the time separable preferences 
assumption for the one of habit formation. The percentage change in consumption (
g
τ ) uniform 
across all dates and values of the shocks, required to leave the consumer indifferent between the 
growth rates g and g0 is the solution to the equality: 
 
                                                 
36 See annex A4.3 for complete solution.  
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The costs of economic instability (increased variance in real consumption), can be 
measured in conceptually identical way as before. This implies solving for 
Var
τ  the equation:  
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4.5.2. Loss in lifetime utility with habit formation 
 
With this specification, the permanent utility of projected consumption with the parameters 
before the crisis (U0) and the observed consumption parameters after the crisis (U1):  
( ) ( )
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= − + − − 
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With these two utility functions we calculate the percentage change in utility as in equation 
4.9. Which simplifying yields the expression:  
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   
   
   +    
         (4.25) 
Using this expression for the total change, we can calculate the effect of separate changes in 
the growth rate, the level and the variance of consumption.  
Change in level, when g0=g1, and Var0=Var1.  
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   − + +   
   − +    
 
         (4.26) 
 
Change in growth, when C0=C1, and Var0=Var1.  
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   
   +    
         (4.27) 
 
Change in variance, when g0=g1, and C0=C1.  
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   
   +    
         (4.28) 
 
 
4.5.3. Compensation required due to changes in utility after a crisis: 
the WLM with habit formation 
 
We now turn to calculate the WLM with the assumption of habit formation instead of time 
separable preferences, we proceed in the same way as Lucas (1987) in order to find the 
compensation in consumption required to be indifferent between periods as in equation 4.14. 
When substituting the utility functions we have that the total compensation in consumption after 
the crisis will be the solution of τ for: 
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  − + +
− +  
  − +  
         (4.29) 
 
The effect of separate changes in the growth rate, the level and variance of consumption can 
be derived as follows:  
 
Compensation for changes in growth, when C0=C1, and Var0=Var1.  
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         (4.30) 
 
Compensation for changes in level, when g0=g1, and Var0=Var1.  
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         (4.31) 
 
Compensation for changes in variance, when C0=C1, and Var0=Var1.  
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4.6. Autocorrelation in the consumption process 
 
In some cases we can find that the random error ε of the de-trended consumption series does 
not follow a white noise process but instead shows serial correlation and follows a process such 
as: 
1t t ta vε ε+ = + where  tv is a white noise process with distribution ( )( )~N 0, .v Var v  
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At this point by calculating the expected value of the auto correlated errors at time t allows us to 
state that the conditional distribution given the information at date 0 of 
t
ε  is:   
( )( )0 0~ , |tt tN a Var Iε ε ε 37.  
 
The consumption process is now described by:  
 









t t t i
t i
i
c C g a a v Var
ρ





= + + −  
  
∑   (4.33) 
 
The discounted lifetime utility stream for this process is therefore38: 











E U g a a
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In order to derive the corresponding WLM with autocorrelation we proceed as before 
starting with equation 4.14. When substituting the utility functions we obtain:  
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Solving for τ: 
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We can obtain the effect of separate changes in the growth rate, the level and the variance of 
consumption.  
Compensation for changes in growth, when C0=C1 and Var0=Var1. 
                                                 
37 The demonstration of the expected value of autocorrelated errors is in annex A4.4. 
38 The complete derivation can be found in annex A4.6. 
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       (4.38) 
Compensation for changes in variance, when C0=C1 and Var0=Var1. 
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4.7. Welfare loss under uncertainty 
 
So far we have dealt with an ex-post measure of the effects of a crisis over welfare. We now 
can turn to develop an ex-ante measure taken into account the probability of a crisis occurring.  
 
4.7.1. WLM with time separable preferences under uncertainty  
 
In order to introduce uncertainty to this model we can calculate the expected consumption 
path under the probability of having a crisis pc and not having a crisis pnc.   
 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
1 11 11 1 1
0 0 1 1 11 exp 1 2 1 exp 1 2
t t
t nc t c t
c p g C Var p g C Var
ρ ρρ ρρ ρ ρε ε ε ε




If we calculate the expected consumption as before, we obtain the following expression:  
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 11 1 10 0 0 1 1 1
1 1
E 1 exp 1 1 exp 1
2 2
t t
t nc cc p C g Var p C g Var
ρ ρρ ρ ρε ρ ρ ε ρ ρ
− −− − −   = + − − + + − −   
   
 
(4.41) 
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We can calculate the discounted lifetime utility stream: 
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In order to obtain the required compensation for being indifferent between the current path 
of consumption and the consumption with uncertainty we use the modified equation 4.14a: 
{ } ( ){ }01 0 1  = +uU C U Cτ where uC is consumption under uncertainty and now we are 
calculating how much do we have to take away from current consumption to be indifferent 
between consumption with uncertainty and the actual path of consumption. When substituting 
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(4.45) 
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The effect of separate changes in the growth rate, level and variance of consumption can be 
derived from this equation.  
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     (4.47) 
 
Compensation for changes in level when C0=C1 and g0=g1. 
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 (4.48) 
4.7.2. WLM with habit formation preferences under uncertainty  
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(4.49) 
 
In order to obtain the required compensation (τ) for being indifferent between the current 
path of consumption and the consumption with uncertainty we can use the modified equation 
4.14a. Total compensation can be calculated as the solution for τ in the following equation:  
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The effect of separate changes in the growth rate, level and variance of consumption is the 
solution for individual τ in each of the following equations. 
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4.8. Impact on Emerging Markets’ Consumption 
 
The data used is from the International Monetary Fund, consumption data was deflated with 
the consumer’s price index for each country. We use low frequency (quarterly) data for two 
main reasons: i) the effects of the currency and financial crises are shown in the short-term; and, 
ii) the time span in years for each of these crisis is only around 10 years since we used 1990’s 
data (starting from the 1st quarter of 1991 to the 4th quarter of 2002). The period of 10 years 
was chosen because this allows to isolate from the effects of 1980’s liquidity crises and because 
prior to the events under study. The countries chosen (Mexico, Brazil, Korea, Malaysia, 
Thailand and Philippines) share the same fundamental characteristics, they were receiving 
international resources for investment and going major economic reforms, all were regarded as 
successful emerging economies just before all faced a sudden stop and reversal of capital flows. 
Lucas (1987) analyses the welfare cost when there is a change in the growth rate of 
consumption, we do the same assuming that the crisis is the exogenous shock which is 
responsible for the most of changes in the consumption pattern; this allows to have a clear-cut 
division between periods needed calculate the welfare loss due to the occurrence of each of 
these crises. We will discuss some of the properties of the consumption series in order to 
support this assumption.  
 
4.8.1. Estimation of welfare losses  
4.8.1.1. Time separable preferences 
 
First we applied the change in permanent utility approach and estimated the welfare loss 
that these crises implied. We calculated the utility associated with the projected trend as if there 
was no crisis (U0, maintaining the same level, variance and growth rate before each one of the 
crises) and the one associated to the observed trend after the crisis (U1). The pre-crisis period in 
all cases does not include the quarter in which the crisis occurred while the post-crisis period is 
taken from the quarter that includes the crisis; the effects of crises can be seen already in this 
first quarter. The assumptions that we make and that will be relaxed further on include: i)  
following Hoggarth et al. (2002) welfare is measured by the discounted lifetime utility; ii) a 
discount rate β=0.99 constant across countries and time invariant; iii) a constant risk aversion 
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The summary of the parameters39 describing the consumption process is shown in table 33. 
 
  C C0 C1 g0 g1 Var0 Var1 a ε0 
Mexico 2.6509 2.6984 2.4621 1.79% 1.12% 0.00109 0.00131 -- 0.0663 
Thailand 1.8059 1.8293 1.6135 1.29% 1.05% 0.00064 0.00083 0.491935 0.0997 
Philippines 1.3362 1.3479 1.3449 0.87% 0.85% 0.00006 0.00003 0.456692 0.0000 
Malaysia 5.7282 5.8250 5.5527 1.69% 1.50% 0.00078 0.00100 0.305841 0.0586 
Korea 6.4307 6.5773 6.2368 2.28% 1.76% 0.00045 0.00039 0.645734 -0.0020 
Brazil 7.0032 7.1692 7.0071 2.37% 0.39% 0.00134 0.00029 0.318821 0.0013 
          Table 33: Consumption process parameters  
 
As expected, when taken separately, almost all countries suffered a welfare loss because 
of lower levels of consumption, a reduction in the growth rate, and an increase in the variance; 
Philippines, Korea and Brazil are the exceptions because in these three countries the variance 
actually was reduced after the crisis event so, caeteris paribus, due to this factor they had an 
increase in lifetime utility (as can be seen in table 34). However, the total change in utility was 
negative for all countries because of the impact on level and growth. Mexico had a welfare loss 
of 18.34%; Thailand 8.27%; Philippines 0.52%; Malaysia 6.17%; Korea 16.39%; Brazil 
42.28%. In the all cases, the major changes were due to the decline in growth rates: Mexico loss 
16.83% because of this factor; Thailand 5.94%; Philippines, 0.47%; Malaysia 5.27%; Korea, 
15.49%; and, Brazil 42.02%.  
 
Change in permanent utility 
with time separable preferences 
Changes associated with 
 U0 U1 Total change 
Level Growth Variance 
Mexico 940.84 768.29 -18.34% -1.82% -16.83% -0.00176% 
Thailand 756.36 693.81 -8.27% -2.48% -5.94% -0.00153% 
Philippines 640.76 637.46 -0.52% -0.04% -0.47% 0.00027% 
Malaysia 1065.30 999.52 -6.17% -0.95% -5.27% -0.00172% 
Korea 1318.67 1102.57 -16.39% -1.06% -15.49% 0.00047% 
Brazil 1385.36 799.67 -42.28% -0.46% -42.02% 0.00835% 
 Table 34: Change in permanent utility with time separable preferences 
 
We then applied the cost measures proposed by Lucas (1987) and calculated the 
compensation required by individuals, as percentage of new consumption process, to be 
indifferent between the pre and the post crisis periods. We found that because of the change in 
the growth rate Mexico requires a 151.27% of increase in consumption; Thailand 35.80%; 
Philippines just 2.40%; Malaysia 31.09%; Korea 132.05%; and, Brazil 1425.78%. When 
calculating the requirement due to the variance, this goes between 0.0024% for Philippines to 
0.0535% for Brazil; it is important to note that the compensation is positive in all cases even 
                                                 
39 Where C0, g0 and Var0 are the level, growth rate and variance of consumption without crisis; C1, g1 and 
Var1 are the level, growth rate and variance of consumption after a crisis; the parameters a and ε0 are the 
autocorrelation parameter and the initial error to estimate the error process.  
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though there are some countries that actually reduced the variance after the crisis, such as 
Philippines and Korea. This is because Lucas (1987) assumes that volatility goes from zero to a 
non-zero value. 
Compensation required due to changes in 
consumption parameters: Lucas (1987)  
Compensation associated with 
  Growth Variance 
Mexico 151.27% 0.0436% 
Thailand 35.80% 0.0255% 
Philippines 2.40% 0.0024% 
Malaysia 31.09% 0.0314% 
Korea 132.05% 0.0178% 
Brazil 1425.78% 0.0535% 
       Table 35: Compensation required, Lucas (1987) 
 
When we apply the extension of Lucas (1987) we can see that: i) the costs associated with 
the variance change with respect to the original measure; ii) when we included the cost 
associated to a change in level and calculated the total compensation required, we observed that 
the Lucas (1987) approach can be underestimating significantly if the drop in level is 
significant; the latter is the case for Mexico, where the cost raises from 151.26% to up to 
175.39%; Thailand, where the cost goes up from 35.79% to 53.92%;  in Malaysia, where it goes 
from 31.08% to 37.49%; in Korea, it goes from 132.04% to 144.71%; in Brazil it goes from 
1425.78% up to 1460.44%.  In Philippines the change is marginal and increases only from 
2.39% to 2.61%; and, iii) changes associated with cost are similar to those of Lucas, even when 
adjusted by autocorrelation. 
 
Compensation  in consumption required  
due to changes parameters: WLM 
Compensation  associated with 
 Total compensation 
Level Growth Variance 
Mexico 175.3986% 9.5930% 151.2699% 0.0088% 
Adjusted for 
autocorrelation No adjustment necessary 
Thailand 53.9781% 13.3747% 35.8032% 0.0077% 
Adjusted for 
autocorrelation 53.9224% 13.3747% 35.7940% -0.0218% 
Philippines 2.6161% 0.2156% 2.3967% 0.0003% 
Adjusted for 
autocorrelation 2.6168% 0.2156% 2.3967% -0.0006% 
Malaysia 37.5314% 4.9020% 31.0933% 0.0086% 
Adjusted for 
autocorrelation 37.4915% 4.9020% 31.0881% -0.0164% 
Korea 144.7096% 5.4595% 132.0467% -0.0024% 
Adjusted for 
autocorrelation 144.7189% 5.4595% 132.0480% 0.0009% 
Brazil 1460.4256% 2.3134% 1425.7801% -0.0417% 
Adjusted for 
autocorrelation 1460.4478% 2.3134% 1460.4478% -0.0396% 
  Table 36: Compensation required, WLM 
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4.8.1.2. Habit formation preferences  
 
We now turn to the case where individuals have habit formation preferences and calculate 
the cost with non-separable utility functions. As we already discussed, the utility function takes 
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We assumed the same parameters as in the case of time separable preferences, that is 
β=0.99, ρ= 0.8. Additionally, we set δ=0.9 to be consistent with Deaton (1987) who shows, δ 
must equal 0.78 to fully explain the “excess smoothness” of aggregate consumption; Carroll and 
Weil (1994) calculate that δ would have to exceed 0.95 to explain the observed relationship 
between high aggregate income growth and subsequent periods of high aggregate saving; and 
Constantinides (1990) argues that δ must be approximately 0.80 to explain the historical equity 
premium.  
As we can see, with this new utility specification almost all countries suffered a welfare 
loss because of lower levels of consumption, a reduction in the growth rate, and an increase in 
the variance; again Philippines, Korea and Brazil had an increase in the utility if we only take 
into account the change in the variance. However, the total change in utility was negative for all 
countries because of the impact on level and growth. Mexico had a welfare loss of 19.46 %; 
Thailand 9.83%; Philippines 0.55%; Malaysia 6.57%; Korea 17.15%; Brazil 44.19%. The major 
changes were due to the decline in growth rates: Mexico loss 17.80% because of this factor; 
Thailand, 6.34%; Philippines, 0.51%; Malaysia 5.58%; Korea, 16.22%; and, Brazil 44.00%.  
 
Change in permanent utility 
with habit formation δ=0.5 
Changes associated with 
 U0 U1 Total change 
Level Growth Variance 
Mexico 612.66 493.44 -19.46% -1.96% -17.80% -0.0294% 
Thailand 488.54 440.50 -9.83% -3.63% -6.34% -0.0264% 
Philippines 411.05 408.79 -0.55% -0.05% -0.51% 0.0047% 
Malaysia 692.78 647.29 -6.57% -1.01% -5.58% -0.0289% 
Korea 866.42 717.81 -17.15% -1.11% -16.22% 0.0076% 
Brazil 910.60 508.20 -44.19% -0.48% -44.00% 0.1340% 
 Table 37: Change in permanent utility with habit formation preferences 
 
When applying the cost measures proposed by Lucas (1987) and assuming δ=0.8, we 
have that the compensation required by individuals, as percentage of new consumption process, 
to be indifferent between the pre and the post crisis periods, because of the change in the growth 
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rate, Mexico requires 162.06% of increase in consumption; Thailand 37.32%; Philippines 
2.43%; Malaysia 32.15%; Korea 139.16%; and, Brazil 1672.55%.  
 
 
Compensation in consumption required for changes in parameters:  
Lucas (1987) approach with habit formation δ=0.8 
Compensation associated with 
  Growth Variance 
Mexico 162.06% 0.1402% 
Thailand 37.32% 0.1249% 
Philippines 2.43% -0.0221% 
Malaysia 32.15% 0.1375% 
Korea 139.16% -0.0366% 
Brazil 1672.55% -0.6420% 
                              Table 38: Compensation required, Lucas (1987) with habit formation preferences 
 
Again, when we included the cost associated to a change in level and calculated the total 
compensation required, we observed that the Lucas (1987) approach can be underestimating 
significantly if the drop in level is significant; the latter is the case for Mexico, where the cost 
raises from 162.06% to up to 187.20%; Thailand, where the cost increases from 37.32% to 
55.38%; in Philippines it goes up from 2.43% to 2.61%; in Malaysia, where it goes from 
32.15% to 38.67%; in Korea, it goes from 139.16% to 151.92%; and in Brazil increases from 
1672.55% to 1699.10%.  
 
Compensation in consumption required for changes in parameters:           
WLM with habit formation δ=0.8 
Compensation associated with 
 Total compensation 
Level Growth Variance 
Mexico 187.20% 9.15% 162.06% 0.1402% 
Thailand 55.38% 12.68% 37.32% 0.1249% 
Philippines 2.61% 0.20% 2.43% -0.0221% 
Malaysia 38.67% 4.65% 32.15% 0.1375% 
Korea 151.92% 5.24% 139.16% -0.0366% 
Brazil 1699.10% 2.22% 1672.55% -0.6420% 
             Table 39: Compensation required, WLM with habit formation preferences 
 
When we compare the results obtained with different specifications of preferences, we 
can see in the first place that utility is less when we use habit formation preferences. As well the 
change in utility and in the compensation required from the pre-crisis to the post-crisis period 
are bigger in the three measures, in other words, the losses are bigger when we have habit 
formation preferences irrespective of the measure we are using. On the other hand, when 
changes in each factor are taken individually (level, growth and variance) we can see that the 
only source of change is in the growth measures for welfare loss in the three cases under study; 
costs associated with changes in variance and in level are not affected.  
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Comparison between the different measures of welfare costs 
Utility Costs associated with changes in 




Total   
Level Growth Variance 
Time separable  - - - - 151.27% 0.0524% 
Lucas (1987) 
Habit formation - - - - 163.95% 0.8363% 
Time separable  940.84 768.29 -18.34% -1.82% -16.83% -0.0018% Change in  
permanent utility Habit formation 612.6577 493.4379 -19.46% -1.96% -17.80% -0.0294% 








Habit formation - - 187.20% 9.15% 162.06% 0.1402% 
Time separable  - - - - 35.80% 0.0332% 
Lucas (1987) 
Habit formation - - - - 37.91% 0.5423% 
Time separable  756.36 693.81 -8.27% -2.48% -5.94% -0.0015% Change in  
permanent utility 
Habit formation 488.5417 440.5002 -9.83% -3.63% -6.34% -0.0264% 










 Habit formation - - 55.38% 12.68% 37.32% 0.1249% 
Time separable  - - - - 2.40% 0.0010% 
Lucas (1987) 
Habit formation - - - - 2.47% 0.0174% 
Time separable  640.76 637.46 -0.52% -0.04% -0.47% 0.0003% Change in  
permanent utility 
Habit formation 411.0529 408.7920 -0.55% -0.05% -0.51% 0.0047% 










WLM Habit formation - - 2.61% 0.20% 2.43% -0.0221% 
Time separable  - - - - 31.09% 0.0400% 
Lucas (1987) 
Habit formation - - - - 32.84% 0.6410% 
Time separable  1065.30 999.52 -6.17% -0.95% -5.27% -0.0017% Change in  
permanent utility 
Habit formation 692.7812 647.2902 -6.57% -1.01% -5.58% -0.0289% 









Habit formation - - 38.67% 4.65% 32.15% 0.1375% 
Time separable  - - - - 132.05% 0.0155% 
Lucas (1987) 
Habit formation - - - - 139.84% 0.2401% 
Time separable  1318.67 1102.57 -16.39% -1.06% -15.49% 0.0005% Change in  
permanent utility 
Habit formation 866.4245 717.8126 -17.15% -1.11% -16.22% 0.0076% 







Habit formation - - 151.92% 5.24% 139.16% -0.0366% 
Time separable  - - - - 1425.78% 0.0117% 
Lucas (1987) 
Habit formation - - - - 1687.81% 0.1811% 
Time separable  1385.36 799.67 -42.28% -0.46% -42.02% 0.0083% Change in  
permanent utility 
Habit formation 910.5967 508.1965 -44.19% -0.48% -44.00% 0.1340% 






Habit formation - - 1699.10% 2.22% 1672.55% -0.6420% 
             Table 40: Comparison between different measures and preferences 
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4.8.2. Variation in parameters: robustness 
 
We can vary the value of the parameters to see the sensibility of the costs. We will only 
calculate ρ=5 since the costs tend to diminish the higher the value of ρ. The total change in 
utility was negative for all countries because of the impact on level and growth.  
4.8.2.1. Time separable preferences 
 
Mexico had a welfare loss of 111.73%; Thailand 94.92%; Philippines a gain in utility of 
2.61%; Malaysia 33.91%; Korea 53.64%; Brazil 322.48%. In the majority of cases, the major 
changes were due to the decline in growth rates: Mexico loss 46.45% because of this factor; 
Philippines, 1.77%; Korea, 24.28%; and, Brazil 289.59%. Thailand and Malaysia major changes 
were due to changes in level 65.22% and 21.10% respectively. 
 
Change in permanent utility 
with time separable preferences 
Changes  associated with 
 U0 U1 Total change 
Level Growth Variance 
Mexico -0.0613 -0.1297 -111.73% -44.26% -46.45% -0.22% 
Thailand -0.3778 -0.7363 -94.92% -65.22% -17.75% -0.19% 
Philippines -1.7335 -1.7788 -2.61% -0.87% -1.77% 0.03% 
Malaysia -0.0030 -0.0040 -33.91% -21.10% -10.34% -0.22% 
Korea -0.0014 -0.0022 -53.64% -23.69% -24.28% 0.06% 
Brazil -0.0010 -0.0041 -322.48% -9.58% -289.59% 1.04% 
             Table 41: Change in permanent utility with time separable preferences and ρ=5 
 
With Lucas (1987) we found that because of the change in the growth rate Mexico 
requires a 10.01% of increase in consumption; Thailand 4.17%; Philippines just 0.44%; 
Malaysia 2.49%; Korea 5.59%; and, Brazil 40.49%. When calculating the requirement due to 
the variance, this goes between 0.0148% for Philippines to 0.3347% for Brazil. 
 
Compensation in consumption required due to 
changes parameters: Lucas (1987)  
Compensation associated 
with 
  Growth Variance 
Mexico 10.01% 0.2726% 
Thailand 4.17% 0.1596% 
Philippines 0.44% 0.0148% 
Malaysia 2.49% 0.1964% 
Korea 5.59% 0.1115% 
Brazil 40.49% 0.3347% 
       Table 42: Compensation required, Lucas (1987) with ρ=5 
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When we apply the extension of Lucas (1987) we can see that we still have the same 
conclusions: i) the costs associated to the variance change with respect to the original measure; 
ii) when we included the cost associated to a change in level and calculated the total 
compensation required, we observed that the Lucas (1987) approach may be underestimating 
costs significantly if the drop in level is significant; the latter is the case for Mexico, where the 
cost raises from 10 % to up to 20.62%; Thailand, where the cost goes up from 4.28% to 
18.07%;  in Malaysia, where it goes from 2.55% to 7.47%; in Korea, it goes from 5.57% to 
11.34%; in Brazil it goes from 40.51% up to 43.40%.  In Philippines the change is marginal and 
increases only from 0.43% to 0.64%; and, iii) changes associated with cost are similar to those 
of Lucas, even when adjusted by autocorrelation. 
 
 
   Table 43: Compensation required, WLM with ρ=5 
 
4.8.2.2. Habit formation preferences 
 
As we can see, with this new utility specification almost all countries suffered a welfare 
loss because of lower levels of consumption, a reduction in the growth rate, and an increase in 
the variance. In some cases, the measure of loss associated with changes the level of 
consumption becomes extremely large making it difficult to get a solid conclusion with this 
method. This is because of the shape of the utility function when ρ takes values greater than 
zero; small changes in consumption will yield big changes in utility as the function becomes 







Compensation  in consumption required due to changes parameters: 
WLM 
Compensation associated with 
  
Total  
compensation Level Growth Variance 
Mexico 20.6279% 9.5930% 10.0083% 0.0551% 
Adjusted for autocorrelation No adjustment necessary 
Thailand 18.1590% 13.3747% 4.1700% 0.0479% 
Adjusted for autocorrelation 18.0702% 13.3747% 4.2831% -0.1356% 
Philippines 0.6469% 0.2156% 0.4387% -0.0083% 
Adjusted for autocorrelation 0.6515% 0.2156% 0.4387% -0.0037% 
Malaysia 7.5721% 4.9020% 2.4902% 0.0538% 
Adjusted for autocorrelation 7.4737% 4.9020% 2.5552% -0.1010% 
Korea 11.3331% 5.4595% 5.5851% -0.0148% 
Adjusted for autocorrelation 11.3478% 5.4595% 5.5779% 0.0052% 
Brazil 43.3674% 2.3134% 40.4918% -0.2605% 
Adjusted for autocorrelation 43.4095% 2.3134% 40.5132% -0.2449% 
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Change in permanent utility 
with habit formation δ=0.9 
Change associated with 
 U0 U1 Total change 
Level Growth Variance 
Mexico -365.34 -8307.71 -21.74 -2043.45% -84.92% -2.78% 
Thailand -2545.67 -12472016.65 -4898.30 -489777.57% -28.08% -2.70% 
Philippines -12548.60 -12944.71 -0.03 -1.20% -2.49% 0.53% 
Malaysia -17.57 -34.26 -0.95 -69.56% -17.55% -2.84% 
Korea -6.60 -17.17 -1.60 -104.76% -46.19% 0.76% 
Brazil -4.89 -37.08 -6.58 -20.41% -699.91% 12.02% 
 Table 44: Change in permanent utility with habit formation preferences and ρ=5 
 
When applying the cost measures proposed by Lucas (1987), we have that the 
compensation required by individuals, as percentage of new consumption process, to be 
indifferent between the pre and the post crisis periods, because of the change in the growth rate, 
Mexico requires 19.84% of increase in consumption; Thailand 7.88%; Philippines 0.65%; 
Malaysia 5.77%; Korea 9.95%; and, Brazil 74.85%.  
Compensation required for changes in consumption:  
Lucas (1987) approach with habit formation δ=0.5 
Compensation associated with 
  Growth Variance 
Mexico 19.84% 3.37% 
Thailand 7.88% 2.35% 
Philippines 0.65% 0.08% 
Malaysia 5.77% 2.58% 
Korea 9.95% 0.80% 
Brazil 74.85% 0.58% 
                              Table 45: Compensation required, Lucas (1987) with habit formation preferences and ρ=5 
 
Again, when we included the cost associated to a change in level and calculated the total 
compensation required, we observed that the Lucas (1987) approach can be underestimating 
significantly if the drop in level is significant; the latter is the case for Mexico, where the cost 
raises from 15.54% to up to 27.54%; Thailand, where the cost increases from 5.49% to 20.14%; 
in Philippines it goes up from 0.46% to 0.52%; in Malaysia, where it goes from 3.21% to 
8.58%; in Korea, it goes from 8.40% to 13.86%; but not for Brazil where decreases from 
67.70% to 64.77%.  
Compensation required for changes in consumption:            
WLM with habit formation δ=0.8 
Compensation associated with 
 Total compensation 
Level Growth Variance 
Mexico 27.54% 7.82% 15.54% 0.4604% 
Thailand 20.14% 11.82% 5.49% 0.4750% 
Philippines 0.52% 0.15% 0.46% -0.0968% 
Malaysia 8.58% 3.61% 3.21% 0.4726% 
Korea 13.86% 3.67% 8.40% -0.1106% 
Brazil 64.77% 1.42% 67.70% -1.5811% 
           Table 46: Compensation required, WLM with habit formation preferences and ρ=5 
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Comparison between the different measures of welfare costs 
Utility Costs associated with changes in 




Total   
Level Growth Variance 
Time separable  - - - - 10.01% 0.3279% 
Lucas (1987) 
Habit formation - - - - 19.84% 3.3691% 
Time separable  -0.06 -0.13 -111.73% -44.26% -46.45% -0.2206% Change in  
permanent utility 
Habit formation -365.3413 -8307.7073 -2173.96% -2043.45% -84.92% -2.7751% 







Habit formation - - 27.54% 7.82% 15.54% 0.4604% 
Time separable  - - - - 4.17% 0.2076% 
Lucas (1987) 
Habit formation - - - - 7.88% 2.3528% 
Time separable  -0.38 -0.74 -94.92% -65.22% -17.75% -0.1917% Change in  
permanent utility 




489829.84% -489777.57% -28.08% -2.6953% 










Habit formation - - 20.14% 11.82% 5.49% 0.4750% 
Time separable  - - - - 0.44% 0.0065% 
Lucas (1987) 
Habit formation - - - - 0.65% 0.0773% 
Time separable  -1.73 -1.78 -2.61% -0.87% -1.77% 0.0332% Change in  
permanent utility 
Habit formation -12548.59 -12944.70 -3.16% -1.20% -2.49% 0.5335% 










Habit formation - - 0.52% 0.15% 0.46% -0.0968% 
Time separable  - - - - 2.49% 0.2503% 
Lucas (1987) 
Habit formation - - - - 5.77% 2.5779% 
Time separable  0.00 0.00 -33.91% -21.10% -10.34% -0.2153% Change in  
permanent utility 
Habit formation -17.5733 -34.2599 -94.95% -69.56% -17.55% -2.8425% 









Habit formation - - 8.58% 3.61% 3.21% 0.4726% 
Time separable  - - - - 5.59% 0.0967% 
Lucas (1987) 
Habit formation - - - - 9.95% 0.7956% 
Time separable  0.00 0.00 -53.64% -23.69% -24.28% 0.0591% Change in  
permanent utility 
Habit formation -6.5952 -17.1745 -160.41% -104.76% -46.19% 0.7645% 







Habit formation - - 13.86% 3.67% 8.40% -0.1106% 
Time separable  - - - - 40.49% 0.0733% 
Lucas (1987) 
Habit formation - - - - 74.85% 0.5819% 
Time separable  0.00 0.00 -322.48% -9.58% -289.59% 1.0380% Change in  
permanent utility 
Habit formation -4.8940 -37.0835 -657.73% -20.41% -699.91% 12.0170% 






Habit formation - - 64.77% 1.42% 67.70% -1.5811% 
             Table 47: Comparison between different measures and preferences with ρ=5 
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4.9. Conclusions of the chapter 
 
By studying the consumption behaviour in countries affected by major financial and 
currency crises during the 1990’s we can derive some interesting conclusions about the impact 
that these crises had on welfare. The impact of crises on consumption was important, except in 
the case of Philippines, the least affected country in the South East Asian crisis.  
 
We used three methodologies in order to calculate the welfare cost of the crises, one was 
the original developed by Lucas (1987) that proved to underestimate the costs associated to a 
crisis because:  
 
1. It only measures separately the cost of changes in the growth rate and in variance; 
therefore it does not offer a measure of the total cost.  
2. It only considers the case where the variance goes from zero to a non-zero level 
and not changes from an initial situation with some volatility in consumption to 
another with a different volatility. 
3. It does not consider the case of changes in the level of consumption and therefore 
it is not appropriate to determine the costs of catastrophic events where the level 
itself is decreased.  
 
We introduced a simple measure comparing the utility between consumption processes. 
This measure however, lacks the feature of capturing the required compensation in terms of 
consumption (not utility) that would make an individual indifferent across all periods. With this 
in mind: 
1. We propose a comprehensive welfare loss measure (WLM) in order to calculate 
the cost associated with the change in level and to get a measure of the excess 
variability due to the occurrence of a crisis.  
2. An additional adjustment has to be made in the presence of autocorrelation, 
however this proved to be negligible.  
3. We derived an ex-ante measure with uncertainty that involves the probability of a 
crisis happening.  
4. We dropped the assumption of time separable preferences and introduced habit 
formation.  
 
The main results of applying the WLM in its different versions are:  
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1. We observed that the associated cost of a decrease in the growth rate is more 
important than the cost associated to changes in the variance of real consumption.  
2. When introducing the effect on the level of consumption, results can vary as to 
almost double the costs after a crisis.  
3. When we compare the results obtained with different specifications of 
preferences, we can see in the first place that utility is less when we use habit 
formation preferences. As well the change in utility and in the compensation 
required from the pre-crisis to the post-crisis period are bigger in the three 
measures, in other words, the losses are bigger when we have habit formation 
preferences irrespective of the measure we are using.  
4. When changes in each factor are taken individually (level, growth and variance) 
we can see that the only source of change is in the growth measures for welfare 
loss in the three cases under study; costs associated with changes in variance and 
in level are not affected.  
 
As we have determined, the level effect has an important contribution to welfare costs in 
the short run; this effect arises the question: why does consumption fall? The purpose of chapter 
5 is to answer this question. As we will discuss, existing theories of consumer behaviour do not 
have a straightforward answer and some of them have predictions contradicting observed data.  
We explore different theoretical frameworks which model consumption behaviour and decided 
to re-examine the intertemporal consumption framework which provides a simple specification 
for allocating resources across time not only by participating in the banking system but also it 
allows examining other asset markets such as stock markets.  
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Chapter 5: Impact on welfare; evaluating policy options 
while solving some puzzles  
 
 
Be prepared to re-examine your reasoning 
Robert S. McNamara Lesson #8 in Errol Morris’ 
Fog of War (2003) 
 
 
First and second generation models of exchange rate crises assume that the monetary 
authorities may react to defend fixed exchange regimes when an attack is under way and they do 
it so by using monetary policy and international reserves until the latter deplete and the peg has 
to be abandoned. During the 1990s most of the countries that faced a crisis intervened before the 
collapse of their exchange regimes through the money market increasing interest rates. An 
extreme case of this policy is Mexico where this process was accompanied by the substitution of 
debt denominated and payable in pesos by short term debt nominally denominated in pesos but 
coupons and principal payable in dollars at maturity at the spot exchange rate fixed at the date 
of issuance40. Brazil and South East Asian countries followed defensive policies with different 
variations. This kind of defence is designed to keep and even increase the incentives of 
maintaining capital inflows and to curtail the possibility of a currency crisis occurring. 
However, none of these countries were able to stop the reversal in capital flows and most of 
them suffered large welfare losses because of sheer drops in consumption levels.  
 
Just after the collapse of the Exchange Rate Mechanism Ozkan and Sutherland (1995) 
developed a simple model to analyse possible policy responses to avoid a currency crisis; 
however, these authors did not address the use of the interest rate as an instrument that can be 
used for defending the exchange rate. More recently Lahiri and Vegh (2000) developed a model 
of balance of payment crises to analyse the case where interest rate increases at the time when 
the crisis occurs rather than a pre-emptive measure. The focus of this model is on the effect on 
fiscal imbalances and the timing on the crisis but effects on consumption are not included as 
part of the main analysis. Braggion, Christiano and Roldos (2005) focus in the apparent 
contradiction of an increase of interest rates before and at the moment of the crises and 
reductions of interest rates following the crises; they argue that this behaviour is optimal 
because of the effects that this policy has a positive effect on intermediate goods that translates 
                                                 
40 These are the Ajustabonos, to understand the mechanism we need to think it as a contract to buy dollars 
in the future but fixing today’s exchange rate S0 pesos/USD. If today we pay 10 pesos, when the contract 
is due at date t the bearer receives 10*(1+r)/S0 USD rather than 10*(1+r)/St USD. This mechanism allows 
profits if the exchange rate Peso/USD depreciates.  
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in an increase of production of traded goods. A first problem we found when comparing the 
conclusions in these studies is that welfare implications are far from consistent; Lahiri and Vegh 
(2000) analysis find negative welfare effects when consumption depends on interest rates; 
however, this negative effect does not imply adjustments in consumption as severe as the ones 
observed in emerging countries. Braggion et al. (2005) find that the optimal response in terms of 
maximising welfare is to raise interest rates and then reduce them sharply; while Ozkan and 
Sutherland (1995) assume that interest rates have a negative effect on production and therefore 
on welfare. We found that real income in those affected countries where information was 
available had an identical behaviour than the one of consumption; in other words, in countries 
where real income fell sharply, the same happened to consumption. This is consistent with 
Carroll’s (2002) findings but still has no theoretical explanation from the point of view of 
intertemporal consumption. There is a large branch of the empirical research based on 
intertemporal maximisation of consumption which focuses on the estimation of the Euler 
equation for consumption: 
 
1 2 (1 )t t tc r eα α∆ = + + +       (5.1) 
 
However, this literature has not found a consistent relationship between real interest rates 
and consumption growth.  Moreover, Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2003) define the challenge 
for monetary policy to explain why consumption falls for several quarters after there is an 
increase in interest rates, this result is inconsistent with the implications of the standard Euler 
equation. Favero (2005) expresses his “surprise”41 that the first order condition and the budget 
restriction are not used together to find an optimal solution to the maximisation problem and to 
evaluate it empirically.  
 
The main question to ask is if the standard intertemporal approach can link 
consumption to shocks in real income regardless their origin. In other words, can we 
explain why real income shocks during a crisis transmit to consumption without recurring 
to “special case” assumptions. Therefore we focus on the standard intertemporal choice 
problem to understand the consumer’s behaviour and why some observed puzzles may be 
relevant when considering any policy options. When analysing the standard model we derive an 
optimal path solution for consumption behaviour based not only on real interest rates but on real 
income as well we need two simple assumptions in order to depart from the Euler equation 
result which are: 
 
                                                 
41 Sic in the original. 
Chapter 5: Impact on welfare; Evaluating policy options while solving some puzzles 
Financial and Currency Crises 
173 
1. The maximisation of consumption is done over a lengthy period of time subject to 
a budget constraint rather than assuming that the planning horizon consists of 
sequential 2-period problems. 
2. Once a period has passed it is not possible to adjust consumption; there is no time 
travelling.  
 
 With this result we present some exercises to analyse the behaviour of consumption when:  
 
1. There is perfect information ex-ante about real income shocks and interest rates. 
2. There is an unexpected shock in real income and the interest rate policy. 
3. There is an expected shock in real income and the interest rate policy but rigidities 
in the consumption path. 
4. There are liquidity constraints as consequence of a financial crisis.  
 
These scenarios will allow us to analyse theoretically, the behaviour of real consumption 
under different conditions. We also derive a modified version of the Euler equation that includes 
income effects and which can be estimated empirically. One of the findings is that there is a 
limit to the use of monetary policy to offset drops in consumption associated with falls in real 
income; this limitation is because surprise changes in real interest rates have a negative impact 
on the level of consumption.  
 
First, we examine the implications of monetary policy for the consumption decision. An 
important result is that when the planning horizon is longer than one period, a surprise increase 
in the risk-free interest can reduce consumption when it happens. This result arises from the 
same reason than in the loanable funds market, the individual cannot adjust decisions in periods 
that already passed and the wealth available for consumption decreases, this time through lower 
asset prices. We then apply this model to some issues in financial markets; following Emmons 
and Schmid (2000) we assume that the participants in the market are either noise traders 
(investors with a misperception of the real value of the asset) or informed investors (those who 
know the real value of the asset). We found that the existence of noise traders can have 
externalities on informed investors. We then turn to analyse some of the possible sources of 
financial turmoil such as slowdown of the economy, rational bubbles and crashes. As a third 
section of this chapter we present a possible timeline of events in a crisis which takes into 
account the results of intertemporal optimisation and a second generation model structure based 
on the UIP discussed in early chapters. Finally, we present the conclusions of the chapter.  
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5.1. Consumer’s behaviour: how do we explain welfare costs?  
 
 
In this section we review the available models of consumption that may be useful to 
explain its behaviour after emerging markets crises. The first option we look at regards to the 
ability of the economy to insure against fluctuations of consumption via international capital 
markets. This ability for smoothing consumption is lost when the country is excluded (or 
chooses self-exclusion) from international capital markets. We will examine if the conditions 
and costs involved really describe what we observed were the facts during the crises under 
study. As a second option we discuss the Euler equation approach which relates the interest rate 
with consumption growth giving an explicit policy instrument that could be used to evaluate 
policy decisions and their impact on consumption.  
 
5.1.1. International capital market exclusion 
 
According to Obstfeld (1995), global trade in financial assets has clear potential benefits. 
Individuals gain the opportunity to smooth consumption by borrowing or diversifying abroad 
and world savings are directed to the world’s most productive opportunities. However, the size 
of these gains and the extent to which they are being attained in practice remain uncertain. 
Capital mobility allows countries to trade differential consumption risks; the effect is to provide 
mutual insurance against purely idiosyncratic national consumption fluctuations. In practice, 
consumption insurance is provided by trade in a wide array of contingent and non-contingent 
securities. The insurance function of international capital markets is illustrated by assuming that 
countries can trade a set of Arrow-Debreu securities, one of which entitles its owner to a 
specified payment on a particular date if and only if a determinate state of nature occurs. 
Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) argue that the distinguishing feature of an open economy is 
that it can borrow and lend in international markets by running trade surpluses and deficits. The 
trade balance can vary systematically over the cycle. Its cyclical properties are determined by 
the balance of two forces: the desire and ability of agents to smooth consumption using 
international markets and the additional cyclical variability of investment that international 
capital flows permit. Tesar (1995) argues that this kind of assessment of welfare gains from 
international risk-sharing may be an underestimate of the true gains for several reasons. First, 
representative agent models do a poor job of pricing risky assets. As a consequence, the models 
generally imply that the gains from reducing all uncertainty are small. Second, in each of the 
models, the variance output is assumed to be finite. If output follows a random walk, the 
uncertainty facing individuals is obviously much larger, and the resulting gains from risk-
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sharing substantially greater. Whether output is in fact non-stationary and whether countries can 
effectively insure permanent country-specific shocks to income remain open questions.  
 
Yet, there is a possibility of disruption in this international insurance process. Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1999) analyse the case in which a defaulting country faces the possibility of a long-term 
cut-off from foreign capital markets. This is a reputation model that identifies the implicit costs 
in the threat of a forced withdrawal from international capital markets. The measurement of the 
costs associated to fluctuations in GDP follow Lucas (1987) but in an open economy context. 
Some estimates were previously made for eight countries with data from the period comprised 
between 1950 and 1992. However, the results yielded some high costs that would make it 
difficult for such countries as Mexico and Brazil to opt for a macroeconomic adjustment. It is 
important to notice that this model captures the cost of complete loss of access to international 
capital markets; however, in all cases an IMF package of rescue was set up for these economies, 
which in practice means that the deterrent incentive is not as strong as it should be. In practice, 
there is no loss of access to foreign resources and therefore the threat of cutting the funds is not 
a credible one, which makes easier the decision for the country to default. These authors discuss 
Lucas (1987) study and point out that it would be possible to conclude that if the gain form 
eliminating unpredictable consumption variability is as small as suggested in this study, then the 
gain from perfect international pooling of risks must be even smaller.  
 
Cole and Obstfeld (1991) use an underlying consumer-preference model and the stochastic 
properties of industrial country output growth, related to one that Lucas (1987) uses to estimate 
the cost of post-war United States consumption variability, and find small gains from 
international risk sharing. However, they do so incorporating the effect of output shocks on the 
relative prices at which international commodity trade occurs, which is absent from Lucas’s 
(1987) framework. The authors found that fluctuations in international terms of trade can play 
an important role in automatically pooling risks. Indeed, the models used have the property that 
for certain parameter choices terms-of-trade responses provide perfect insurance against output 
shocks, in this extreme case, gains from international portfolio diversification are nil. Tesar 
(1995) tries to bring the theory of international risk-sharing into line with the empirical evidence 
by considering alternative models of the real and financial linkages between countries. In order 
to do so, the author develops a benchmark model which assumes that individuals in different 
countries consume a homogeneous, internationally-traded good and can write contracts 
contingent on all states of nature. In the pooled equilibrium, investors hold a market portfolio of 
domestic and foreign securities. 
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Tesar's (1995) main conclusions are: i) that gains from risk-sharing for the large country are 
less than one-half of one percent of lifetime consumption across all experiments. In a small 
country, the utility gains range from zero to two percent of lifetime consumption depending on 
the household’s degree of risk aversion and the type of uncertainty; ii) when shocks are highly 
persistent and the set of financial assets is limited to non-contingent bonds, the fraction of 
uncertainty that can be eliminated by trading on international markets falls dramatically; iii) 
when households receive an uncertain endowment of a non-traded good, the utility gains are 
larger than in the one-good model when traded and non-traded goods are complements in 
consumption; and, iv) the results from the production economy suggest that when countries can 
smooth consumption domestically through investment, the added benefit of trading on world 
financial markets is minimal. Global markets allow countries to allocate investment more 
efficiently across markets and can help offset fluctuations in leisure. However, the costs of self 
insurance through adjusting domestic saving and investment appear to be significant.  
 
When we measured the welfare loss with the modified Lucas (1987) methodology, we 
concluded that: i) volatility did not play an important role; ii); that the bulk of the loss was 
related to a sudden adjustment of consumption level; and, iii) in some cases there were gains in 
welfare because the impact on volatility was negligible, and the growth rate of consumption 
actually increased after the shock enough to offset the effect of a lower consumption level in the 
short run. Based on Lucas (1987), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1999) developed a model to measure 
the welfare loss of self-exclusion of international capital markets that emphasises the loss of the 
ability of insuring volatility as the source of welfare losses. These authors calculate the cost 
associated with the loss of credibility in international capital markets. The derivation of this cost 
follows exactly the same intuition than that of Lucas (1987), but while this study tries to 
establish the compensation in permanent consumption across all dates that the consumer needs 
to be indifferent between the pre and the post crisis period, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1999) 
calculate the same amount in terms of present output. Two measures can be derived from this 
context; the first one is the total cost of reputation loss as a ratio to current mean output. That 
ratio can be measured by the solution for κ of the equation: 
 
( ) ( ) FI Au 1 Y u Y U U + κ − = −      (5.2) 
 
For countries where κ→∞, that is where the cost as a proportion on current output tends to 
get higher, a full insurance is sustainable by reputation. The other measure is the cost per year, 
which reports the permanent fractional increase in GDP equivalent to access to full insurance. 
This is the same measure of cost of volatility as in Lucas (1987) and is given by: 
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−ρ−ρ ρ ε 
τ = − 
 
     (5.3) 
 
The assumption of this model that the volatility is the main cost of a crisis is at odds with 
the stylised facts of 1990’s crises which are the ones we are interested in. Although is a useful 
approach for analysing self-exclusion for capital markets, this volatility cost is a feature more 
related of the debt crises during the 1980s. Trying to modify this framework to measure the 
costs of emerging markets’ crises follows the same reasoning than modifying Lucas’s (1987) 
measures; however, it lacks of clear theoretical support:  
 
1. There is no clear connection between self inflicted exclusion and a crisis taking 
place; 
2. Sudden drops in consumption are not explained by the abandonment of a full 
insurance environment; and,  
3. Although volatility of consumption is explained by this framework and it is a cost 
to measure, we found that costs associated to volatility were not important when 
using the modified Lucas (1987) measure.  
 
In other words, the main source that we found for welfare losses has no explanation in this 
model. Therefore, we opted to follow a new line of research to understand consumption 
behaviour during a crisis and to develop a tool to evaluate monetary policy to respond to real 
shocks. In order to explain consumption behaviour and to provide a theoretical explanation to 
these adjustments in the level, we need to analyse the determinants of consumption. On the 
other hand we are interested as well in the impact of an active interest rate policy on 
consumption.  
5.1.2. The Euler equation: an intertemporal consumption approach 
 
A result of the intertemporal consumption problem (which we will develop in the following 
section) is the Euler equation for consumption. This result offers a simple relation between 
consumption and interest rate, this allows to measure the possible impact of real interest rate 
policy (by affecting the nominal interest rate given an inflation level the monetary authority can 
affect the real interest rate) which is the Euler equation for consumption that has been amply 
used empirically. The simple form of the Euler equation if we assume a relative risk aversion 
form of utility with parameters for relative risk aversion ρ and a subjective intertemporal 
discount β is:  
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t 1 t tc 1 r cρ+ = β +       (5.4) 
 




c ln ln 1 r∆ = β + + + ε
ρ ρ
     (5.5) 
 
This approach offers a simple explanation of consumption behaviour based on 
intertemporal preferences and the interest rate; however, Carroll (2001) and Favero (2005) 
coincide in pointing out that this approach has consistently obtained contradicting empirical 
results that are not compatible with the theoretical Euler equation. As a first exercise we applied 
directly this specification of the Euler equation to the countries in our sample to see if we can 
apply it to evaluate monetary policy and explain the drop in consumption: 
 



























R-squared 0.0575 0.0548 0.0218 0.0629 0.2016 0.0692 




































































































Figure 14: Fitted values from the estimation of Euler equations 
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As we can see the coefficients are not significant, and when they are (Philippines and 
Thailand) the sign of the coefficient of the interest rate is at odds with the implied by this log-
linear form of the FOC which should be positive. 
 
Carroll (2001) and Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2003) explain the puzzle that these results 
imply: standard macroeconomic models assume that the money market interest rate is equal to 
the interest rate implied by a consumption Euler equation in which the interest rate is 
proportional to the expected growth rate of consumption. In other words, the consumption 
growth rate increases if the interest rate does. However, the empirical literature shows that a 
monetary tightening slows consumption growth for a few quarters; this decline in expected 
consumption growth is inconsistent with the real interest rate implied by the Euler equation. In 
order to solve this puzzle, Carroll (2001) attempts to find other effects different than the ones 
contained in the Euler equation; in order to do that, he explores the effects on wealth of different 
regressors : 
 
 Effect on  
wealth holding 
Implied effect on consumption 
Interest rates (+) (-) 
Permanent income (-) (+) 
Income uncertainty (+) (-) 
Risk aversion (+) (-) 
Table 49: Effects on wealth and consumption from Carrol (2001) 
 
The effect of these variables is not captured by the Euler equation as it is defined, and this 
omission constitutes the core of the caveats that we already mentioned. However, Carroll (2001) 
does not find a theoretical justification to include them and mentions the inclusion of these 
regressors just as a possible way to improve the estimation of consumption. Favero (2001) 
criticises the use of the first condition as a consumption function arguing that it is not the closed 
form solution to the intertemporal model which he derives but does not go further in the 
analysis of the implications of using the latter. Favero (2005) when trying to solve the puzzle of 
consumption growth and asset pricing fluctuations found two branches of the literature. One 
focused on the use of the traditional Euler equation and the other one on the budget constraint of 
the maximisation problem alone (by testing that the present value of income equals the present 
value of consumption). When combining both the first order conditions and the budget 
constraint this author found that the deviation of consumption from its long-run trend has some 
predictive power for long-run expected stock market returns; this is contrary to the result when 
using the Euler equation alone where there is no predictive power at all.  
 
In order to analyse policy actions when there is a crisis we need to solve these puzzles and 
derive an applicable result that yield sound results. We do this by making just an additional 
Chapter 5: Impact on welfare; Evaluating policy options while solving some puzzles 
Financial and Currency Crises 
180 
assumption to the 2-period model: any shock in period 1 is a surprise one and therefore there 
cannot be any adjustments to the consumption in the previous period. This allows us to explain 
the apparent inconsistency of the intertemporal approach when predicting the behaviour of 
consumption.  
5.2. Consumer’s behaviour: why consumption sank during the 
1990s? 
 
We already measured the costs in terms of consumption and welfare in the affected 
countries using Lucas (1987). We need to explain why consumption can suffer a severe 
adjustment not only in its growth or volatility but in its level. Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo 
(1999) characterise the aftermath of 1990’s crises in simple terms: when the fixed exchange rate 
is abandoned in favour of a crawling peg, banks go bankrupt, the domestic (nominal) interest 
rate rises, real wages fall, and output declines. As we can see, those countries where real wages 
fell sharply consumption fell as well. A currency crisis has a pass-through effect over prices, 
Calvo and Reinhart (2000) find in a 41 country sample that developed countries show less pass-
through than emerging countries. These authors mention this as one of the reasons why 
emerging countries usually maintained pegged exchange rate regimes. When abandoning the 
pegged exchange rate regimes, inflation may come as an important consequence and Burnside et 
al. (1999) observations of fall in real wages can be justified. The question is, is there any 
theoretical support to these findings? From the Euler equation result of the intertemporal 
consumption problem it would seem like there is none; as well, Obstfeld and Rogoff’s (1999) 
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Figure 15: Real consumption and real income in selected countries 
 
We can argue that a fall in real wages has a negative impact on consumption; however, none 
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income on consumption we review the standard intertemporal model of consumption. We first 
solve the two-period version and obtain the first order conditions (FOC) and the optimal 
consumption of both periods. The FOC of this problem are an important result because it 
constitutes the empirical log-linearised Euler equation widely used in empirical research on 
consumption. We then proceed to solve a 3-period intertemporal problem and a longer 4-period 
model; this will allow us to discuss the importance of medium/long term planning of 
consumption schedules and how when taking this approach, together with the fact that there is a 
binding intertemporal constraint we depart from the result of the Euler equation and find 
predictions that describe better the observed behaviour of consumption.  
 
The modelling of intertemporal consumption taking into account only the loanable funds 
market gives some answers to the puzzles found in empirical literature; however, it does not 
address all financial decisions taken by the individual. Moreover, it does not explain other types 
of financial crises such as frenzies, bubbles or asset mispricing. In order to address these 
important issues we solve an intertemporal consumption problem that incorporates a risky asset 
which follows a binomial stochastic behaviour. The modelling of capital markets using the 
intertemporal approach allows us to avoid the use of ad-hoc demands for the asset and to 
minimise the need of information-revealing structure to obtain results of when a crisis is 
optimal. This model by no means substitutes the decision to participate in the loanable funds 
market; it is however an important addition in the investment-consumption optimisation 
problem since an individual can diversify in different asset markets. A simplifying assumption 
is that there is an initial wealth (a stock) which is destined to the capital markets and it can only 
be transferred for future consumption through the value of the portfolio; on the other hand, 
income (a flow) can be transferred from future periods to present in the form of borrowing or 
transferred to the future in the form of lending. It is possible to combine income and wealth and 
calculate the optimal proportion destined to each market but doing this adds in complexity while 
the implications remain the same. Hence, for simplicity in the exposition we analyse what 
happens in each market separately.  
5.2.1. The 2-period model of intertemporal consumption 
 
As we mentioned earlier the Euler equation is derived from the same maximisation 
problem we just described, it is in fact the relation between periods of first order conditions; 
however, it is not the solution of the problem at hand. In other words, it describes a condition 
that the optimum path has to fulfil, not the optimum path itself. In this model we assume that 
consumers have access to credit from the banking system and can transfer income between 
periods at a real interest rate r; in other words, they can save and borrow at the same rate. For 
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this we assume that the consumer gets a disposable real endowment net of taxes (wt=Wt-τt) at 
every date t. Agents cannot spend more of what they earn over time, that means that when they 
die they do it without debts or without savings in their bank account. Consumers will maximise 
the intertemporal utility: 
 
( ) ( )0 1 0 1 ( , )Max U c c u c u cβ= +  
Subject to: 










Where β is the intertemporal preference discount rate and fulfils 1β ≤  and wt is the 
endowment at each period. This constraint indicates that the present value of consumption has 
to be equal to the present value of wealth. The mapping of this problem can be seen in the 










Diagram 10: Intertemporal consumption 
 
The first step to find a solution is to substitute the consumption FOC in the budget 
restriction, by doing so we obtain the optimal consumption for both periods42: 
 
( )





































    (5.7) 
 
Note that if we obtain the rate of change of consumption between periods we get back to 
the Euler equation approach. This is because we are adjusting 0 *c  when there is a change 
                                                 
42 The solution is on annex A5.1 
Chapter 5: Impact on welfare; Evaluating policy options while solving some puzzles 
Financial and Currency Crises 
183 
either in income or in the interest rate. What happens when this is not possible? Let’s assume 
that we decide our consumption schedule at the beginning of date 0, we consume at the 
beginning of date 043 (we take at the same time a savings decision either borrowing or lending) 
and then either the interest rate or the income at date 1 changes before making the decision and 
consuming at date 1. In this case, the optimal value derived before for consumption at date 1 it 
is not anymore a feasible solution; since the present value of income changed the new present 




















c r NPVw I c
    (5.8) 
 
This has important implications because now the Euler equation is not enough to describe 
the behaviour of consumption but we incorporate the current value of income and the expected 
income across the agent’s lifetime.  
 
Let’s explore the behaviour of consumption under this solution of both net lenders and net 
borrowers. We first assume that there is a negative endogenous shock to income at period 1; this 
means that we move from endowment 0 to endowment 1 and given the existence of a financial 
market the budget constraint shifts in a parallel way. The common assumption of instant 
adjustment of date 0 consumption implies that lenders move from L0 to L1 and borrowers from 




remains constant in the equilibrium. Hence, the growth 




















Change in Income Change in Interest Rate
 
Diagram 11: Intertemporal consumption with time rigidities 
                                                 
43 This assumption is perhaps grasped easier in a multiperiod setting when consumption has been taking 
place up to date t when there is an unexpected shock and previous consumption cannot be adjusted 
anymore, therefore there must be a level adjustment from date t onwards.   
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However, if we do not allow the adjustment of consumption at date 0, the new equilibrium 
is Ladj for lenders and Badj for borrowers. The implications on welfare are: i) bigger losses for 
net borrowers than for net lenders; and, ii) these losses increase with the amount of debt. 
Therefore, a real income shock does have impact on consumption and we can explain now the 
behaviour after each one of the crises where there was a fall in real income and a fall in 
consumption.  
 
Let’s see how the conclusions change for a change in the interest rate. With perfect 
foresight and free adjustment an increase in the interest rate will increase consumption at date 1 
and decrease consumption at date 0. Lenders will face a positive income effect while borrowers 
face a negative one. In both cases the growth rate of consumption increases, following the 
predictions of the Euler equation. Here is where the Canzoneri et al. (2003) puzzle comes into 
play, as we already mentioned, they observed that there is either a contraction or an unexpected 
slowdown of consumption following an increase in the interest rate. Again, if we assume non-
free adjustment at date 0 we obtain a compatible result with these observations. In order to keep 
fulfilling the intertemporal budget constraint given that consumption at date 0 has been already 
committed we need to adjust consumption at date 1. For the lenders we will have that their 
future consumption will be less than it would have been at the new equilibrium L1 and they will 
consume at Ladj which is Pareto-inferior but preferred to L0 and the growth rate at this new 
solution point will be in-between the ones corresponding to L0 and L1. However, the borrowers 
will be worse off in every sense, they don’t only need to cut down on future consumption but 
the new growth is less than the ones at B0 and B1. Therefore, we have further redistributive 
effects of interest rate policy between lenders and borrowers; for the first, the growth rate of 
consumption is not as high as it would be, but for the latter, not only is lower than the initial 
situation but the level of consumption falls as well. This effect limits the effectiveness of the 
monetary policy and can actually diminish welfare. 
 
5.2.2. Intertemporal consumption with a surprise crisis: a 3 period 
solution 
 
We need now to model a crisis with this framework, in order to do so we have to assume a 
three period setting where date 0 is the pre-crisis period; at date 1 the crisis reveals and date 2 is 
the post-crisis period when the effects of the crisis and policy are already in place. Hence, in this 
setting there are two interest rates, the one between date 0 and date 1 (r1) which remains 
unchanged and the one from date 1 and date 2 (r2) which can be set by the monetary authority.  
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As we can see the model implies that current consumption will depend on income and on 
the interest rate. This is an important result because:  
 
i) It gives theoretical support to Carroll’s (2001) findings about the relation of 
consumption and other variables; 
                                                 
44 See annex A5.2. 
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ii) It is possible to evaluate the effect of monetary policy in response to external 
shocks to income. 
iii) Consumption has no longer purely short term behaviour adaptive to the short term 
interest rate as the log-linear Euler equation would imply, but is the result of long 
term planning. 
iv) Regarding preference parameters:  
 
- An agent will be a net lender if (1-β) <r; otherwise, he will be a net borrower.  
- For higher values of ρ (relative risk aversion) the discounted consumption path 
gets closer to the discounted income path.  
 
Any change in the present value (due to a change in wt or rt) will have effects on 
consumption depending if the shock is an expected or a surprise one. The standard assumption 
is to let consumption through the whole horizon to adjust the implications being:  
 
1. A parallel shift of the optimal consumption schedule if wt changes.  
2. A change in the slope of the consumption path if rt changes (Euler equation effect). 
 
However, if we face a surprise shock which does not allow adjusting consumption at date 0 
the new solution path has to fulfil the new budgetary restriction: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )0 j 1,2 t 0,1,2c * | I 0 PVc * | I 1 K PVw | I 1= == + = − = =   (5.11) 
 
 
Where the present value of the adjustment needed at every period is given by K and the 
period-by-period cost is given by κ. 
 
( ) ( )1 1 2
K




     (5.12) 
 
 
The right hand side of the new budgetary restriction is the new present value of income 
given the information at date 1. The first term of the left hand side is the optimal consumption 
given the information at date 0; the second term is the present value of optimal consumption at 
dates 1 and 2 given the information at date 1; and, the third term (K) is the present value of the 
adjustment ( κ ) needed to fulfil the new budget restriction. If consumption at date 0 were 
allowed to adjust then this adjustment would be K=0. We can express the adjustment needed at 
dates 1 and 2 as: 
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Note that this adjustment is a parallel shift, and that after the shock, the optimal growth rate 
is not affected; in other words, the Euler equation is still being fulfilled after the short term 
adjustment. We now turn to analyse what happens when there is a surprise shock at date 1. 
5.2.2.1. Income changes  
 
At a first glance it is evident that a decrease in current income at date j will decrease 
consumption. The same will happen if there is a change in expected income at date 2 because 
the present value of income decreases. The mechanism of adjustment is as follows: 
 
i) The original optimum path without a expected crisis at date 1 is given by line AA’ 
ii) The optimum path with an expected crisis with effects on real income is given by 
line BB’ 
iii) If we start on point A and at date 1 when a crisis happens we change to line AB’ 
then the adjustment is not enough since we are still violating the new budget 
constraint.  




















Diagram 12: Intertemporal consumption with time rigidities and changes in w (net borrowers) 
 
 
We set a numerical example with the following assumptions of parameters and income with 
a crisis at date 1 that affects only the level of real income for one period.  Preferences are 
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described for a borrower by the parameters β=0.95 and ρ=5; interest rates are constant r1= 
r2=5% and real income follows the schedules:  expected at date 0 wt=10 and when information is 
revealed at date 1: w0= w2=10 and w1=9. 
   
We can see that the present value of income reduces from 28.59 to 27.64; we can see that if 
there is a simple adjustment (path AB’) then the present value of consumption (27.97) is still 
higher than the new restriction and the only path that fulfils the new restriction is if we adjust 
further and follow a path AC’ which present value of consumption is 27.64. 
 
  Consumption schedule, changes in w 
Net borrowers 
 






Observed adjusted path 
AC’ 
Present value of income 
(Information at date 0) 
28.5941 -- -- -- 
Present value of income 
(new restriction)  
-- 27.6417 -- -- 
c0 10.0048 9.6716 10.0048 10.0048 
c1 9.9998 9.6668 9.6668 9.4876 
c2 9.9948 9.6619 9.6619 9.4827 
Present value 
consumption 
28.5941 27.6417 27.9750 27.6417 
κ 0.1792    
Table 50: Consumption schedule with changes in w, net borrowers 3 period model 
 
 
We have the same effects even when we are dealing with a net lender; the only difference is 
that consumption will now tend to rise over time. In this case we only set β=0.99 and the rest of 
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Consumption schedule, changes in w 
Net lenders 
 






Observed adjusted path 
AC’ 
Present value of 
income (Information 
at date 0) 
28.5941 -- -- -- 
Present value of 
income (new 
restriction)  
-- 27.6417 -- -- 
c0 9.9251 9.5945 9.9251 9.9251 
c1 10.0023 9.6692 9.6692 9.4914 
c2 10.0801 9.7444 9.7444 9.5666 
Present value 
consumption 
28.5941 27.6417 27.9723 27.6417 
κ 0.1778    
Table 51: Consumption schedule with changes in w, net lenders 3 period model 
 
5.2.2.2. Interest rates change 
 
We start from an original situation which is given by the line AA’. To determine what 
happens when the interest rate increases is more complicated because involves two contrary 
effects:  
 
1. The first one is an intertemporal substitution effect which will increase the slope of the 
consumption path because with a higher interest rate a consumer will increase the rate of 
consumption as the first order conditions imply. This is the effect described by the standard 
form of the Euler equation and it is shown in line BB’. Note that this result needs the 
rescheduling of consumption from date 0; in other words, if we calculate an optimal path as 
if the new interest rate scenario was known at date 0, we will notice that this new path has a 
greater slope from date 1 onwards and a lower intercept than the original AA’. Each 
consumption path is compatible with different present values of income being the original 

















Diagram 14: Intertemporal consumption with time rigidities and changes in r (net borrowers) 
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2. However, there is a second effect which is the reduction of the present value of income. The 
question is: it is enough to move between paths after date 1 (that is to follow AB’)? The 
answer is no, because even if we are in an infinite setting we have a binding constraint 
across the whole horizon not only from date 1 onwards; as we already followed the 
consumption path up to date 1, just increasing the rate of consumption has as consequence 
the violation of this constraint, the present value of consumption will be higher than the 
present value of the new income, therefore we need a further adjustment downwards to keep 
fulfilling the binding constraint, that is to follow the schedule AC’. In terms of our 
numerical example we have the following assumptions: preference parameters b=0.95 and 
r=5; w0=w1= w2=10; and, interest rates at date 0 rt=5% and when information is revealed at 
date 1 r1=5% and 0 r2=7% 
 
3. As we can see, event if we keep the path AA’ the present value of consumption (28.4247) 
with the new interest rates at date 1 is still slightly above the new present value of income 
(28.4246), hence for us to maintain the budget restriction need to adjust consumption to 
AC’ and not simply to AB’. Note that this effect is not as big as if there is a contraction of 
real income but we have the result that a surprise change in the interest rates may have level 
effects on consumption limiting the effectiveness of monetary policy which is consistent 
with Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba's (2003) findings about higher interest rates and drops in 
consumption.  
 
Consumption schedule, changes in r 
Net borrowers 






Observed adjusted path 
AC’ 
Present value of income 
(Information at date 0) 
28.5941 -- -- -- 
Present value of income 
(new restriction)  
-- 28.4246 -- -- 
c0 10.0048 9.9930 10.0048 10.0048 
c1 9.9998 9.9880 9.9880 9.9816 
c2 9.9948 10.0207 10.0207 10.0143 
Present value consumption 
(Information at date 1) 
28.4247 28.4246 28.4364 28.4246 
κ 0.0064    
Table 52: Consumption schedule with changes in r, net borrowers 3 period model 
 
 
In the case of a net lender (β=0.99), the effect of interest rates on consumption has the same 
implications; at date 1, when the new interest rate is known consumption must adjust further 
relative to the full information schedule BB’ and we end up in the path AC’. 
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Diagram 15: Intertemporal consumption with time rigidities and changes in r (net lenders) 
 
 
Consumption schedule, changes in r 
Net lenders 






Observed adjusted path 
AC’ 
Present value of income 
(Information at date 0) 
28.5941 -- -- -- 
Present value of income 
(new restriction)  
28.4246 -- -- -- 
c0 9.9251 9.9138 9.9251 9.9251 
c1 10.0023 9.9909 9.9909 9.9847 
c2 10.0801 10.1067 10.1067 10.1005 
Present value 
consumption (Information 
at date 1) 
28.4232 28.4246 28.4359 28.4246 
κ 0.0064    
Table 53: Consumption schedule with changes in r, net lenders 3 period model 
 
5.2.2.3. A crisis in motion: monetary policy response 
 
We now study what happens when there is a surprise crisis that diminishes real income and 
the monetary authority decides to intervene by changing r2. Using the same assumptions as 
described above, we define a crisis as a fall in real income at period 1 so that w1=9. We can 
observe that increasing the interest rate has a negative effect at date 1 (the higher the increase 
the greater the fall in c1) but at date 2 we can achieve a higher consumption when compared 
with the no-intervention case (maintaining r2=5%). If the monetary authority opts for lowering 
the interest rate, then consumption at date 1 will be higher than without intervention because of 
a positive income effect, but at date 2, consumption will fall with respect to this latter case 
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c0 10.0048 10.0048 10.0048 10.0048 10.0048
c1 9.9998 9.4876 9.4652 9.4330 9.5226
c2 9.9948 9.4827 9.4968 9.5181 9.4618










c0 9.9251 9.9251 9.9251 9.9251 9.9251
c1 10.0023 9.4914 9.4697 9.4384 9.5254
c2 10.0801 9.5666 9.5816 9.6042 9.5443
Table 54: Consumption schedule with policy responses 3 period model 
 







Original No intervention Policy 7%
Policy 10% Policy 2%
 
Diagram 16: Policy responses to a crisis  
 
 
This analysis depends largely on the crisis being unexpected at date 0; however, this 
assumption does not reflects entirely the reality where a crisis can be anticipated and the 
monetary authority would react pre-emptively by rising interest rates. We could implement that 
kind of policy in this 3 period set up but that would imply that the consumer has different 
information than the authority implying an asymmetric information problem; on the other hand, 
removing the surprise component will leave us with the usual framework that relies on the Euler 
equation and again the behaviour of consumption would go again unexplained. Nonetheless, the 
main assumption we are doing can be used to expand the analysis to include an expected crisis 
and possible pre-emptive policies: the individuals engage in medium or long term planning and 
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5.2.3. Intertemporal consumption with an expected crisis: long term 
planning horizons 
 
The assumptions underlying the derivation of the Euler equation are that consumers 
maximise consumption as sequential 2-period problems and the optimising result is obtained by 
applying the envelope theorem. However, when we are dealing with longer planning periods 
and if we assume that past consumption is already realised, the Euler equation does not describe 
anymore the behaviour of consumption if there are unexpected shocks in the middle of the 
planning period. In other words, unexpected shocks within the planning period will require 
adjusting the optimal path to fulfil the new budget constraint and this implies a departure from 
the Euler equation approach as a solution. We will now assume that consumers have longer 
term planning horizons and they plan consumption for several periods ahead given some 
stability of the economy; this is not an unrealistic assumption since this planning can be done on 
a quarterly or monthly basis. This also allows for the government to engage in pre-emptive 
active policy before a crisis happens. We will assume that the crisis is inevitable and that this 
pre-emption has no effect on the decision to attack the currency peg.  
 
There are four periods, the first one (t=0) is a normal period when an optimal consumption 
path is obtained and the agent engages in consumption. During the second period (t=1) it 
becomes evident that a crisis that could affect real income will happen at the third period (t=2); 
both consumers and the monetary authority can react accordingly but cannot change past 
actions. At period three, there is a crisis that has a negative impact on real income; the monetary 
authority can react and consumers take this information into account. Given the structure of the 
assumptions we eliminate any element of surprise other than the knowledge of a crisis unveiling 
at date 1; in other words, the monetary authority discloses the policy it will follow before and 
after the crisis and consumers are able to take into account the decisions of the monetary 
authority at dates 1 and 2, this allow to evaluate the minimum cost scenario (introducing more 
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With an optimal solution: 
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   (5.15) 
 
Again, at date 1 when the coming real income shock is known the consumers will have to 
adjust their consumption to keep fulfilling the restriction:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )0 j 1,2,3 t 0,1,2,3c * | I 0 PVc * | I 1 K PVw | I 1= == + = − = =   (5.16) 
5.2.3.1. Policy options against real consumption potholes 
 
We can compare different policy options and compare the resulting consumption schedules. 
The initial assumptions are β=0.95, ρ=5, wj=10 and rj=5%. The crisis will result in w2=9. As we 
can see, the results show that a no-intervention policy will leave us with the smaller 
consumption at date 3. However, in the short run at date 1, consumption (c1) is greater than 
when r2 is left unchanged or when it increases. Consumption at date 2 (c2) shows mixed 
behaviour depending on the policy followed before the crisis period.  
 
















c0 10.0072 10.0072 10.0072 10.0072 10.0072 10.0072 
c1 10.0022 9.6690 9.6361 9.5843 9.6693 9.6162 
c2 9.9972 9.6641 9.6312 9.6701 9.6080 9.7022 
c3 9.9922 9.6592 9.7173 9.7567 9.6938 9.6973 
Table 55: Consumption schedule with policy responses 4 period model, net borrowers 
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c0 c1 c2 c3
Original No intervention Policy 10% 
Policy 10% 10% Policy 2% 10% Policy 10% 5% 
 
Diagram 17: Policy responses to a crisis 4-period model (net borrowers) 
 
When we look at the case of a net lender we can see that in all cases, the no-intervention 
case is the worst for consumption at date 3. As well, decreasing the interest rate r2 increases 
consumption at date 1 while increasing it has the contrary effect. At date 2, in those scenarios 
where r2 increased, consumption increased.  
















c0 9.8888 9.8888 9.8888 9.8888 9.8888 9.8888 
c1 9.9657 9.6344 9.6032 9.5538 9.6349 9.5840 
c2 10.0432 9.7101 9.6786 9.7201 9.6539 9.7506 
c3 10.1213 9.7863 9.8468 9.8892 9.8214 9.8273 








c0 c1 c2 c3
Original No intervention Policy 10% 
Policy 10% 10% Policy 2% 10% Policy 10% 5% 
 
Diagram 18: Policy responses to a crisis 4-period model (net lenders) 
Liquidity constraints 
 
One of the features of a financial crisis may involve the shrinking of credit by higher 
borrowing rates relative to lending rates. This differentiation in the terms of borrowing and 
lending is a common assumption that reflects stylised facts of the real functioning of debt 
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markets; loans and credit cards often ask for a higher interest rate that the one of the risk free 
asset. We now characterise a financial crisis as an increase in this risk premium; this can be due 
to a currency crisis that is expected to worsen the credit worthiness of borrowers (via reduced 
income and ability to pay) or by balance-sheet imbalances in the banking system (cost of 
liabilities increasing) what we are interested in is in the effect on consumption and 
precautionary savings.  
 
Hence, we assume that there is no fall in real income but that this type of crisis is purely 
financial and that it affects the conditions of borrowing; in fact, this is equivalent to assume an 
increase in the interest rate payable where the borrower has to pay the higher rate: 
3 3 p3r * r r= + where rp3 corresponds to a risk premium; we do not allow the credit market to 
disappear in which case the borrower will consume his initial endowment minus the accrued 
interest from previous loans (if collateral recovery can be enforced). As we can see with our 
example, introducing a risk premium as a consequence of an expected financial crisis will 
reduce consumption at dates 1 and 2 but increase it at date 3 (this is because of the increase in 
savings and their corresponding returns). The assumptions are again ρ=5, β=0.95, rj=5%, 









c0 c1 c2 c3
Original Optimum path







Diagram 19: Financial crisis with liquidity constraints 
 
Again, we start from a schedule AA’ and engage in consumption. At date 1 we learn that 
there is going to be a crisis that will increase the borrowing rate and we can adjust consumption 
from date 1 onwards but not date 0 consumption. The optimum path if we were allowed to 
adjust date 0 would be BB’. A simple jump between paths to follow the AB’ schedule is not 
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Consumption schedule with liquidity constraints 
Net borrowers 






Observed adjusted path 
AC’ 
Present value of income 
(Information at date 0) 
37.2325 -- -- -- 
Present value of income 
(new restriction)  -- 
36.8398 -- -- 
c0 10.0072 9.9862 10.0072 10.0072 
c1 10.0022 9.9812 9.9812 9.9734 
c2 9.9972 9.9763 9.9763 9.9684 
c3 9.9922 10.0645 10.0645 10.0567 
Present value 
consumption (Information 
at date 1) 
36.8401 36.8398 36.8608 36.8398 
κ 0.0113    
Table 57: Consumption schedule with liquidity constraints 
 
Debt defaults 
Let’s remember that in this framework we are allowing to transfer income between several 
periods; hence, a borrowing agent will be carrying trough time these liabilities. This analysis 
suggests that an increase in real interest rates (such as those imposed by liquidity constraints) 
and a fall in real wages can tighten the budget constraint and may make it optimal for the 
borrowing agent to default on his debt. This becomes a transmission mechanism from a 
currency crisis that has a negative impact on real wages to the banking system that will see the 
value of its assets reduced if massive defaults occur (as it happened in Mexico during 1995).  
 
In the absence of collateral, and assuming that the borrowing consumer faces the choice of 
repaying its debt or defaulting to consume his endowment, the consumer will find it optimal to 
default when the lifetime utility of not defaulting is less than the lifetime utility of 
defaulting ND DU U< . As an example, we can assume a borrowing agent with preference 
parameters β=0.9, ρ=5; an income of wt=10 and faces an interest rate rt=5% and it is a problem 
of 4 periods with t=0, … , 3. The individual borrows up to date n following the optimum 
consumption path and faces the choice at date n+1 when he has to start repaying his debt; hence, 
he will default if the following condition is met:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 13 n 3
t t tt t t
t 0 t 0 t n 1
c * c * w
1 1 1
−ρ −ρ −ρ
= = = +
β < β + β
− ρ − ρ − ρ
∑ ∑ ∑  
 
Or similarly:  
( ) ( )
1 13 3
t tt t




= + = +
β < β
− ρ − ρ
∑ ∑         (5.17) 
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A loan contract with collateral that eliminates the incentives to default should then comply 
with:  
 















= + = +
−ρ −ρ
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β = β −






    (5.18) 
 
An important assumption is that the threat of the bank of keeping the collateral is 
credible. If not, we can model the exposure of the bank in a simple way. The monetary 
authority is providing liquidity to the banking system. In this model there are 2 types of agents, 
net lenders (a) who deposit in the banking system and net borrowers (1-a), population is 
normalised to 1. The banking system obtains funding from two sources: the central bank and 
deposits. Banks lend to early consumers at an interest rate r and pay late consumers the rate rp 










NS w c . 
 
And the bank’s position with the central bank is denoted by the expression: 
( ) ( )( )| 1 | 1= = + − = −t t tB a NS type a a NS type a   
 
When B>0 then the bank buys government bonds and when B<0 the bank borrows from 













, the bank cannot overdraft 
from the central bank and deposits are always paid. Therefore, when a=0 the bank just invests in 
risk free bonds the savings from late consumers and pays off by redeeming those bonds from 
the central bank. When a=1 then the bank borrows from the central bank and repays at rate r, the 
credits to the consumer are also at rate r. This simple expression implies that when there are 
defaults from some borrowers and when collateral is either not exercised or at a percentage of 
the value of the loan the loss is unrecoverable. Common solutions to this problem are to set 
minimum capital levels, requirements on deposits and lender of last resort arrangements. This 
availability of reserves (DR) has the effect of minimising the possible impact on the bank’s 
position from defaults and hence the bank’s position is now:   
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( ) ( ) ( )| 1 | 1 DR= = + − = − +t t tB a NS type a a NS type a  (5.19) 
 
Depending on the source or the reserves, the bank will end up with a positive or a zero 
balance in its position B. If for example, it takes a fraction of deposits then the possibility of 
allocating credit will be restricted but the position will be self-financing and will take the form:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )| 1 | 1 1= = + − = − + −t t tB a NS type a a NS type a δ δ  
 
Where ( )( ) ( )1 | 1 1− = − − =ta NS type a DRδ  and ( )( )1 | 1− = −ta NS type a δ is the 
available amount to lend. On the other hand, if bank’s own capital is paid then at the end there 
will be a positive balance depending of the size of defaults.  
 
5.2.4. Implications for consumption estimation: an infinite period 
solution 
 
The previous analysis has important implications for the empirical estimation of 
consumption since it departs from the standard Euler equation. We can derive a new equation 
that is theoretically compatible with Carroll’s (2001) findings regarding the importance of other 
variables to estimate consumption. In order to do that we will assume an infinite-lived consumer 
with the following problem: 
 
( )t0 1 t
t 0
Max U(c ,c ) u c
∞
=
= β∑  
Subject to 
( ) ( )
t t
0 0t t
t 1 t 1
k k
k 1 k 1
c w
c w










To calculate the present value of a given observation we need to compound the time variant 
interest rates of all the periods from date 0 up to date t. The assumptions on rk are:  
 
1. Every value of rk is the interest rate prevailing between k and k-1.  
2. Each rk is not the rate of the term structure prevailing at date 0, it corresponds to 
the one period interest rate at date k.  
3. The interest rate does not follow a stochastic process45 but is a monetary policy 
instrument.  
                                                 
45 Relaxing this assumption is necessary if we need to obtain an optimal portfolio where the available 
assets follow a martingale process, Pliska (1997).  
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In order to simplify the calculation, we can introduce the concept of equivalent interest rate 
which is the geometric mean46 of all the discounting factors up to date t such 
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     (5.20) 
 
And an optimal consumption path: 
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( ) ( ) ( )
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Note that in order to have an interior solution we need that the present value of income 
must be a finite number and the denominator must converge as well. Hence, we need two 
assumptions:  
 
1. Income cannot have a growth rate 
t
ϕ between periods that replicates exactly the 
observed interest rate process or that is permanently higher47. This to ensure that 
the discounted summation converges. Otherwise, consumption becomes infinite at 
                                                 
46 This equivalent interest rate allows to discount each period with a single rate. For instance instead of 
having to calculate (1+0.05)*(1+0.07)*(1+0.08) =1.21338 we can calculate the geometric mean of these 
rates and obtain (1.06659353) ^3=1.21388 as the discount factor for date t=3. 
47 As an example, if the interest rate is fixed at a level r and we have a fixed income growth ϕ then it 
must be that rϕ < . 
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every point in time. In the n-period model the finite present value of income is 
forced by the transversality condition.  
  
2. For the denominator to converge, one sufficient but not necessary condition is 
that 1β <  which corresponds to an impatient agent with no restriction on the 
degree of relative risk aversion; another sufficient but not necessary condition is 
1>ρ , which is an agent with high relative risk aversion coefficient with no 
restriction on the subjective preference discount, this means that convergence can 
be achieved if 1β = and 1>ρ , this corresponds to a patient agent with high 
relative risk aversion. In the case of a patient agent with low relative risk aversion 
( 1β = and 1<ρ ) the denominator does not converge and consumption collapses 
to zero at every point in time implying infinite savings. 
 
If we want to determine the adjustment needed when there is an unexpected shock at date t 
we need to solve again for K:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )j 0,..,t 1 j t ,.., t 0,..,PVc * | I 0 PVc * | I t K PVw | I t= − = ∞ = ∞= + = − = =  (5.22) 
 
 
5.2.4.1. An equilibrium consumption path equation vs. the Euler equation 
 
We can compare this result with the standard Euler equation. The solution with an infinite 
horizon, time variant real interest rates and time variant real income that we just derived can be 
rewritten as:  
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )( )





j j j 1
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∑ is a constant, jA  is the present value of income excluding 
the observed income and any lags included explicitly, and applying logarithms to obtain the 
result: 
( )
( ) ( )
j j 1
jj j j j 1
j j 1
w wln j 1 1
ln c * j ln 1 r ln ln A





β   = + + + + + +  ρ ρ   + +
  
   (5.23) 
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corresponds to the discounted growth rates of 
consumption at equilibrium which is required to be a constant for an interior solution. The 
second of the new terms can be described as a function of present income and permanent 
income. We found that there is a time index involved (which is denoted by j) and its parameter 
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1 1
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Discounted growth rate of 





Table 58: Log-linear Euler equation vs. equilibrium consumption path 
 
5.2.4.2. Empirical considerations 
 
As we have seen the Euler equation comes from the same maximisation problem we just 
described, it is in fact the relation between periods of first order conditions; however, it is not 
the solution of the problem. In other words, it describes a condition that the optimum path has to 
fulfil, not the optimum path itself. When trying to apply this long run, full information and ex-
ante relationship to obtain short run implications with uncertainty it is not surprising it performs 
badly. Why? Because the Euler equation is consistent with one and only one level of permanent 
real income, any unexpected change in interest rates and/or current income will alter the budget 
constraint and will affect consumption. The solution to the constrained problem takes the form 
of the standard Euler equation only in the case of full information where income and interest 
rates are known, the interest rate is constant and there are no surprise changes in any of these 
variables, then it is true that: 
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Applying the standard form of the Euler equation to a series that does not fulfil these 
conditions ignores the intertemporal budget constraint. It is important to note that there is no 
restriction on the interest rate sign since it is possible that there is a negative effect on income 
and consumption due to its impact on the present value. This is contrary to the standard form of 
the Euler equation which requires the parameter to have a positive sign to be considered a valid 
estimation. A related issue to interest rates is that consumption depends not only in current but 
past and future interest rates; this is the result of having a binding constraint. In other words, 
optimising intertemporal consumption means transferring real income from all over the 
planning horizon; this implies that the agent contracts debt or accumulates savings both which 
accrue an interest rate. Treating non-current interest rates as by-gone or not-yet-existing, 
effectively ignores the accrued interest that must be paid (or spent) in the future which in turn 
violates the binding constraint.  
 
Empirical estimation of this function poses several problems though, as it can be seen we 
need a measure of the present value of income across the planning horizon (not only of future 
but of past income as well). We can separate the effect of current and lagged values of income 
but we are still kept with the problem to calculate future income. There are several proposed 
methods, ranging from simple approaches such as Graham, Eggers and Sukhtankar (2003) who 
consider the average income over two periods as a proxy for permanent income and any 
deviation as transitory income to more sophisticated and data-intensive ones such as Carrol 
(1994).  However, under this specification this variable depends not only of future income alone 
but on its discounted value therefore it responds to expected interest rates as well (either if a 
shock is temporary or permanent) making it more difficult to find an appropriate proxy. 
Ignoring this variable may bias the estimations of the rest of the parameters are we would be 
omitting a relevant variable as Graham et al. (2003), Carrol (1994), DeJuan, Seater and Wirjanto 
(2004) and Shea (1995) have found that consumption responds to permanent income.  
 
As a preliminary exercise, we followed the Graham et al. (2003) approach to permanent 
income. Under that approach, observations of current income contain all the information of both 
permanent and transitory income implicitly:  
Current Income = Permanent income + Transitory income 
( ) t t 1 t t 1t t
w w w w
w w
2 2
− −+ +   = + −   
   
   (5.24) 
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Hence, we can include a regression with current and lagged observations and compare these 
results with the standard Euler equation approach. We regressed the equations:  
t 1 2 t 3 t 1 tc r c −= α + α + α + ε       (5.25)  
t 1 2 3 t 4 t 5 t 1 tc t r w w −= γ + γ + γ + γ + γ + η     (5.26) 
In order to compare the results from the Euler equation in its extended form and the ones 
obtained from the optimal path equation. It is important to note that the interest rate used in the 
latter is the expected long term interest rate, in this case it was calculated as the ex-ante 
geometric average interest rate up to date t.  
 
Euler Equation Results 
Coefficient 
(Probability) 
Mexico Korea Thailand Philippines 
0.3105 0.2085 0.1140 0.0063 
α1 
(0.0473) (0.1624) (0.1432) (0.5682) 
0.9000 0.0493 -1.1308 -0.1561 
α2 
(0.0755) (0.9092) (0.0058) (0.1142) 
0.8788 0.9689 0.9426 1.0033 
α3 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8325 0.9821 0.9209 0.9972 
Akaike info criterion -3.2330 -4.3210 -4.8962 -7.3219 
Schwarz criterion -3.1149 -4.2029 -4.7683 -7.2038 
Optimal Path Equation Results 
Coefficient 
(Probability) 
Mexico Korea Thailand Philippines 
-0.1060 4.8399 -0.3878 1.0154 
γ1 
(0.7057) (0.0000) (0.0037) (0.0000) 
0.0065 0.0057 0.0020 0.0069 
γ2 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
6.8269 7.5418 -2.2678 -2.2783 
γ3 
(0.0057) (0.0000) (0.2774) (0.0154) 
1.2808 0.4314 0.6231 0.1012 
γ4 
(0.0000) (0.0067) (0.0000) (0.0437) 
-0.7349 0.6872 0.2805  
γ5 
(0.0009) (0.0000) (0.0211)  
Adjusted R-squared 0.9152 0.9766 0.9376 0.9968 
Akaike info criterion -3.8748 -4.0161 -5.0874 -7.1720 
Schwarz criterion -3.6780 -3.8193 -4.8741 -7.0146 
Table 59: Comparison of results 
 
As we can see, when estimating this version of the Euler equation, for Korea and 
Philippines the only significant coefficient is the one that corresponds to lagged consumption, 
the other two coefficients are not significant. For Mexico and Thailand we have that the 
coefficient associated with the interest rate α2 is significant but not the one associated with 
preference parameters α1. When estimating the optimal path equation, we can see that all 
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coefficients are significant and that in most of the selected countries the adjusted R-squares 
improves. Regarding the information criterion, we see that for Mexico and Thailand both values 
show that the optimal path approach performs better than the traditional Euler equation. As 
opposed to the standard approach of the Euler equation in the optimum path approach it is more 
complicated to identify the values of the preference parameters β and ρ and to isolate the 
specific effects of each variable on consumption because of the non-linear form of the 
theoretical equation. That is the reason why the interest rate can have a negative sign, depending 
on which effect prevails, the effect on the slope (as in the Euler equation) or on the level via the 
present value of lifetime income (as in the new optimal path equation). 
 
5.3. Intertemporal consumption and risky assets 
 
 Past sections have focused on the lending-borrowing problem for transferring income 
between periods given access to a banking system and the money market. This is a partial 
explanation of what is going on within one market of the financial sector. The next question is: 
how does a planning horizon beyond 2 periods can affect an investor that participates in a risky 
asset market? In this section we will apply the approach we have adopted to solve the 
investment problem of an investor who faces uncertainty in the returns of his assets. This 
problem follows Pliska (1997) in the general specification of the model but differs in the 
approach to the solution by solving over the entire horizon rather than splitting the problem into 
a sequential 2-period modelling. Since this model is the standard approach to financial decision 
making it can be modified to address several issues in financial theory.  
5.3.1. Arbitrage-free pricing of contingent assets 
 
We start assuming that there is a risky asset which value depends on the realised state of 
nature, we can think of it as a stock share or even real state. Depending on the state in which the 
economy is found it will be its value; if the economy performs well then the final value of the 
asset is higher than with respect to other states of nature. For simplicity and manageability we 
assume that there are 3 periods and t=0, 1, 2. The risky asset follows a stochastic binomial 
behaviour with probability p2 to reach a final known value of Suu after 3 periods; a probability 
2p (1-p) to reach a final known value of Sud=Sdu; and, a probability (1-p)2 to reach a final 
known value of Sdd.  Hence, at date 0 there is one observed state of nature, at date 1 there are 2 
states of nature, at date 2 there are 3 states of nature. It is important to have clear from this point 
that higher prices of the asset at date 1 may constitute higher ex-post returns but the expected 
return is an inverse proportion of the price; to make this clearer let’s assume that at date 1 the 
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price is 10 but the maximum possible real value of the asset at the best state of nature at the date 
2 is 9, then the expected return is negative. The investor can sell and buy at any time without 
cost. There is a risk-free interest rate r (for simplicity we will assume it constant). We have a 
three period model where t=0, 1, 2. In an arbitrage-free valuation the value of any asset is given 
by the discounted expected value of future prices. The price H of the risky asset at each date at 
each node of the binomial tree will be: 
 
Asset price at each date 
Date 0 
( )
( )u d0 1 1
1
H pH 1 p H
1 r
 = + − +
 
Date 1  
State 1  
(1 step up)  ( )( )u
1





State 2  
(1 step down)  ( )( )d
1





Date 2  
State 1 
(2 steps up) 
uuH  
State 2 
(1 step up and 1 down) or  
(1 step down and 1 up) 
ud duH H=  
State 3 
(2 steps down) 
ddH  
Table 58: Asset price process 
 
As we are assuming that the individual can only invest in the risky asset to allocate his 
initial wealth to consumption over time, we need to determine the proportion of initial wealth 
destined to consumption and to buy the asset at every point in time (st). For simplicity we 
assume that preferences are given by U (ct) = ln (ct). In this case we need to maximise the 
expected utility subject to the restrictions: i) wealth has to be either destined to consumption or 
to investment; ii) consumption in 1 is the residual from the value of the initial portfolio minus 
the value of the new portfolio; and, iii) consumption at date 2 is equal to date 1 portfolio valued 
at date 2 prices. Note that s1* is being determined independently of the state of nature, this 
allows to simplify the algebraic treatment otherwise the problem becomes non-linear and 
intractable. This ensures that initial wealth is depleted at the end of the planning horizon and 
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Where Pt are the prices at date t of the consumption goods. Hence, the optimal solution
48 of 
this problem is given by:  












c *                         s * 1
HP 1 P 1
H W
c * s * s *                         s *  
P H 1
H
c * s *
P
 
 = = −
 + β + β + β + β 
 β
= − =  
+ β + β 
=
 (5.27 to 5.31) 
 
Note that c1* and c2* depend on the specific value taken by the asset price H1= {u, d} and 
H2= {uu, ud, du, dd}. Hence, with a risky asset consumption depends on the observed 
realisation of the states of nature and it is sensitive to fluctuations in the value of the portfolio as 
new information is being revealed disregarding unattainable nodes of the asset price tree.  
5.3.2. Interest rate changes 
 
Since we are interested in the effect of monetary policy on welfare when there are financial 
markets, we need to analyse the effects of changes in the interest rate on consumption.  We are 
interested in the effect of changes in the interest rate on the optimal consumption path. We will 
assume that the interest rate can change; therefore we have that the interest rate prevailing 
between date 0 and date 1 is r1 and the one prevailing between date 1 and date 2 is r2. The 
expressions for the real price of the asset at dates 0 and 1 are then given by:  
Asset price at each date 
Date 0 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )220
1 2
1
H p Huu 2p 1 p Hud 1 p Hdd
1 r 1 r
= + − + −
+ +
 
Date 1  
State 1  
(1 step up)  ( )( )u
2
1





State 2  
(1 step down)  ( )( )d
2
1





Table 59: Asset price process with varying interest rates 
 
5.3.2.1. Expected changes in the interest rate 
 
The first case we can consider is when the interest rates are equal r1=r2 and both change at 




                                                 
48 The complete solution can be found in annex A5.3 
49 A demonstration can be found in annex A5.4 
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Effect of expected changes of interest rates 
 1 2r r r= = ,
tdc *
dr
 1 2r r≠ ,
t t
2 2
dc * dc *
0, 0
dr dr
= ≠  1 2r r≠ ,
t t
2 2
dc * dc *
0, 0
dr dr
≠ =  
c0* 0 
c1* >0 0 >0 
c2* >0 >0 >0 
Table 60: Asset price changes with expected changes in interest rates 
 
5.3.2.2. Surprise changes in the interest rate 
 
We now turn to the case where the interest rate r2 changes at date 1 unexpectedly. This 
means that all decisions for date 0 are irreversible50. Consumption at date 0 and date 2 remains 
constant, the latter because the optimal investment remains unchanged as does the final price of 
the asset. But consumption at date 1 changes in the opposite direction of the interest rate 
because the investor cannot adjust the initial holdings of the asset s0*.  
 
Effect of surprise changes of the interest rate at date 1 
 1 2r r≠ ,
t t
2 2
dc * dc *
0, 0
dr dr




Table 61: Asset price changes with surprise changes in interest rates 
 
5.3.3. A model of asymmetric information with informed investors 
and noise traders 
 
Emmons and Schmid (2002) develop a model of arbitrage by professional traders who need- 
but lack wealth of their own to trade. Professional arbitrageurs must convince wealthy but 
uninformed investors to entrust them with investment capital in order to exploit mispricing 
perceptions in an asset and push the market back to its fundamental value. It is possible that 
assets become even more mispriced before reverting eventually to their fundamental value, 
having incurred in losses, the outside investors may demand their money back at this point even 
though the price will recover to its fundamental value. The results may depend on factors such 
as the ability of investors to wait, the use of performance rules (feedback rules) when assessing 
                                                 
50 We can check if the investment strategy at date 1 is still optimal, the demonstration is found in annex 
A5.5. 
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the fund manager. In this model it is shown that the existence of professional arbitrageurs 
mitigates, but not eliminates, mispricing in asset markets. A timeline of the model that outlines 








Diagram 20: Emmons and Schmid (2002) model timeline 
 
There are three participants in the market: i) noise traders who have wealth but misperceive 
the intrinsic value of the financial asset; ii) investors who have wealth but not insight into the 
financial asset’s intrinsic value; and, iii) arbitrageurs who know the intrinsic value but they 
don’t have wealth of their own. All parties are risk neutral. We will assume that there is a 
mechanism that can align the investor’s and the arbitrageur’s interests so we treat them as one 
agent within the market (since we are not analysing the funds’ market and fee structure we can 
simplify to two participants, informed investors and noise traders). Noise traders maximise 
expected utility as well but under a different perception of the asset price. The assumption of 
maximising utility will allow us to derive a demand for the asset building up on Emmons and 
Schmid (2002) and Schleifer (2000) approaches that assume ad-hoc demands for the asset. The 
timeline now becomes:  
 
1. Participants are all buyers in the asset market and they need to set a market price. 
There is a proportion (a) of informed investors and (1-a) of noise traders. They set a 
market price of the asset given their different expectations and calculate the real 
consumption schedule.  
2. At the second period participants decide whether or not the asset is still mispriced 
and if it is optimal to adapt their optimal portfolio calculated at date 0. As well, they 
determine a market price for the asset.   
3. At the last period the asset reveals its true value and the agents consume the value 
of their portfolios.  
 
Why can an asset be mispriced? Noise traders exist because pricing of an asset depends on 
expected returns that are not observable but in this model we are assuming that the final 
possible values of the asset are known. Another factor is that the probabilities of different states 
t1 t2 t3
Noise trader’s misperception S1 in place
Arbitrageur allocates financial resources 
to asset and cash
Noise trader’s misperception  might deepen to S2
If asset reverts to intrinsic value V arbitrageur liquidates
Noise trader’s misperception  corrects S2=0
Hedge fund winds down
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on nature are not observable; this is the assumed source of error in our model, noise traders have 
their own estimation of these probabilities. At this point it is important to remind that an 
overpriced asset at date 1 will have a lower expected return at date 2, it effectively represents an 
exp-post higher return from date 0 to date 1 but the expected return diminishes with respect to 
the real price at date 1.   
 
The maximisation problem is the one that we derived above; however, noise traders price 
the asset at date t as tNT t tH H E= where Et is a proportion of the real price. We will assume 
additionally that the subjective probability of the noise traders can vary over time pt, NT this will 
allow us to correct or deepen the misperception at date 1. Hence Et is given by the expressions:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
uu ud dd
0,NT 1,NT 0,NT 1,NT 0,NT 1,NT
0 22 uu ud dd
p p H 2p 1 p H 1 p 1 p H
E
p H 2p 1 p H 1 p H
+ − + − −
=
+ − + + −
(5.32) 
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     (5.33) 
If Et=1 there is no mistake in the pricing process; if Et<1 the probability of the value of the 
asset going up pNT is less than the real probability p and the asset is under-priced; on the other 
hand, if Et>1 then the probability pNT>p and the asset is over-priced.  
 
Noise traders maximise the same problem as in the previous section, but they have a 
misperception about the price. Hence, a noise trader optimal investment-consumption schedule 
is:  
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We can solve for the market price by aggregating the demands for both types of consumers, 
we will normalise the supply of the asset at date 0 to ( ) ( ) ( )0 0 0 0 0S a s | H 1 a s | H E= + + . By 
doing this we are in fact assuming that the market functions as a clearing house that provides the 
required liquidity being able to satisfy the demand. This pricing mechanism avoids distortions 
in prices that come from artificial liquidity shortages and prices only reflect the mix of informed 
and uninformed investors in the market. Since we are looking for a unique market price, the 
aggregate demand for the asset is given by: 
( )
( )
( ) ( )2 2 20M 0M 0M0 0 0
W 1 W 1 W 1
D a 1 1 a 1 1
H H HP 1 P 1 P 1
     
     = − + − − = −
     + β + β + β + β + β + β     
 















 + β + β 
 
 = −
 + β + β 
(5.34) 
If there is no mistake in the price E, then the market price at date 0 that clears the market is 
the real price; the same happens if a=1. If a=0 then the prevailing price is the “wrong” price. For 
estimating the price at t=1, we have 2 markets again, this time the asset market is cleared and 
we need to clear the goods market. We assume that the supply of goods at date 1 is 
( ) ( ) ( )g 1 1 1 1 1 1 1S a c | H , P 1 a c | H E , P= + +  for the same reasons as with the asset market at date 0. 
Since it is a 2-market model and the asset market clears at any price, we want that the price 
reflects the mix of investors rather than possible shortages in goods. This is an interesting result, 
when asset prices start increasing in real terms more than the real price and this is required 
because there is a slowdown in production then this will trigger a crisis in the financial sector, 










 that is 
when the value of one unit of the asset is equal to the discounted value of the maximum final 
price of the asset. In other words, the risky asset cannot pay fewer returns than the risk-free 
asset if that happens, then the optimal strategy will be a sell out of the holdings of the risky asset 
and buying the risk-free bond until prices fall enough to correct the mispricing. On the other 
hand the price has no floor since an under-priced asset below will always have greater returns 
than expected.   
 
The demand for goods is given by:  
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( ) ( ) ( )1 1g 0 1 0NT 1NT 1
1 1
H H
D a s * s * 1 a s * s * E
P P
= − + − −      
But because both agents have the same behaviour at date 0 and we are looking for a single 
market price of goods, then we can simplify to a representative agent that faces a single market 
price:  
( ) 1Mg 0 1
1
H
D s * s *
P
= −       (5.35) 
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   (5.36) 
 
At date 2, goods market clears at the final price. Some implications of this model are:   
 
1. When the asset is under priced informed investors will demand more of the risky 
asset at date 0 and date 1 than when the price is the real value. Noise traders 
demand less of the asset than if the price were the one they think is real. When the 
asset is over priced the contrary will take place.  
2. An under priced asset will always increase the expected utility of informed 
investors with respect to the expected utility under no price errors. 
3. An over priced asset will always decrease the expected utility of informed investors 
with respect to the expected utility under no price errors. 
5.3.3.1. Financial crises: optimal breakdowns 
 
This model allows analysing some of the possible sources of instability other than the ones 
that can arise because of the asymmetric information that explains the existence of noise traders 
and informed investors. Since this is a model of financial decisions under constrained 
optimisation, it allows calculating the possible impact on welfare of different phenomena in the 
risky asset market. As well, financial decisions being the result of intertemporal maximisation 
allow us to avoid the use of ad-hoc asset demands commonly used when modelling financial 
markets. With little modifications, we can analyse other phenomena that has been widely 
covered in the literature such as frenzies and crashes.  In this section, we briefly address these 
types of financial crises within this model. 
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As we have already mentioned, at date 1 in this model there is the possibility for a real 
shock such as a contraction in aggregate supply to transmit to the financial sector. When there is 
a slowdown in production, then the market price H1 asked for the asset that clears the market 
must go up, since portfolio holdings are the only source of income in this model. This creates an 
artificial bubble in the asset market which cannot be indefinite; the market crashes if the price 
goes beyond the roof imposed by the existence of the risk-free asset when it is a better strategy 
for the buyers giving liquidity to the market to stop trading the asset at that price. As we will see 
in the following section, if we allow for sequential trading (an agent has to sell his position in 
order to buy a new portfolio) there are some price-correction mechanisms.  
Bubbles and slumps 
 
Till now we have assumed that at date 1 all transactions are made at a single price, however 
the structure of the model points towards an interesting phenomenon: the appearance of a bid-
ask gap. If we remember consumption at date 1 is given by ( )1 0 1 1M 1c * s * s * H / P= − . If we add 
the assumption found in Chen (1999) which is that transactions are made in sequence, we can 
end up with an optimal frenzy followed by an optimal crash in the risky asset in the pursue of 
increasing consumption. Consumption at date one will now depend on a selling price (ask) and 
a buying price (bid) ( )1 0 1ask 1 1bid 1c * s * H s * H / P= − . 
 
Let assume that at date 1 the individuals need first to liquidate their portfolio and then buy a 
new portfolio. It can be argued that they need only to sell ( )0 1s * s *− at the observed price but 
that may be suboptimal if we can differentiate the selling and the buying price aiming for the 
golden rule in asset markets “buy low and sell high”. Hence, given that the market price is 
calculated taking into account the proportion of noise traders, it may be optimal for informed 
investors to manipulate the price by presenting themselves as noise traders and asking for the 
noise trader price.  
 
When the turn comes to buy the asset, informed investors will behave as their true nature, 
since it will correct the price down; for noise traders is their turn to behave as informed 
investors will find it optimal to correct their price and the market price will correct to the true 
value of the asset. This self-correcting mechanism works if the over pricing is not big; however, 
if that is not the case, and if we accept that the source of error is not only the probability but the 
final value of the asset then we allow for bigger variations of the price. If this happens, it may 
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be optimal for informed investors to crowd in at the incorrect price at a buying frenzy and then 
dropping the market price when it is time to sell. The market can entirely disappear if holding 
the risk-free asset is a better strategy for the buyers giving liquidity to the market. If the 
monetary authority intervenes by increasing the interest rate r2 in an effort to reduce the market 
price then, as we have seen, the effect will be negative on consumption. A slump can happen at 
date 0, when informed investors find it optimal to lie about the price. If the under pricing is 
small, then we may find small deviations from the real value. However, this slump will always 
be corrected at date 1 when it is turn to sell the asset and the real value is revealed.   
 
5.4. Financial and currency crises: twin crises in 3 stages 
 
We can turn to the second generation model described in a previous chapter to analyse the 
interaction between financial, currency and goods markets. The UIP approach is a portfolio 
model where we have risk-free assets in 2 countries, a currency market and a goods market. We 
will introduce 2 features, a capital market in the small country with a risky asset that makes it 
attractive to diversify internationally the portfolio and intertemporal consumption in 2 periods. 
The implications of the existence of a risky asset can be derived intuitively given the 
mechanisms that we have already studied and we can outline a generic timeline of a financial 
crisis in the risky asset market that transmits to a currency crisis and feedbacks to a financial 
crisis but this time in the banking sector. We can turn to equation 1 to describe the expected 
devaluation given the interest rate parity:   
 
( ) ( )
e
cb cb e et 1 t
t t t 1 t 1
t
s s





= − + ∆ − ∆  
 
We start from an equilibrium situation without inflation in any country and an expected 
devaluation of 0 which implies that the risk-free returns set by the central bank are cb cbf fr r *= . 
Consumers are participating in 3 markets: goods, loanable funds and capital markets. Taking 
into account the simplifying rule that income is transferred via loanable funds and wealth 
through risky asset; at this point we can imagine that a person may have income but not enough 
wealth to participate in share markets or to invest in real estate on the other hand a wealthy 
agent may prefer to invest in a riskier asset with higher returns. Given the characteristics of the 
countries of interest this is not an unrealistic assumption. We can characterise the risky asset as 
we have done before, 3 possible ending scenarios with different values of the asset (Huu, 
Hud=Hdu and Hdd) and a probability p of going up 
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At date 0, every agent makes his decision of consumption and investment schedule. In the 
risky asset market there may be a mix of noise traders and informed investors and a market 
price for the risky asset is set. At date 1, it is possible that there is a bubble in the risky asset. As 
we have already discussed the size of the bubble may vary depending on the mispricing of the 
asset. We have 2 cases:  
 
1. The bubble is small and the impact on prices in the goods sector is small and can be 
managed with a temporary increase in the real interest rate by the central bank to avoid 
devaluating the currency whilst the prices correct. Consumption falls or slowdowns in 
response to the increase in interest rates (the effect may be small or even negligible as we 
have discussed). 
2. In the first stage, the bubble becomes frenzy and the impact on prices cannot be countered 
with increasing the interest rates and the abandonment of the peg follows. During the 
second stage the correction of the asset price translates into a market crash. Since there is 
an upsurge in prices real income falls and income-related consumption does it as well. 
Borrowers face higher interest rates on their loans and may decide to default.   
 
At date 2, the true state of nature is revealed. Borrowers decrease consumption, lenders 
increase consumption. Some investors benefit from the selling at a higher price and leaving the 
market before the crash and moving towards the risk free asset denominated in foreign currency. 
Hence, a typical 1990’s crisis can be explained as a result of speculative bubbles in otherwise 
“well-behaved” countries with strong fundamentals. 
Bubble in:
• Stock exchange index






Increase in interest rates 
















 Diagram 21: Financial and currency crises timeline 
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5.5. Conclusions of the chapter 
 
 
The Lucas (1987) model provides a way of measuring the loss in lifetime utility after a 
shock; however, there is little room to test the possible effects of monetary policy (we are 
particularly interested on movements of the real interest rate) on real consumption. Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1999) apply Lucas (1987) in the context of self-exclusion of international capital 
markets and identify the possible losses in terms of the loss of insurance capabilities against 
volatility in consumption. This model was developed to explain the effects of debt crises with 
default sovereign debt by countries; however, it does not explain the changes of the growth rate 
and of the level of consumption that countries in crises experienced in during the 1990s making 
it hard to evaluate the effects of policy to counter the negative effects of the crises.  
 
The intertemporal maximisation problem provides a useful framework to explain the 
behaviour and determinants of consumption. However, the usual estimation of the Euler 
equation (which relates the real interest rate with consumption growth) is not enough to explain 
the behaviour of consumption because it overlooks the one-direction linearity of time by 
implicitly assuming that there is instantaneous adjustment along the planning period. This is 
more evident in analysis where there is a planning horizon longer than 2 periods and the Euler 
equation is still considered to be the relevant solution to the problem. 
 
We need to solve the complete model and obtain the optimal path of consumption and 
obtain the true determinants of consumption at equilibrium. It is necessary to understand that 
this analysis is based solely on the effects on consumption and constitutes a partial equilibrium 
approach. However, we consider that understanding the consumer’s behaviour is necessary to 
evaluate any policy response to an external shock. This allows us not only to address the 
specific case of the transmission mechanisms present during a crisis, but also to extend the 
analysis to stability periods and to improve consumption estimation. It turns out that 
consumption depends not only on the interest rate but on household income as well. We found 
that there is an intertemporal substitution effect of interest rates, which affects the slope of the 
optimal path and an income effect that may affect the level. In this context, interest rate 
increases may have a short-term negative impact on consumption that solves the puzzle 
observed by Canzoneri, et al. (2003), Carroll (2001) and Favero (2005). An additional benefit is 
that we were able to calculate implied interest rates compatible with the observed ones a puzzle 
that Favero (2005) addresses. It would seem that a policy which decreases the interest rate 
would be useful to increase consumption in the short run; however, this kind of policy implies a 
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trade off with the growth rate of consumption which would decrease and can have other effects 
on financial markets making unattractive investment in the country. It is the decision of the 
policy maker to balance the objectives of interest rate policy taking into account that there is no 
option with pure benefits but all of them imply a trade off.   
 
This approach to the solution provides an equilibrium consumption path equation that 
should incorporate real income, the behaviour of the stock exchange market (as wealth 
proxy) and the expected interest rate in order to explain consumption. If we compare this 
specification with the standard log-linear Euler equation, there are several omitted 
variables in the latter. Unfortunately, because of limited and incomplete information we were 
not able to estimate a more complete empirical model to include the value of the stock exchange 
but we could incorporate a measure of real income which yields better results than the standard 
Euler equation.  
 
The question is why the Euler equation does not capture these effects? This is because one 
of the assumptions from which it is derived is that consumers behave like they have sequential 
2-period planning horizons. However, this result has been applied to cases where there are 
longer and finite horizons incorrectly disregarding the budget constraint as Favero (2001) points 
out. On the other hand we can think that the intertemporal consumption model is as well a 
financial model, the individual has the possibility not only to participate in the loanable funds 
market (through the banking system) but as well in the capital market (through risky assets) and 
his financial decisions are the ones that allow this consumer to transfer income and wealth 
between periods for consumption. When we allow longer planning periods, the intrinsic 
characteristic of time (it runs linearly and in one direction) imposes rigidities that make 
instantaneous adjustments along time limited to present and future consumption. It is because of 
these rigidities that surprise changes in financial markets may have the opposite effects than the 
expected ones when there is perfect foresight. 
 
In economics, the intertemporal maximisation framework has been commonly used to 
explain consumption taking into account only the possibility of lending and borrowing in the 
banking system. By doing this, investment in wealth carrying assets has been completely left 
out of the explanation of consumption.  On the other hand, in finance the same framework has 
been used to derive optimal portfolios for investment in financial markets without studying 
more in-depth the implications for consumption. We solve the portfolio optimisation problem 
for a single asset in a multi-period setting and we derive the optimal investment-consumption 
path for an investor with perfect information and for a noise trader. With these two types of 
investors we: 
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1. Build a shares market based on the model developed by Emmons and Schmid 
(2002) and derive the market price at all periods; this allows to derive the true 
demands for assets rather than to assume ad-hoc ones.  
2. Explore the implications of monetary policy; interest rates movements have an 
immediate negative effect on consumption.  
3. Derive the implications for the price of consumption goods; an overpriced financial 
market has an inflationary impact.  
4. Derive the possibility of the existence of a bid-ask spread that depends on the 
uncertainty in the market; uncertainty is generated by the proportion of noise 
traders and the degree of mispricing of the asset; a higher distortion in the market 
price with respect with the true value increases the spread.  
 
As we have demonstrated, financial crises can evolve into currency crises and feedback, 
even if the fundamentals of the economy do not point towards a currency crisis happening. This 
constitutes a problem for policy makers since intervention through interest rates alone may not 
be enough to correct the asset market but a more direct intervention. A precedent of this took 
place on August 1998 when the government of Hong Kong intervened directly in the stock 
market with the expressed purpose of drive out of the market currency speculators (Chan, Chan 
and Fong, 2000). Another issue to bear in mind is that we are not deriving an optimal policy 
package in the medium and the long run. This package would include the restructuring of the 
financial sector, adoption of other exchange rate regime, deepening of the economic reforms or 
even reversion of previously adopted reforms which would have further and possibly larger 
welfare effects.  
Final Remarks 




The word crisis has its Greek root on Krisis that is derived from the verb krinein that means 
“to separate” or “to decide”. The modern conception applies “crisis” to a period of disruption of 
normal functioning and a time to decide. Chinese relate “crisis” to a period of danger but also to 
one of opportunity. Crises in asset markets have taken place along history and they may be an 
inherent part of the functioning of financial markets. These episodes may be perceived as 
oddities in economic functioning for developed economies where safeguards are in place and 
the economy is able to absorb external shocks; however, for a number of countries they are a 
harsh reality that cause not only temporary disruption in economic performance but large 
income and wealth redistributions (more often than not, with regressive consequences).  For a 
time it has been the common assumption that the causes of economic instability were either a 
government with “bad” economic behaviour (as was the case of German hyperinflation or the 
debt crises during the 1980’s) or irrational market behaviour. However, the 1990’s crises made 
evident that even when there is economic adjustment and structural reforms it is still possible 
for a crisis to take place. We have reviewed the crises that emerging countries faced during the 
1990’s in countries where the usual policy “mistakes” were not present; in other words, there 
were stabilisation programmes in place, opening to international commodities and financial 
markets and stabilisation of public deficits.  
 
The openness of financial markets added an extra risk to consider when crises took place; 
regional contagion effects were an important source of instability in the South East Asian 
region. We estimated a leading indicators-contagion model or financial and currency crises 
using the standard measure for the Exchange Market Pressure and proposed a measure for the 
Financial Market Pressure in order to define periods with crisis. We found that financial and 
currency crises in the countries under study were closely intertwined, that contagion effects 
were important but that fundamentals were not sufficient explanation for triggering these crises.  
 
The proposed measure by Lucas (1987) was a starting point to measure the impact of crises 
on welfare. We expanded this measure in order to incorporate the effect on the level of 
consumption and to derive a single measure that comprises changes in the growth rate, the 
variance and the level of consumption. As well we explored the results under different forms of 
preferences and modified assumptions to incorporate stochastic consumption and 
autocorrelation in consumption series. The main cost we found was a short term effect on the 
level of consumption; the change in growth rates after a crisis was in some cases positive 
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implying welfare gains; and, increase in consumption volatility was not an important source of 
welfare costs. 
 
One of the striking features of consumption series was the sudden breakdown in the 
consumption path. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1999) assume that the main cost of international capital 
markets exclusion is volatility, which is contrary to the results we obtained, and moreover there 
is no available explanation the drop in the level of consumption. On the other hand the Euler 
equation result does not explain what happens either since it requires sudden and sharp drops of 
interest rates to explain observed consumption. However, the evidence of the adequacy of the 
Euler equation to describe consumption even in tranquil periods is under great debate because of 
its poor results. We decided to re-examine the intertemporal consumption model modifying 
some assumptions: i) that individuals solve sequential 2-period problems; ii) the intertemporal 
budget constraint always binds; and, iii) that past decisions cannot be adjusted.  
 
The results explain the fall in consumption as consequence of a fall in real income and in 
the process we provided a solution to a puzzle in monetary policy: that an increase in interest 
rates have a negative impact in the short run, possibility which is not allowed by the Euler 
equation.  
 
Since the intertemporal allocation of income addresses only the loanable funds market we 
expanded the analysis to a risky asset market. In this analysis we maximise the intertemporal 
utility of an initial wealth that has to be consumed along time. We demonstrated that 
consumption depends on the value of the asset after the initial period and that surprise changes 
of interest rates may have a negative effect on consumption. In order to explain what may cause 
a crisis we incorporated an asymmetric information structure in the market with noise traders 
and informed investors and derived the following results: i) that bubbles are possible as a 
rational strategy; ii) noise traders improve welfare of informed investors when the market price 
is under the real value of the asset; iii) an ask-bid spread arises naturally. When combining the 
results of the loanable funds market, the risky asset market and a second-generation model of 
exchange rate crises we can build a timeline that resembles the 1990’s crises. That is a country 
with apparently strong fundamentals can face a financial crisis that results in a currency crisis 
and feedbacks into a banking crisis. In astrophysics, black holes (points in space so massive that 
laws of physics collapse) were considered to be an odd phenomenon of nature and their 
existence as fascinating as rare; recent discoveries have placed a black hole in the centre of 
every galaxy and linked them to the their formation. It is necessary to go deeper in the causes of 
crises and economic disruption; it may be the case that these phenomena are linked to the 
formation and new developments in markets (not only as new assets appear but when new 
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institutional arrangements are made) and sudden adjustments need to take place at the limits of 
these innovations.  
 
This continues to be a fascinating topic not only because it puts to test the limits of the 
understanding of economic theory but also because it has important consequences far beyond 
affecting economic performance and market efficiency. In economic terms, the disruption of the 
“normal” performance of the economy has further implications; severe crises diminish welfare 
and have redistributive effects between lenders and borrowers, between informed investors and 
non-informed ones, between the rich and the poor. On the other hand, the intertwining of 
economic, political and social functioning becomes even more evident during a period of 
instability. As crises affect welfare and distribution of wealth there has always been a reaction to 
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Annex to Chapter 3 
 
A3.1: Inconsistency of OLS estimators  
 
In order to demonstrate the inconsistency of OLS estimators, we can assume the simplest 
form of the model, with only one exogenous country-specific regressor Xi that is stationary and 
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t t t t
y x I y c u
y x I y c u
α β
α β
= + − +
= + − +
 
 
With a distribution of errors u conditional to xit, given by: 
 
2
1 1 1 2
1, 1, 2




t u u u
t t






     
     
      
∼   
 
As we can see, the correlation between ( )1 2,t tu u is given by 1 2u uρσ σ . An approximation of 
the probability of a crisis can be calculated as a function of the observed values of the crisis 
variable ( )I • which gives an interior value of the probability, this is similar to the one calculated 













= −∑  
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Let’s simplify the notation by defining a new variable ( )it it id I y c= − and rewrite this 
system in matrix form as = Β +Y X U where H is the partitioned matrix 1 2
2 1
 

















For each country we can write an equation = Η Β +
i i i i
y u . The OLS estimator for this 






Β = Η Η Η
i i i i i
y  
 






Η Η =  
 
i i i j
i i
j i j j
X X X D
D X D D
51.  





i ii i i ji
j i j j j ii
X yX X X D




   
=    
     
 
 






i j i j j i i




                                                 
51 The inverse of this matrix takes the general form:  
1 1 1 1
11 12 1 11 11 12 22 21 11 11 12 22
1
21 22 22 21 11 22
A A A A A B A A A A B
A A
A A B A A B
− − − −
−
−
 + − 
= → =   
−   where 
( )
11
22 22 21 11 12B A A A A
−−= −
. In this 
particular case: ( )( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
22 ' ' ' ' '  with ' 'j j j i i i i j j i j i i i i iB D D D X X X X D D M D M I X X X X
− −
= − = = −
.  
52 See Johnston and DiNardo (1997) for a complete derivation of this result. 
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In order to check for consistency we need to calculate the plim of 
î
β we first need to 
calculate the value of the component: 
 

















I y c x
T














Which tends to a non-zero 
constant j >0ϕ ; a special case which is the simplest and allow as us to verify this convergence is 
when 1
it
x = for all t. In that case, we have: 
 







j j jt j jt j
t t
D M D I y c I y c
T T T= =
 
= − − − 
 














= −∑   therefore in this particular case, ( )1j j jϕ π π= −  
   
Then continuing checking consistency: ( )













( )( ) ( )1 1
'
' ' ' ' ' ' 'j i i
j i i i i i j i j i i i i i
D M U
D I X X X X U D U D X X X X U
T
− −
= − = −  
 
2
' ' ' '1
lim lim lim limj i i j i j i i iT T T T
xi
D M U D U D X X U
p p p p
T T T Tσ
→∞ →∞ →∞ →∞
       
= −       
      
 
 
Because X is uncorrelated with U, then ( )( )
'
lim j i iT it jt j
D M U
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( ) ( )( )1ˆlimT i i it jt j
j
p E u I y cβ β
ϕ
→∞ = + − Therefore, îβ  is inconsistent to the extent 
that ( )( ) 0it jt jE u I y c− ≠ .  
 
In order to see different possibilities, let’s assume that 0
j
β = . Under normally distributed 






= + , where xit, ut and vt are independently distributed 
and ( )~ 0,t vv N σ . So we can express: 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )uiit jt j it j jt jt j jt j jt jt j t j jt jt j
uj
E u I y c E u I x u c E u I x u c E v I x u c
σ
α ρ α α
σ
− = + − = + − + + −
 
Given the independence between errors vt and the rest of the variables, then we have 
that ( )( ) 0t j jt jt jE v I x u cα + − = and 
( )( ) ( )( ) 0uiit jt j jt j jt jt j
uj




− = + − ≠  
 
A3.2: Currency and financial dummy variables  
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A3.3: 2-SLS estimations 
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A3.3.2. Currency crises conditional to financial crisis 
(threshold=1.28 SD) 
 
We present the estimation of the Pesaran and Pick (2005) model for the EMP pf Thailand 
and Mexico. We chose these two countries because they are representative of the 1990’s crises. 
Thailand was the first country to suffer a crisis in South East Asia and Mexico in Latin 
America. As first stage we estimate with OLS the EMP for each separate equation and obtain 







Variable Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   
LIBOR 18.4755 0.3066 26.9993 0.0929
WINF 7.998055 0.7976 -54.17457 0.0565
WIPG 8.740851 0.7994 -41.72428 0.1725
OILP 2.358198 0.6255 0.257538 0.9509
OGAPMEX -3.139438 0.8495 20.91777 0.1562
GOVMEX 0.012365 0.7880 0.038721 0.3373
CAMEX 0.14303 0.7782 -0.689651 0.1288
M2MEX -35.1637 0.0038 -5.25801 0.5766
FINMEX 2.947234 0.0985 0.000471 0.9997
FINMEX(-1) -1.859297 0.3699 0.881819 0.6215
OGAPTHA 5.582366 0.7080 26.98553 0.0476
GOVTHA -0.00532 0.9020 -0.000272 0.9942
CATHA -0.003875 0.8330 0.001586 0.9207
M2THA 2.642778 0.6318 0.771733 0.8715
FINTHA 1.258857 0.4469 -1.10654 0.4411
FINTHA(-1) 0.85798 0.6146 0.240717 0.8703
 
 
Each of the fitted EMP series are renamed to denote the country they are conditional to; in 
other words, the estimated EMP for Mexico given the information of Thailand is labelled 
MEXTHAMEMP and the estimated EMP for Thailand given the information of Mexico is 
labelled MEXTHATEMP. Since the results are exactly the same for this threshold and the 1.65, 
the residuals have the same properties at this stage of the estimation.  
 
We obtained the same strength of the instruments than when having a threshold of 1.68 SD. 
 






Again, with the fitted values of the EMP we obtain new series of the non-linear variables for 
a currency crisis. In this particular case these are labelled: CURRTHAMEX which is the 
currency crisis variable of Thailand given the information of Mexico; and, CURRMEXTHA for 
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Dependent Variable: EMPMEX Dependent Variable: EMPTHA 
 Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.  
LIBOR 30.5834 0.1204 LIBOR 35.9572 0.026 
WINF -12.9083 0.7963 WINF -104.7045 0.0671 
WIPG 0.3994 0.625 WIPG -31.10766 0.2865 
OILP 1.7449 0.7301 OILP -4.794291 0.261 
OGAPMEX -4.4300 0.5881 OGAPTHA 18.06784 0.0584 
GOVMEX 0.0186 0.6565 GOVTHA 0.001132 0.9732 
CAMEX -0.0408 0.6639 CATHA 0.003789 0.7531 
M2MEX -34.5547 0.0032 M2THA 0.811858 0.8635 
FINMEX 2.9245 0.1095 FINTHA -2.008532 0.1257 
FINMEX(-1) -0.8862 0.4593 FINTHA(-1) 0.6759 0.6098 
CURRTHAMEX -0.7018 0.5997 CURRMEXTHA 1.712533 0.2118 
CURRTHAMEX(-1) 0.3253 0.5529 CURRMEXTHA(-1) -0.255454 0.8652 
R-squared 0.6083 R-squared 0.5096  




In this stage the results change because the fitted CURR series for both countries change. 
We tested again for normality and autocorrelation of the residuals at this second stage. As we 
can see, there is no evidence to reject the null hypotheses of absence of autocorrelation and 







BREUSCH-GODFREY 1.1607 0.2651 
PROBABILITY  0.3335 0.7698 
JARQUE-BERA 3.7720 1.3179 
PROBABILITY 0.1517 0.5174 
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 A3.3.3: Financial crises conditional to currency crises 
(threshold=1.65 SD) 
 
In this annex we present the estimation of the Pesaran and Pick (2005) model for the FMP 
of Thailand and Mexico. We chose these two countries because they are representative of the 
1990’s crises. Thailand was the first country to suffer a crisis in South East Asia and Mexico in 
Latin America. As first stage we estimate with OLS the FMP for each separate equation and 




FMPMEX Dependent Variable: FMPTHA 
Variable Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   
LIBOR -26.2224 0.1991 7.942162 0.5953 
WINF 43.44143 0.1324 18.39553 0.3833 
WIPG 50.21732 0.0866 24.13872 0.2587 
OILP -11.95832 0.0164 -2.049845 0.5524 
OGAPMEX 11.5895 0.5208 -37.65053 0.0103 
GOVMEX -0.014007 0.7164 -0.02353 0.4166 
CAMEX 0.845222 0.1148 1.258742 0.0038 
M2MEX 12.80559 0.4219 -29.3623 0.0207 
CURRMEX 6.904085 0.0531 0.040905 0.9871 
CURRMEX(-1) -0.730359 0.8038 -7.669816 0.0022 
OGAPTHA -4.430962 0.6844 9.967202 0.2284 
GOVTHA 0.013173 0.8585 -0.187422 0.0027 
CATHA 0.001985 0.9499 -0.077297 0.0035 
M2THA -4.015353 0.4138 10.81765 0.0071 
CURRTHA -0.866831 0.6700 3.682611 0.0234 
CURRTHA(-1) 0.761017 0.8619 12.83301 0.0008 
 
Each of the fitted FMP series are renamed to denote the country they are conditional to; in 
other words, the estimated FMP for Mexico given the information of Thailand is labelled 
MEXTHAMFMP and the estimated FMP for Thailand given the information of Mexico is 
labelled MEXTHATFMP. In this case we don’t have evidence to reject the null hypotheses of 







BREUSCH-GODFREY 3.5451 0.2534 
PROBABILITY  0.0517 0.7790 
JARQUE-BERA 0.3387 0.0013 
PROBABILITY 0.8442 0.9993 
 
Again, the instruments are strong for this first stage.  
 






With the fitted values of the FMP we obtain new series of the non-linear variables 
for a financial crisis. In this particular case these are labelled: FINTHAMEX which is 
the financial crisis variable of Thailand given the information of Mexico; and, 
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FINMEXTHA for the financial crisis variable of Mexico given the information of 
Thailand.  
 
Dependent Variable: FMPMEX Dependent Variable: FMPTHA 
 Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   
LIBOR -15.7479 0.3245 LIBOR -13.9238 0.1744 
WINF 32.2874 0.1855 WINF 33.4138 0.1407 
WIPG 45.8047 0.0761 WIPG 14.0531 0.5908 
OILP -10.4748 0.0072 OILP -5.0739 0.2324 
OGAPMEX 2.9884 0.8424 OGAPTHA 4.0292 0.5763 
GOVMEX -0.0067 0.8136 GOVTHA -0.1150 0.0750 
CAMEX 0.9964 0.0075 CATHA -0.0451 0.0809 
M2MEX 0.9479 0.9394 M2THA 6.6622 0.1173 
CURRMEX 5.3748 0.0534 CURRTHA -0.3379 0.8121 
CURRMEX(-1) -2.2764 0.3100 CURRTHA(-1) 8.9033 0.0248 
FINTHAMEX 0.6247 0.6116 FINMEXTHA 0.7878 0.5278 
FINTHAMEX(-1) 0.3569 0.7305 FINMEXTHA(-1) 0.8901 0.5419 
R-squared 0.5852  R-squared 0.4288  
Adjusted R-squared 0.3868  Adjusted R-squared 0.1556  
 
In this case, we don’t have evidence to reject the null hypotheses of no serial 







BREUSCH-GODFREY 2.3901 0.1937 
PROBABILITY  0.0789 0.8254 
JARQUE-BERA 0.5827 0.3467 
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A3.3.4: Financial crises conditional to currency crises 
(threshold=1.28 SD) 
 
In this annex we present the estimation of the Pesaran and Pick (2005) model for the FMP 
of Thailand and Mexico. We chose these two countries because they are representative of the 
1990’s crises. Thailand was the first country to suffer a crisis in South East Asia and Mexico in 
Latin America. As first stage we estimate with OLS the FMP for each separate equation and 





FMPMEX Dependent Variable: FMPTHA 
Variable Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   
LIBOR -37.5491 0.1550 16.4434 0.4585 
WINF 41.4309 0.1751 7.4970 0.7694 
WIPG 39.9765 0.2067 24.5994 0.3598 
OILP -12.4160 0.0182 -3.6014 0.3930 
OGAPMEX 25.8723 0.2151 -32.7536 0.0736 
GOVMEX -0.0135 0.7443 -0.0079 0.8249 
CAMEX 0.2872 0.5706 0.7669 0.0881 
M2MEX 28.4609 0.1908 -30.1924 0.1095 
CURRMEX 3.6596 0.1288 0.7888 0.6942 
CURRMEX(-1) 3.6014 0.2291 -4.4450 0.0895 
OGAPTHA -7.6054 0.5196 9.7103 0.3407 
GOVTHA 0.0507 0.4935 -0.1214 0.0660 
CATHA 0.0196 0.5402 -0.0558 0.0519 
M2THA -6.6523 0.2207 9.8496 0.0414 
CURRTHA -2.4104 0.2379 2.0630 0.2386 
CURRTHA(-1) -1.1114 0.8020 9.1856 0.0240 
 
 
Each of the fitted FMP series are renamed to denote the country they are conditional to; in 
other words, the estimated FMP for Mexico given the information of Thailand is labelled 
MEXTHAMFMP and the estimated FMP for Thailand given the information of Mexico is 
labelled MEXTHATFMP. Again we don’t have evidence to reject the null hypotheses of no 







BREUSCH-GODFREY 1.7122 0.7223 
PROBABILITY  0.2102 0.5000 
JARQUE-BERA 3.8352 0.7664 
PROBABILITY 0.1470 0.6817 
 
In this case the instruments are weaker but still relevant.  
 
F-statistic Value   Probability 
Equation: 
MEXTHATFMP 1.5669 0.1740 
Equation: 
MEXTHAMFMP 1.7060 0.1328 
 
With the fitted values of the FMP we obtain new series of the non-linear variables for a 
financial crisis. In this particular case these are labelled: FINTHAMEX which is the financial 
Annex to Chapter 3 
Financial and Currency Crises 
xvi
crisis variable of Thailand given the information of Mexico; and, FINMEXTHA for the 
financial crisis variable of Mexico given the information of Thailand.  
 
Dependent Variable: FMPMEX Dependent Variable: FMPTHA 
 Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   
LIBOR 3.4654 0.8666 LIBOR -16.4572 0.1864 
WINF -33.4137 0.3829 WINF 41.6921 0.2418 
WIPG 49.2814 0.0873 WIPG 23.1304 0.4319 
OILP -12.5348 0.0008 OILP -4.9568 0.2704 
OGAPMEX -2.8774 0.8673 OGAPTHA 4.7878 0.5076 
GOVMEX 0.0077 0.7993 GOVTHA -0.0936 0.1497 
CAMEX 1.1109 0.0047 CATHA -0.0383 0.1181 
M2MEX 0.6239 0.9651 M2THA 5.7079 0.1858 
CURRMEX 4.2655 0.0368 CURRTHA -0.3530 0.8072 
CURRMEX(-1) -0.2732 0.9003 CURRTHA(-1) 7.8211 0.0317 
FINTHAMEX -0.9182 0.2290 FINMEXTHA 0.1887 0.8658 
FINTHAMEX(-1) 0.8328 0.2154 FINMEXTHA(-1) 0.6621 0.4396 
R-squared 0.5728  R-squared 0.4403  
Adjusted R-squared 0.3592  Adjusted R-squared 0.1605  
 
In this case with a lower threshold we have evidence to reject the null hypothesis of 
serial correlation in Mexico at 5% significance. Regarding normality there is no 







Breusch-Godfrey 4.1628 0.3453 
Probability  0.0308 0.7122 
Jarque-Bera 3.1589 0.9835 
Probability 0.2061 0.6116 
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A4.1: Consumption behaviour 
 
A4.1.1 Unit root tests 
 
Mexico, breakpoint at 1995/02 
ADF Test Statistic -2.9040     1%   Critical Value* -2.6182 
      5%   Critical Value -1.9488 
      10% Critical Value -1.6199 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
 
Mexico, breakpoint at 1994/04 
ADF Test Statistic -3.1430     1%   Critical Value* -2.6182 
      5%   Critical Value -1.9488 
      10% Critical Value -1.6199 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
 
Korea, breakpoint at 1998/02 
ADF Test Statistic -3.3201     1%   Critical Value* -2.6132 
      5%   Critical Value -1.9480 
      10% Critical Value -1.6195 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
 
Korea, breakpoint at 1997/04 
ADF Test Statistic -2.7496     1%   Critical Value* -2.6132 
      5%   Critical Value -1.9480 
      10% Critical Value -1.6195 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
 
Malaysia, breakpoint at 1998/02 
ADF Test Statistic -3.5787     1%   Critical Value* -2.6182 
      5%   Critical Value -1.9488 
      10% Critical Value -1.6199 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
 
Malaysia, breakpoint at 1997/04 
ADF Test Statistic -2.9436     1%   Critical Value* -2.6182 
      5%   Critical Value -1.9488 
      10% Critical Value -1.6199 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
 
Philippines, breakpoint at 1998/02 
ADF Test Statistic -2.9604     1%   Critical Value* -2.6182 
      5%   Critical Value -1.9488 
      10% Critical Value -1.6199 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
 
Philippines, breakpoint at 1998/01 
ADF Test Statistic -2.8055     1%   Critical Value* -2.6168 
      5%   Critical Value -1.9486 
      10% Critical Value -1.6198 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
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Thailand, breakpoint at 1998/01 
ADF Test Statistic -2.1127     1%   Critical Value* -2.6321 
      5%   Critical Value -1.9510 
      10% Critical Value -1.6209 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
 
Thailand, breakpoint at 1997/03 
ADF Test Statistic -2.5144     1%   Critical Value* -2.6321 
      5%   Critical Value -1.9510 
      10% Critical Value -1.6209 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
 
Brazil, breakpoint at 1998/01 
ADF Test Statistic -2.6884     1%   Critical Value* -2.6395 
      5%   Critical Value -1.9521 
      10% Critical Value -1.6214 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
 
Brazil, breakpoint at 1997/04 
ADF Test Statistic -2.1767     1%   Critical Value* -2.6423 
      5%   Critical Value -1.9526 
      10% Critical Value -1.6216 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
 
A4.1.2 Results of the estimation of crises’ optimal breakpoints 
 
 
Dependent Variable: MEXICO     
Sample: 1991:1 2002:4     
Variable Coefficient Prob.   
   
C 2.3824 0.0000 
@TREND 0.0179 0.0000 
@TREND*MEX -0.0067 0.0023 
MEX -0.0997 0.0010 
   
R-squared 0.9139    
Adjusted R-squared 0.9080    
    Akaike info criterion -3.7327    
    Schwarz criterion -3.5767    
 
 
Dependent Variable: BRAZIL     
Sample(adjusted): 1994:1 2002:3     
     
Variable Coefficient Prob.   
   
C 6.717314 0 
@TREND 0.0237 0 
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@TREND*BRZ(+1) -0.019804 0 
BRZ(1) 0.22357 0 
     
R-squared 0.933165    
Adjusted R-squared 0.926697    
    Akaike info criterion -4.123968    




PHILIPPINES     
Sample(adjusted): 1991:2 2002:4     
     
Variable Coefficient Prob.   
   
C 1.110235 0 
@TREND 0.008694 0 
@TREND*PHI(-1) -0.000158 0.6314 
PHI(-1) -0.008097 0.4776 
   
R-squared 0.996605    
Adjusted R-squared 0.996368    
    Akaike info criterion -7.053249    




Dependent Variable: KOREA     
Sample: 1990:1 2002:4     
     
Variable Coefficient Prob.   
   
C 5.725206 0 
@TREND 0.022758 0 
@TREND*KOR -0.005169 0 
KOR -0.051246 0.1483 
     
R-squared 0.99282    
Adjusted R-squared 0.992371    
    Akaike info criterion -4.814998    




Dependent Variable: THAILAND     
Sample: 1993:1 2002:4     
     
Variable Coefficient Prob.   
   
C 1.562055 0 
@TREND 0.014787 0 
@TREND*THAI -0.005546 0.0005 
THAI -0.106427 0.0012 
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R-squared 0.889422    
Adjusted R-squared 0.880208    
    Akaike info criterion -4.352839    




Dependent Variable: MALAYSIA     
Sample: 1991:1 2002:4     
     
Variable Coefficient Prob.   
   
C 5.272396 0 
@TREND 0.016882 0 
@TREND*MAL -0.001869 0.179 
MAL -0.139997 0.0038 
     
R-squared 0.965199    
Adjusted R-squared 0.962826    
    Akaike info criterion -4.080844    
    Schwarz criterion -3.924911    
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A4.2: Solution for Lucas (1987)  
 
Assuming the consumption process we can verify the solution provided by Lucas 
(1987):  
 
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )












        = 1 exp 1 1
2
1
















ρ ε ρ ε






= + −  
  
 
+ − − − 
 
 
+ − − − 
 
 
Where t ε is an uncorrelated stationary stochastic process with a stationary distribution given 
by ( )( )~N 0,Varε ε  so that the expected utility of consumption in date t conditional on the 
information on date 0, can be calculated as: 
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We can calculate the discounted lifetime expected utility stream: 
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The parameter τ is the ‘compensation’ for variations in the parameters g and ( )Var ε ; 
therefore, the parameter g is the average growth rate in total consumption and ( )Var ε  as the 
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variance of the log of consumption about trend. With these parameters we can describe the real 
consumption path as being a function of ( )( ), ,tc g Varτ ε  and a utility function U that depends 
on consumption. 
 
Furthermore, we can obtain a measure of compensating variations in ct to evaluate various 
levels of g and ( )Var ε . To evaluate changes in the growth rate g, let us define τ as a function 
( )0 1,g g gτ  such that: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1 0 1 0 0, , , 0, ,gu g g g Var u g Varτ ε ε=   
 
Where u0 is the utility before the change has occurred and u1 is the utility after the change. In 
this case, ( )0 1,g g gτ  is the percentage change in consumption, uniform across all dates and 
values of the shocks, required to leave the consumer indifferent between the growth rates g1 and 
g0; in other words, is the cost of reducing consumption growth from g0 to g1.  Equating the 
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The costs of economic instability (increased variance in real consumption), can be 
measured in conceptually identical way. Let’s define the function ( )( )var Varτ ε as the 
percentage increase in consumption, uniform across all dates and values of the shocks, required 
to leave the consumer indifferent between consumption instability of ( )Var ε and a perfectly 
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smooth consumption path; in other words, is the cost of real consumption instability. As before, 
the condition to be met is: 
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A4.3: Lifetime utility stream for habit formation in preferences 
 
Consumption follows the same process as before: 






c C g Varε ε
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Where εt is an uncorrelated stationary stochastic process with a stationary distribution given 
by ( )( )~N 0,Varε ε . Taking expectations conditional on the information at date t: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )11 111 0 11 | exp 1 1 1 exp exp2
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In order to obtain the expected value we can use a second-order Taylor approximation of the 
function ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
1 1, 1 exp expt t t tf g
ρ
ε ε ε δ ε
−
+ += + −       . A second-order Taylor 
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The second-order Taylor approximation can be expressed as: 
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If we substitute the partial derivatives we obtain the function: 
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If we expand around the mean values of e0= e1 =0 then we have: 
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Now we can calculate the discounted lifetime utility stream: 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )









1 1 2 11 exp 1
1 1 2 1
1 1 2 1
1
1
1 1 2 1         exp 1





























  − 
+ − + ×  −   + −  = + + − − 
− −    + −
− + + − +    
−
+ − + ×−   + −= + − − 
− −   + −
∑
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )










1 1 2 1
1
1 11 1 2 1= exp 1
1 1 2 1 1 1





























− + + − +  
 − 
+ − + × − +  + − + − − 
− −    + − − +




A4.4: Expected value of autocorrelated errors 
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Iterating forwards from  which is known, and taking expectations at each point 
it is always true that:
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A4.5: Derivation of the lifetime expected utility stream with 
autocorrelation 
 
Given the consumption process with autocorrelation:  
 
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )















        = 1 exp 1 1 1
2
1
        = 1 exp 1 exp 1
2
t








t t t i
i
i
c C g a a v Var
C g a a v Var






ρ ε ρ ρ ε









= + + −  
  
 
+ − + − − − 
 
    
+ − − −    





( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
11 1






E |  =E 1 exp 1 exp 1 |
2









c I C g a Var a v I
C g a Var
ρρ ρ
ρρ





     
+ − − −     
     
  




And we are left to calculate the expected value: 














Calculating this expectation is a similar result to the moment generating function of a Normal 
variable say x~(µx,σx
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iSince  are independently and normally distributed and with mean 0: 
            i) there are no covariance terms; and,
            ii) the conditional expectation and conditional variance given the in
v
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formation at date 0, 
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We know that the unconditional variances of εt and εt+1 can be described as 
( ) ( ) ( )1t tVar Var Varε ε ε+= = (Verbeek, 2000) and therefore, solving for ( )Var ε , we can 
work out the following relationship: 
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We can calculate the discounted lifetime utility stream for this process: 
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Annex to Chapter 5 
 
A5.1 Two-period intertemporal maximisation 
 
The solution to this problem is straight forward:  
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If we assume a utility function of the form: 
1-  




























1 01c r cρβ= +  
 
The first step to find a solution is to substitute the consumption FOC in the budget 
restriction, by doing so we obtain the optimal consumption for both periods: 
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And substituting into the budget constraint we obtain the optimal initial consumption in 
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A5.4. Expected changes of the interest rate 
 
The first case we can consider is when the interest rates are equal r1=r2 and both 
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Consumption at date 0 does not depend on the price of the asset, therefore it does 
not change. This is not true for consumption at date 1 and 2 as we demonstrate next. 
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Another possibility is that 1 2r r≠ , we will assume that the interest rate changes at r2. 
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Finally, the other possibility is that 1 2r r≠ , and the interest rate r1 is the one that 
changes. 
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We can check if the investment strategy at date 1 is still optimal. We now maximise 
the expected utility at date 1 as:  
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H is the price up at date 2 given that H1 is at the node i and 
1i2d|H
H  is the 
price down at date 2 given that H1 is at the same node where i=u,d. The FOC with 
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the optimal solution of this problem is given 
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Hence, it is optimal to continue with the initial strategy calculated before the change 
in the interest rate. Substituting into the optimal consumption for date 1:  
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